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UNDERSTANDING THE RIGHT TO AN UNDILUTED 
VOTE 
Heather K. Gerken* 
This Article offers a new approach for conceptualizing vote dilution claims. 
Professor Gerken argues that abridgment of the right to an undiluted vote is a special 
kind of injury, one that does not fit easily within a conventional individual rights 
framework. She demonstrates that vote dilution claims require a court to examine the 
relative treatment of groups in determining whether an individual has been harmed. 
Professor Gerken terms rights that share this special characteristic "aggregate rights." 
After closely examining the unique attributes of aggregate rights, the Article uses the 
Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v. Hunt - specifically its application of a traditional 
form of strict scrutiny to a remedy for vote dilution - to explore how the differences 
between conventional individual rights and aggregate rights play out in practice. 
Professor Gerken demonstrates that a doctrinal structure built around a traditional 
conception of individual rights fails to achieve its purpose when applied in the context of 
an aggregate harm. She further explains how a doctrine like strict scrutiny can be 
tailored to fit within an aggregate rights framework. Finally, Professor Gerken examines 
the difficult normative questions raised by an aggregate rights approach. She suggests 
that although an aggregate right does notfit easily with conventional assumptions about 
individual rights, it nonetheless can properly be deemed an individual right. She notes, 
however, that to the extent that the group-based characteristics of aggregate rights seem 
inconsistent with individualist principles, there is no easy doctrinal fix for this problem 
because these characteristics stem from the nature of the underlying injury. Thus, she 
concludes that the Court's adherence to a highly individualist notion of rights in Shaw 
v. Hunt portends a serious constitutional battle. At stake will be the constitutionality of 
? 2 and other measures to redress civil rights injuries that share dilution's unique 
attributes, as well as some of the basic principles that undergird our representative 
democracy. 
INTRODUCTION 
T wo distinct approaches to equal protection are on a collision 
course: the highly individualistic view of rights developed by the 
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Rehnquist Court and the group-based conception of harm evident in 
many other areas of the law. At stake is not only the coherence of 
equal protection doctrine, but also the constitutionality of many civil 
rights protections, including portions of Title VII, the Fair Housing 
Act, and the Voting Rights Act. As yet there is no conceptual frame- 
work for mediating this conflict. This Article represents the first step 
toward developing one. 
The most immediate problem presented by this conflict arises in 
the context of redistricting. Every state in the country will redraw its 
district lines after the release of the 2000 Census. Litigation will be 
unavoidable and immediate. The latent tensions in equal protection 
law will inevitably emerge as vote dilution claims - which exemplify 
this special, group-based harm - are litigated. Indeed, these tensions 
have already manifested themselves in the voting context, and the Su- 
preme Court has shown itself utterly ill-equipped to deal with them. 
Vote dilution claims, which are usually raised under ? 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act,' are one of the most important weapons in the civil 
rights arsenal. Section 2 applies when whites and racial minorities 
consistently prefer different candidates at the polls. A state could take 
advantage of this type of voting pattern by drawing district lines that 
give whites a majority in a disproportionate share of districts, thus en- 
suring that minority voters are unable to elect a candidate of their 
choice. Section 2 protects minority voters from this type of injury, 
which we call "vote dilution," by requiring states to draw district lines 
that offer racial minorities a fair chance to elect their candidates of 
choice. 
Vote dilution claims implicate a special kind of injury, one that 
does not fit easily with a conventional view of individual rights. That 
is because they require a court to consider the relative treatment of 
groups in determining whether an individual has been harmed. Al- 
though a handful of courts and commentators have noted the group- 
related aspects of dilution claims,2 there is not yet a fully developed 
theory for describing and understanding this unique constitutional and 
statutory injury. 
This Article therefore offers a new conceptual framework for un- 
derstanding what makes dilution claims special and for adapting tradi- 
tional doctrinal structures to such claims. It does so by identifying and 
closely analyzing the special nature of the injury in question. What 
1 42 U.S.C. ? I973 (I994 & Supp. II i996). Vote dilution claims may also be raised as consti- 
tutional claims. Plaintiffs rarely litigate this type of claim because it requires proof of invidious 
intent as well as of discriminatory effect. See infra pp. i673-74. This Article focuses primarily on 
statutory dilution claims, and references to dilution claims are to the statutory right unless other- 
wise noted. 
2 See sources cited infra note 46. 
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makes dilution claims unusual is that the individual injury at issue 
cannot be proved without reference to the status of the group as a 
whole; no individual can assert that her vote has been diluted unless 
she can prove that other members of her group have been distributed 
unfairly within the districting scheme. Because all of these features 
stem from the unique injury underlying dilution claims - in which 
individual injury arises from the aggregate treatment of group mem- 
bers - I call rights that share these characteristics "aggregate rights." 
Although many rights - including many civil rights - share dilu- 
tion's unique attributes and thus fit within this conceptual framework, 
this Article centers on the right to an undiluted vote. This focus al- 
lows for an in-depth exploration of the doctrinal and normative impli- 
cations of the framework proposed here while addressing a particularly 
urgent problem. 
The special nature of the dilution injury has received inadequate 
attention from courts and commentators, and little effort has been 
made to develop a framework for understanding ? 2 claims that takes 
their unusual nature into account. During the last few years, the ab- 
sence of such a framework has taken on special importance. The 
group-based conception of individual injury found in vote dilution 
claims has coexisted uneasily with the increasingly individualistic, an- 
tiessentialist vision of rights expressed in the Supreme Court's recent 
equal protection cases. But these competing visions of racial harm 
have finally come into direct contact as bizarrely shaped majority- 
minority districts,3 drawn to avoid the dilution of minorities' votes, 
have been challenged as racial gerrymanders under Shaw v. Reno 
("Shaw I").4 Shaw v. Hunt ("Shaw II")5 presented the Court with the 
clearest evidence to date of the poor fit between these two visions. 
There the Court had to decide how to apply strict scrutiny - an ana- 
lytic approach that has been built around a conventional view of indi- 
vidual rights - to a district designed to remedy vote dilution, an ag- 
gregate harm. 
The Court's answer is quite revealing. It evaluated the constitu- 
tionality of a dilution remedy by applying strict scrutiny in the form 
3 By majority-minority district, I mean a district in which the minority population is large 
enough for its members to exercise electoral control by voting cohesively. In some instances, there 
may be sufficient white cross-over voting for members of a racial minority group to exert such 
control even if they constitute less than fifty percent of the district's voters. See generally Allan J. 
Lichtman & J. Gerald Hebert, A General Theory of Vote Dilution, 6 LA RAZA L.J. I (I993) (dis- 
cussing these issues); Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Ap- 
proach to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, I49 U. PA. L. REV. I, 79-80 (2000) (same). 
4 509 U.S. 630 (I993). 
5 517 U.S. 899 (I996). In the interest of full disclosure, I should note that I was a law clerk to 
Justice David H. Souter during the Term that Shaw II was decided. It should go without saying 
that all views expressed here are my own and are based solely on the text of that opinion. 
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typically employed in conventional individual rights cases. And it ex- 
pressly premised its decision to do so on the view that treating dilution 
claims differently from conventional individual rights claims would 
suggest that "the coordinate right to an undiluted vote (to cast a ballot 
equal among voters) belongs to the minority as a group and not to its 
individual members. It does not."6 In short, the Court ruled that dilu- 
tion claims must be treated like claims implicating conventional indi- 
vidual rights. 
That notion, however, is impossible to reconcile with the special na- 
ture of the injury we call vote dilution. If the right to an undiluted 
vote exists at all, it has to be an aggregate right. Disregarding this 
fact, as the Court did in Shaw II, results only in doctrinal incoherence, 
something the courts can ill afford with the post-2000 Census round of 
redistricting fast approaching. Moreover, ignoring the differences be- 
tween conventional individual rights and aggregate rights in Shaw II 
did not make them go away; the Court merely postponed the day 
when it must squarely address this conflict. 
This Article analyzes not only what the Court did in Shaw II, but 
also a far more interesting question: why did the Court choose this 
path? It concludes that the Court's insistence on treating the right to 
an undiluted vote like a conventional individual right stemmed from 
one of two problems. The Court may simply have been unable to con- 
ceptualize this conflict (and thus its resolution) because the courts have 
not yet developed a framework for understanding dilution claims. If 
this is the case, the new framework proposed here may prove useful 
because it provides a roadmap for identifying the doctrinal adjust- 
ments that must be made to accommodate an aggregate harm like vote 
dilution. The example I offer here is strict scrutiny, although virtually 
every aspect of dilution doctrine - class certification, standing, etc. 
can be analyzed using an aggregate rights approach. 
Alternatively, the Court may in fact have properly conceptualized 
the dilution injury and recognized that ? 2's constitutionality repre- 
sents a more difficult normative question than the Court's easy dis- 
missal of "group rights" would suggest. The framework proposed here 
also offers significant assistance in assessing this question. To begin 
with, it confirms the Court's intuition that there is something different 
about aggregate harms, something that cannot be squared with the 
Court's conventional conception of an individual right. As the last 
6 Shaw II, 5I7 U.S. at 9I7 (emphasis added). It is difficult to gauge the long-term implica- 
tions of the Court's pronouncements in Shaw II because of divisions within the Shaw majority. 
See infra pp. i692-93. Moreover, the Court's approach in Shaw II is certainly not the only way 
to deal with this unique intersection of individual rights and group identity; indeed, it may be one 
of the most formalistic and least defensible. Shaw II is nonetheless extremely useful for analyzing 
the differences between conventional individual rights and aggregate rights. 
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part of this Article explores in depth, although an aggregate harm can 
properly be understood as an individual harm, there are significant 
tensions between the aggregative aspects of a dilution claim and the 
features of a conventional individual right. In the eyes of the Court, 
these differences might raise a number of normative concerns, all of 
which result from its equation of group rights with the problem of es- 
sentialization: Does the right to an undiluted vote belong to individu- 
als or groups? Does dilution really injure individuals, or does the 
harm fall solely on the group as a whole? Does recognition of this type 
of right require the courts to make assumptions about the substantive 
preferences of individuals based on their group membership? Do dilu- 
tion claims violate the antidiscrimination principle? While one can 
make a strong argument that aggregate rights fully comport with indi- 
vidualist principles, the nature of the harm certainly complicates the 
matter. 
The framework proposed here tells us something else about this 
normative debate. Regardless of how one answers the questions 
above, an aggregate rights approach reveals that these group-like 
qualities cannot be eliminated with an easy doctrinal fix because they 
go to the essence of the injury itself. Thus, the fate of dilution claims 
rises or falls with the courts' willingness to recognize aggregate harms 
in the context of race. 
Finally, this framework reveals what will be at stake when the 
Court is forced to address the question it ducked in Shaw II: whether 
the group-based conception of individual harm embodied in dilution 
claims can coexist with the Court's own highly individualistic, anti- 
essentialist approach. Indeed, the framework proposed here suggests 
that the Court's ultimate decision could cast doubt on the constitu- 
tionality of ? 2 and similar civil rights protections.7 As the final part 
of this Article mentions but leaves for another day, the Court's resolu- 
tion of this question may even call into question some of the basic 
principles that undergird our system of representative democracy. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins to build a concep- 
tual framework for understanding aggregate harms like vote dilution. 
That framework is rooted in the features that distinguish vote dilution 
claims from claims based on conventional individual rights. Part I 
identifies these three features: although the harm is an individual one, 
fairness is measured in group terms; an individual's right rises and 
7 An aggregate rights framework also raises interesting questions about the continuing viabil- 
ity of dilution claims raised under the United States Constitution. See infra pp. 1736-37. 
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falls with the treatment of the group; and the right is unindividuated 
among members of the group. 
The next two Parts of the Article use the Supreme Court's decision 
in Shaw II to illustrate how the differences between an aggregate right 
and a conventional individual right play out in practice. Shaw II is 
employed here not as a foil for attacking the Shaw doctrine - indeed, 
for these purposes I accept Shaw doctrine on its own terms - but as a 
means for illuminating the nature of vote dilution and other analogous 
racial harms. It thus serves as a starting point for furthering the main 
objective of this Article: fleshing out a theory for conceptualizing the 
special category of rights that take groups into account in defining in- 
dividual injury. 
Shaw II is particularly useful in this regard because the Court had 
to decide how to apply strict scrutiny - usually used to evaluate 
remedies for conventional individual harms - to districts designed to 
remedy dilution, an aggregate harm. Part II discusses the develop- 
ment of the Shaw doctrine and the question presented in Shaw II. 
Part III demonstrates that the conventional strict scrutiny framework 
the Court chose to apply in Shaw II fails to achieve its underlying 
purpose when applied to a remedy for an aggregate harm. Indeed, it 
led the Court to look to the wrong facts in applying strict scrutiny, and 
it increased the risk that the Court would ignore the right ones. This 
Part also demonstrates that a different choice was available to the 
Court - it could have tailored strict scrutiny to the unique nature of 
dilution remedies. 
While Parts II and III examine the thorny doctrinal questions at is- 
sue here, Part IV deals with the difficult normative one. It places vote 
dilution claims within the context of a larger debate about individual- 
ist principles and group-related claims. It argues that the Supreme 
Court's rejection of the aggregate harm at stake here arises largely 
from concerns about essentialism. For the Court, a "group right" is 
one that requires a court to indulge in assumptions about individuals 
based on their group membership. This Part concludes that Shaw II 
portends a constitutional battle looming in the Court's future, a battle 
whose resolution will hold serious consequences for voting rights law 
and other civil rights protections. Finally, Part IV briefly identifies 
questions that warrant further exploration, including whether the 
Court's current approach could call into question some of the under- 
lying principles of representative democracy itself. 
I. DILUTION AS AN AGGREGATE HARM 
This Part sketches a conceptual framework for understanding the 
unique harm in dilution cases. Section L.A describes the development 
of dilution doctrine and the theory behind it. Section I.B identifies the 
three main characteristics of dilution claims that differ from conven- 
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tional individual rights. Section I.C then considers whether, and to 
what extent, current dilution doctrine reflects these three unique fea- 
tures. 
A. A Brief Introduction to Vote Dilution Claims 
I. The Development of Dilution Doctrine. - Vote dilution doctrine 
has largely been developed by the courts over time. The statutory ba- 
sis for the claim, ? 2 of the Voting Rights Act, simply provides that 
"[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, prac- 
tice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political 
subdivision in a manner that results in a denial or abridgment of the 
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or 
color."8 Initially, ? 2 and its constitutional counterpart, the Fifteenth 
Amendment,9 were invoked merely to protect an individual's ability to 
cast her ballot on election day. These protections have been termed 
the "first generation" of voting rights; they concerned direct, formal 
limitations (poll taxes, literacy tests, and the like) on the ability of mi- 
norities to register and cast a ballot.10 First-generation suits largely 
sought to vindicate classic examples of individual rights - individual 
citizens casting individual ballots.11 
Vote dilution claims are commonly understood as part of the "sec- 
ond generation" of voting rights law developed by the courts.12 
Broadly understood, dilution claims are designed to ensure that mem- 
bers of a racial group have a fair opportunity to participate in the elec- 
toral process.'3 These claims typically arise when whites and racial 
minorities consistently prefer different candidates at the polls - that 
is, when voting is "racially polarized." Even in circumstances in which 
8 42 U.S.C. ? I973(a) (I994). 
9 For many years, ? 2 was thought merely to mirror the requirements of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, and plaintiffs typically brought dilution claims under both the Voting Rights Act 
and the Constitution. See Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The 
Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, go MICH. L. REV. i833, I84i n.38 (1992). See 
generally Emma C. Jordan, Taking Voting Rights Seriously: Rediscovering the Fifteenth Amend- 
ment, 64 NEB. L. REV. 389 (i985) (reviewing the history of the Fifteenth Amendment). For sim- 
plicity's sake, I will treat ? 2 as if it were the sole source of the right to an undiluted vote unless 
otherwise noted. 
10 Issacharoff, supra note 9, at i838-39; Samuel Issacharoff, Supreme Court Destabilization of 
Single-Member Districts, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 205, 2 IO. 
11 See Samuel Issacharoff, Groups and the Right to Vote, 44 EMORY L.J. 869, 883 (I995). 
12 See Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black 
Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, I093-94 (i99i); Issacharoff, supra note 9, at I839-40. 
The "third generation" of voting rights cases addresses practices that affect the ability of minority 
voters to achieve their goals after the election. See Lani Guinier, No 7ivo Seats: The Elusive Quest 
for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 14I3, 148i-82, 1494-95 (i99i) [hereinafter Guinier, No Two 
Seats] (describing the types of claims that will be brought under the third generation of voting 
rights suits). 
13 See 42 U.S.C. ? I973 (1994 & Supp. II i996). 
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all voters are able to cast their votes, a state can nonetheless take ad- 
vantage of this type of voting pattern to undermine the ability of mi- 
nority group members to affect the political process. It need only give 
whites an electoral majority in a disproportionate share of districts, 
thereby ensuring that minority voters in those districts, who consis- 
tently prefer a different set of candidates, are never able to elect a can- 
didate of choice. 
For example, a state with a population of i,ooo,ooo and an Afri- 
can-American population of 300,000 has several choices. It could 
adopt an "at-large" voting scheme, which would require that all candi- 
dates be elected by all voters, and thus ensure that the candidates pre- 
ferred by minority voters would lose by a vote of approximately 
700,000 to 300,000. It could divide the state into ten districts of 
ioo,ooo people but spread the African-American population out so that 
there are only 30,000 in each district (this is called "fracturing").14 
Here again, the candidates preferred by African-Americans would be 
outvoted by a seven to three ratio. Alternatively, the state could con- 
centrate a large number of African-American voters in one or two dis- 
tricts (for example, two districts with ioo,ooo African-Americans in 
them), thereby reducing the opportunity for African-Americans to ex- 
ercise significant electoral control in any other district (this is called 
"packing"). 15 Finally, the state could create ten districts but ensure 
that at least three of those districts contain at least 50,000 African- 
Americans, thus making it possible for their candidates of choice to 
prevail in at least three districts, consistent with their overall share of 
the population. When the state's choice unfairly disadvantages mi- 
nority voters, we say their vote has been "diluted" because they would 
have had more voting power were the districting scheme drawn differ- 
ently. 
Vote dilution doctrine developed in reaction to states' use of at- 
large districting schemes, in which more than one representative is 
elected from a single district (for instance, where all candidates are 
elected in statewide races, as in the first example described above).16 
14 See Johnson v. De Grandy, 5I2 U.S. 997, IOI5 (I994); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 
n.ii (i986). Democrat-dominated legislatures are most likely to employ this type of practice; be- 
cause minority voters generally vote heavily Democratic, Democrats have an incentive to divide 
these voters among several districts to augment Democratic voting strength in each district. 
BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE i69 (i984). 
15 See De Grandy, 5I2 U.S. at I015; Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46 n.iI. GOP-dominated legislatures 
are most likely to pack minority voters because this practice usually results in the packing of 
Democratic votes, thereby augmenting Republican strength. CAIN, supra note I4, at I70-7I. 
16 Unsurprisingly, some of these districts were originally adopted to deprive recently freed 
slaves of political power. See J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY 
VOTING RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION i6 (i999); Rich- 
ard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: 
Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 487 (I993). 
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Under a winner-take-all voting system, this districting scheme virtually 
guarantees that even a sizeable minority group will always be outvoted 
by whites in any state where voting is racially polarized.17 
The Court's eventual solution to this problem was to invalidate at- 
large districts as "diluting" minority votes and to replace them with a 
single-member districting plan that gave minority voters a majority in 
one or more districts.18 The prerequisites for establishing a vote dilu- 
tion claim were less than clear,19 perhaps resulting, as Professor Issa- 
charoff notes, from the Court's uneasiness in dealing with a right that 
was difficult to fit within a classic individual rights framework.20 
Throughout this early period, the Court used a vague, multifactor 
analysis to assess whether minorities' votes had been diluted.21 
The law was clarified due to a series of events triggered by the 
Court's i980 ruling in Mobile v. Bolden22 that ? 2 and dilution claims 
17 See, e.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 143-44 (I97I). 
18 See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973) (affirming the invalidation of multi- 
member districts). 
19 See Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, io6 
YALE L.J. 2505, 2520 (I997). 
20 See Issacharoff, supra note 9, at i840-4I. 
21 See, e.g., White, 412 U.S. at 765-70; Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d i297 (5th Cir. i973), 
aff'd sub nom. E. Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (i976) (per curiam). Although 
Zimmer was a circuit court decision, it was considered a paradigmatic example of the Supreme 
Court's approach to dilution claims at the time. See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 23 (1982). The Senate 
report accompanying the I 982 amendments summarized the criteria used by the courts. Id. at 29 
n. I I 3. They include: 
the history of voting-related discrimination in the State or political subdivision; the ex- 
tent to which voting in the elections of the State or political subdivision is racially po- 
larized; the extent to which the State or political subdivision has used voting practices or 
procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority 
group, such as unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, and prohi- 
bitions against bullet voting; the exclusion of members of the minority group from can- 
didate slating processes; the extent to which minority group members bear the effects of 
past discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinder 
their ability to participate effectively in the political process; the use of overt or subtle 
racial appeals in political campaigns; and the extent to which members of the minority 
group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. 
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44-45 (i986). 
While a number of commentators have criticized the multifactor test, see T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context: The Continuing Significance of Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 325, 357 n.120 (I992) (describing several academics' criticisms), some recent scholarship has 
come to its defense. Professor Aleinikoff, for example, has suggested that the multifactored ap- 
proach helps a court determine whether the election process has been "tainted" by racism. Id. at 
359-60. Professors Abrams and Karlan have used the test as a counterpoint to their criticisms of 
the formulaic approach of current dilution doctrine, which they argue focuses too heavily on elec- 
toral outcomes at the expense of other aspects of political participation and representation. See 
Kathryn Abrams, Raising Politics up: Minority Political Participation and Section 2 of the Vot- 
ing Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449, 455-57 (I988); Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: 
The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. I73, 175, i86-88, I98 (I989). 
22 446 U.S. 55 (I980). 
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raised under the Constitution require proof of invidious intent, not just 
harmful effects.23 That decision prompted Congress to amend ? 2 in 
I982 to clarify that vote dilution claims are governed by an effects- 
based standard.24 The distinction between the constitutional claim, 
which requires proof of intent, and the statutory claim, which de- 
mands only proof of discriminatory results, will be quite important 
when the constitutionality of ? 2 is challenged under City of Boerne.25 
For our purposes here, however, the i982 amendments are significant 
because they provided an opportunity for the Court to rethink and 
simplify the doctrinal framework for analyzing dilution claims raised 
under the Voting Rights Act. 
Specifically, in Thornburg v. Gingles,26 a seminal decision that has 
dramatically affected voting rights jurisprudence, the Court held that 
plaintiffs asserting a vote dilution claim under the amended ? 2 must 
at least prove that (i) the state could have drawn an additional, com- 
pact majority-minority district (the Gingles district)27 but failed to do 
SO; (2) the minority group is politically "cohesive" - that is, its mem- 
bers vote in a similar fashion; and (3) the white electorate votes as a 
bloc, thus enabling whites usually to defeat the minority group's pre- 
ferred candidates at the polls.28 Although a vote dilution claim chal- 
lenging an at-large district theoretically required some qualitative 
proof beyond the three Gingles factors,29 plaintiffs were very likely to 
persuade a court to invalidate an at-large scheme if they succeeded in 
satisfying the Gingles preconditions alone.30 Dilution cases thus be- 
came battles of the experts, who provided the necessary population 
and election data to evaluate the Gingles criteria. 
23 Id. at 62. 
24 S. REP. NO. 97-4I7, at 2, i6-34. 
25 City of Boerne v. Flores, 52I U.S. 507 (I997). For a discussion of these concerns, see infra 
pp. I736-37. 
26 478 U.S. 30 (i986). 
27 The Court has repeatedly reserved the question whether minority voters who are not nu- 
merous enough to constitute an electoral majority may bring a ? 2 claim challenging the state's 
failure to create what is called an influence district, a district in which minority voters can theo- 
retically influence the election but do not enjoy a controlling electoral majority. See Johnson v. 
De Grandy, 5I2 U.S. 997, I008-09 (I994); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. I46, I54 (I993); Growe v. 
Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 41 n-5 (I993)- 
28 Gingles, 478 U.S. at so-sI; see also De Grandy, 5I2 U.S. at Ioo6-o7; Growe, 507 U.S. at 39- 
41. 
29 See De Grandy, 5I2 U.S. at IOI3. The necessary "proof" tended to be evidence of the nine 
"Senate Factors" listed in the Senate report accompanying the I982 amendments of ? 2. S. REP. 
No. 97-4I7, at 28-29 n.I13. These factors were, in turn, largely restatements of the factors the 
Court had considered in its pre-Mobile dilution decisions. See supra note 2 I. 
30 See Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 4 F.3d II03, II35 (3d Cir. I993) 
(noting that in "only the very unusual case" will satisfaction of the Gingles preconditions not result 
in liability under ? 2). 
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Eventually, the Court applied the Gingles framework to single- 
member districting schemes. The invalidation of at-large districts still 
left room for states to undermine minority voting strength by manipu- 
lating the boundary lines of single-member districts.31 Because there 
are virtually an infinite number of ways to draw a single-member dis- 
trict,32 racially polarized voting creates an opportunity for states to en- 
sure that whites are a majority in as many districts as possible,33 either 
by "packing" or "fracturing" minority voters.34 The remedy for dilu- 
tion in a single-member districting scheme is to redraw district lines to 
create one or more additional districts in which minority voters are 
able to exercise electoral control. (For these purposes, such a district is 
termed a "remedial district" even if it is drawn prospectively to avoid a 
? 2 challenge.) 
The problem with extending Gingles in this manner is that there is 
no clear baseline for determining how many additional majority- 
minority districts a state can fairly be expected to create under ? 2.35 
In the context of a single-member districting scheme, the Gingles pre- 
conditions establish only that vote dilution is possible, depending on 
how the lines are drawn, not that any unfairness has occurred.36 
Confronted with this question in I994, the Supreme Court sketched 
out both the baseline for evaluating dilution and the limiting principle 
for cabining the state's duty to create additional majority-minority dis- 
tricts under ? 2. In Johnson v. De Grandy,37 the Court rejected the 
dilution claim of Hispanic and African-American voters because the 
challenged districting plan provided both sets of voters "rough propor- 
tionality" that is, the opportunity to exercise electoral control in a 
number of districts that roughly corresponded to their share of the 
31 See Growe, 507 U.S. at 40-4I (extending the Gingles test, which was designed to address at- 
large schemes, to single-member districting plans). 
32 Pildes & Niemi, supra note i6, at 489. 
33 See, e.g., De Grandy, 5I2 U.S. at ioi6-I7 (illustrating that a group with only forty percent 
of the voting population could control elections in up to seven of ten districts, depending on how 
the lines are drawn). 
34 See supra p. i672. 
35 This is presumably why the Court noted in De Grandy that proof of the Gingles criteria 
would likely carry more weight in a challenge to a multimember districting plan than to a single- 
member districting scheme. See De Grandy, 5I2 U.S. at IOI2-I3 & n.Io. 
36 See id. at IOI2-i6, I023-24 (upholding a redistricting plan notwithstanding the plaintiffs' 
satisfaction of the Gingles criteria); see also Jenkins v. Manning, ii6 F.3d 685, 700 (3d Cir. I997); 
NAACP v. City of Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d I002, I024 (2d Cir. I995); Rural W. Tenn. African- 
American Affairs Council, Inc. v. McWherter, 877 F. Supp. io96, I I07-09 (W.D. Tenn. I995), affd 
sub nom. Rural W. Tenn. African-American Affairs Council, Inc. v. Sundquist, 5i6 U.S. 8oi 
(I995). 
37 5I2 U.S. 997 (I994). 
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relevant population.38 Although the Court emphasized that propor- 
tionality does not provide a complete defense to a ? 2 suit, proportion- 
ality receives extraordinarily heavy weight in evaluating such claims 
and has become the preeminent measure of fairness in redistricting.39 
2. The Theory of Dilution. - Although dilution doctrine has con- 
cededly developed in a fairly haphazard fashion, it nevertheless may 
be justified in theoretical terms. For the purposes of this Article, I ac- 
cept dilution doctrine on its own terms. I thus do not deal with the 
powerful critiques of winner-take-all schemes, territorially based redis- 
tricting, and the American political process as a whole offered by some 
commentators,40 nor do I address the criticisms directed against dilu- 
tion doctrine's heavy focus on a group's ability to elect its preferred 
candidate at the expense of other facets of electoral participation.4' 
38 The Supreme Court has never formally decided what population should be used as the 
baseline for assessing proportionality - total population, voting-age population, or citizen voting- 
age population. See id. at ioi7 n.I4. 
It is worth emphasizing that the proportionality standard does not suggest that only Afri- 
can-Americans can represent African-Americans or that only Latinos can represent Latinos, nor 
does it guarantee a win to minority voters whether or not they show up to vote. To the contrary, 
in De Grandy the Court explicitly rejected the view that courts should look to election outcomes 
specifically, how many minority legislators are elected in a given district - in order to assess 
whether the districting scheme is "fair." See id. at 10I4 n. II. The Court was unwilling to assume 
that racial minorities can be represented only by other racial minorities, and it similarly refused to 
grant racial minorities a guaranteed right to electoral success. Id. Thus, De Grandy held that 
fairness should be measured against the potential voting power of a minority group - that is, 
whether group members are capable of electing a candidate of choice (whatever the race of that 
candidate) if they choose to do so. In the words of the Court, "the ultimate right of ? 2 is equality 
of opportunity, not a guarantee of electoral success for minority-preferred candidates of whatever 
race." Id. For these reasons, there is now a strong consensus that the proportionality standard is 
merely a functional, opportunity-based fairness standard, not an entitlement to descriptive repre- 
sentation, and thus does not raise problematic assumptions about the substantive preferences of 
minority voters. 
39 See, e.g., Barnett v. City of Chicago, I4i F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. i998) (requiring the city to 
achieve "exact proportional equality" between blacks and whites if possible); see also De Grandy, 
5I2 U.S. at ioi8-ig, I023-24. 
40 For example, Professor Guinier has argued that current dilution doctrine - which is built 
around a winner-take-all, territorially based redistricting scheme - represents an impoverished 
view of participatory democracy and guarantees the permanent submergence of minority electoral 
preferences. See Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note I2, at I437-58. She thus proposes cumulative 
voting schemes, arguing that they give a greater political voice to self-identified racial minorities 
(indeed, to any electoral minorities) and better promote democratic values. Id. at I458-93; see 
also Richard H. Pildes & Kristen A. Donoghue, Cumulative Voting in the United States, I995 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 24I (summarizing and evaluating the success of efforts to employ cumulative 
voting). Other commentators have attacked the ability of our political process even to express the 
will of the majority. See, e.g., Philip Heymann & Jody Heymann, The Fate of Public Debate in 
the United States, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 5 II (i996); Richard D. Parker, The Past of Constitu- 
tional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (i98i). 
41 See Abrams, supra note 2i, at 455-56; Karlan, supra note 2i, at I86-87, i98; Pamela S. 
Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the Voting Rights Act, 77 VA. L. 
REV. I, 29-34 (199i). These criticisms include the problem of the "third generation" voting rights 
cases, in which minority interests are thwarted despite their ability to elect their candidates of 
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Dilution doctrine rests on two assumptions about the way represen- 
tative democracy works: first, that there is more to "voting" than 
merely casting a vote, and second, that members of an electoral mi- 
nority should enjoy an equal opportunity to coalesce effectively despite 
the mandate of majority rule. Although the examples included here 
involve racial dilution claims, members of any number of groups could 
conceivably claim that their votes have been "diluted," provided that 
they find a statutory or constitutional hook for doing So.42 
(a) An Effective Vote Hinges on One's Ability To Aggregate That 
Vote with Those of Like-minded Voters. - The central premise of dilu- 
tion doctrine is that voting involves something more than casting a 
ballot on election day. As the Supreme Court concluded in Reynolds v. 
Sims:43 
There is more to the right to vote than the right to mark a piece of paper 
and drop it in a box or the right to pull a lever in a voting booth. The 
right to vote includes ... the right to have the vote counted at full value 
without dilution or discount.44 
It is this second, more elusive component of voting that dilution claims 
involve - how does a court determine whether one's vote, once cast, 
is "counted at full value"? 
One might argue that a vote is "counted at full value" as long as 
everyone's vote is given equal weight. The notion of dilution, how- 
ever, hinges on the assumption that like-minded voters should have a 
fair chance to coalesce - that is, that an individual's ability to aggre- 
gate her vote with others matters in a representative democracy.46 
choice. See MELISSA S. WILLIAMS, VOICE, TRUST, AND MEMORY 7, 221-27 (1998); Guinier, 
No Two Seats, supra note 12, at 1426-28. 
42 For example, the Court recognized a cause of action based on partisan gerrymandering in 
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. I09, I38-39 (I986) (plurality opinion). 
43 377 U.S. 533 (I964). 
44 Id. at 555 n.29 (quoting South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 279 (1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). 
45 See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 90I (I994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Larry 
Alexander, Still Lost in the Political Thicket (or Why I Don't Understand the Concept of Vote 
Dilution), 50 VAND. L. REV. 327, 32 7-28 (I997). 
46 See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1048-49 (I996) (Souter, J., dissenting); Bandemer, 478 
U.S. at I53 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at i67 (Powell, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part); WILLIAMS, supra note 4I, at 27; Vikram David Amar & Alan Brown- 
stein, The Hybrid Nature of Political Rights, 50 STAN. L. REV. 9I5, 9i8 (i998); Richard Briffault, 
Race and Representation After Miller v. Johnson, I995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 28-29; Bruce E. 
Cain, Perspectives on Davis v. Bandemer: Views of the Practitioner, Theorist, and Reformer, in 
POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 117, I28 (Bernard Grofman ed., i990); 
Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of the Emperor's 
Clothes, 7i TEX. L. REV. 1589, I59I (I993) [hereinafter Guinier, Emperor's Clothes]; Guinier, No 
Two Seats, supra note I2, at I42 9-31; Issacharoff, supra note ii, at 883-84; Issacharoff, supra note 
9, at i856-59; Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding in Voting 
Rights Law, iii HARV. L. REV. 2276, 2282 (I998); Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting 
Rights as an American Nationalities Policy, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 83, 84; Pamela S. Karlan & 
Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 120I, I202-03 (i996); Pildes, supra 
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The essential assumption behind the representative system we have 
developed in the United States is that individuals can collaborate to 
elect a person to speak on their behalf.47 In the oft-repeated words of 
Justice Powell, "[t]he concept of 'representation' necessarily applies to 
groups: groups of voters elect representatives, individual voters do 
not."48 A key debate in American democratic theory is how to deter- 
mine the makeup of these groups - whether by geography, economic 
interest, race, or party affiliation. None of these baselines is a neutral 
one,49 and each often serves as a proxy for the others.50 
Under the structure of our representative system, an individual has 
the best chance of influencing the political process when she acts as 
part of a cohesive voting group that can cast its weight behind one 
candidate or another.51 Vote aggregation helps an individual convey 
her needs to her representative and creates an incentive for politicians 
to pay attention to her concerns.52 In contrast to individual voters, or- 
note i9, at 2544 n.I33; Judith Reed, Sense and Nonsense: Standing in the Racial Districting 
Cases as a Window on the Supreme Court's View of the Right to Vote, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 389, 
432-40 (i999); John R. Low-Beer, Note, The Constitutional Imperative of Proportional Represen- 
tation, 94 YALE L.J. 163, i64 (i984). But see Timothy G. O'Rourke, Shaw v. Reno: The Shape of 
Things to Come, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 723, 734-35 (I995). See generally Lani Guinier, The Supreme 
Court, i993 Term-Comment: [Eiracing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, io8 HARV. L. REV. 
I09 (I994) [hereinafter Guinier, [Eiracing Democracy] (discussing the relevance of groups to de- 
mocracy). 
47 Lani Guinier terms this principle "synecdoche." See generally Lani Guinier, Racial and Po- 
litical Synecdoche: Issues of Representation (July I4, 2000) (memorandum to the Harvard Law 
School Faculty, on file with the Harvard Law School Library). I do not mean to suggest that this 
theory represents the only theory of representation available or that it was somehow predestined 
to be the dominant theory of representation we employ in the United States. I simply intend this 
paragraph to be descriptive. 
48 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at i67 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
49 See, e.g., CAIN, supra note 14, at 52-77. 
50 For example, those who assume that "geography" is simply a neutral baseline dating back to 
the Founding might be surprised that the Founders and the generations following them did not 
share that sense. Indeed, Congress eventually chose single-member districts largely because geog- 
raphy was a useful proxy for economic interests. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. 
KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE 
POLITICAL PROCESS 769-73 (i998). 
51 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Consti- 
tutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 6oi (I993); Guinier, [E]racing Democ- 
racy, supra note 46, at I25-26; Issacharoff, supra note ii, at 884; Carole J. Uhlaner, Rational 
Turnout: The Neglected Role of Groups, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 390,4I9 (I989). 
52 Some political scientists have concluded that group participation may help resolve the 
"paradox of voting" - that is, it might explain why a rational individual will cast a vote even 
though her vote is extremely unlikely to alter electoral outcomes. See, e.g., Rebecca B. Morton, 
Groups in Rational Turnout Models, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 758 (i99i); Uhlaner, supra note 5I. The 
debate on the utility of voting has largely built on Anthony Downs's seminal work, An Economic 
Theory of Democracy, in which he offers a rational account of an individual voter's decision to go 
to the polls. ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 257, 274 (I957); 
see also DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 43-6I (I995); 
John A. Ferejohn & Morris P. Fiorina, The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic Analysis, 
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ganized groups are often able to influence election outcomes - either 
by choosing to endorse one candidate over another or by increasing 
turnout for particular candidates.53 For this reason, politicians will of- 
fer groups desirable "packages of benefits" in exchange for endorse- 
ments, registration drives, and turnout efforts.54 
Redistricting practices plainly reflect the relevance of groups to a 
representational system. One of the main purposes of redistricting is 
to facilitate vote aggregation by grouping individuals together on the 
basis of shared interests. Redistricters do so to enable individuals to 
communicate their needs to their representatives55 and to help legisla- 
tors represent their districts effectively.56 
Compact districts themselves reflect an effort to group individuals 
together in this fashion. Redistricters draw compact districts based in 
part on the assumption that keeping neighborhoods together will en- 
sure a homogeneous district.57 In short, even when drawing districts 
solely along preexisting geographical boundaries, redistricters do not, 
in the words of Justice Ginsburg, "treat people as individuals" but "as- 
semble people in groups."58 
68 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 525, 526 (I974); William H. Riker & Peter C. Ordeshook, A Theory of the 
Calculus of Voting, 62 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 25 (1968). For a critique of this approach, see gener- 
ally DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A 
CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (I994). 
53 Uhlaner, supra note 5 i, at 392. Indeed, every election is inevitably followed by an analysis 
of which "group" swung the election by turning out in high numbers. See, e.g., id.; Editorial, 
Election '98: The Factors at Play in Tuesday's Elections, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, NOV. 2, 
i998, at 14A; Michael K. Frisby, Both Parties Take Stock of Jump in Black Male Turnout, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. I3, I997, at A20; Michael J. Gerson, Parties Know This Year's Voters Are Going to the 
Poles, OREGONIAN (Portland), Oct. ii, i998, at Ei; John Harwood, Left, Right, Left: Are You 
Apathetic About Fall's Election? You're Written off, WALL. ST. J., July I3, i998, at Ai. 
54 See Morton, supra note 52, at 760-6i; Uhlaner, supra note 5i, at 394. The relationship be- 
tween groups and politicians is mutually reinforcing. If a group can increase its turnout, it can 
reward politicians who move "closer" to the group's preferred policies, something an individual 
voter cannot do. Group leaders will, in turn, try "to provide their memberships with incentives to 
vote," thereby "captur[ing that] collective benefit for the group." Id. at 395-96; see also Morton, 
supra note 52, at 760. It is thus unsurprising that "voter turnout rates depend upon the expected 
benefits received from voting at a group level." Id.; see also Uhlaner, supra note 5i, at 394. 
Groups also exert significant influence over policymaking after the election. See Abrams, supra 
note 2 I, at 485 & n.209 (listing various studies). 
55 See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1049 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting); Karlan & Levinson, su- 
pra note 46, at I 204. 
56 See Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 863 (W.D. Wis. I992) (three-judge panel). 
Others have been less enthusiastic about homogeneous districts. See CAIN, supra note I4, at 63- 
65; Richard G. Niemi, The Relationship Between Votes and Seats: The Ultimate Question in Po- 
litical Gerrymandering, 33 UCLA L. REV. i85, i89 (i985). 
57 CAIN, supra note 14, at 63-65; see also Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 
760 (i964) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Guinier, Emperor's Clothes, supra note 46, at i6oi-o6; Pildes & 
Niemi, supra note i6, at 483. 
58 Miller v. Johnson, 5I5 U.S. 900, 947 (Ic995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Reed, supra 
note 46, at 410. 
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(b) Democracy Offers Opportunities for Minority Influence Despite 
the Mandate of Majority Rule. - The second fundamental assumption 
of dilution theory is that even numeric minorities should have an op- 
portunity, consistent with their voting strength, to aggregate their votes 
effectively.59 Indeed, single-member districts were historically chosen 
over at-large schemes precisely to afford electoral minorities a chance 
to affect the political process.60 
Because even single-member districting schemes are extraordinarily 
malleable, however, a group that controls an electoral majority can ef- 
fectively become what Professor Issacharoff has termed a "majority 
faction," guaranteeing itself electoral power that far exceeds its share 
of the population.61 Dilution doctrine is designed to ensure that a 
group cannot obtain an unfair share of political power by manipulat- 
ing district lines.62 
There are a variety of ways to define "fairness."63 It can be defined 
in procedural terms - that is, whether the election process offers indi- 
viduals the same opportunity as others to aggregate their votes, with- 
out regard to election outcomes. Fairness can also be defined in out- 
come-based terms - that is, whether members of a group ultimately 
"claim a just share of electoral results."64 Once we make that choice, 
we must also determine how to measure what constitutes "equal" op- 
portunity or results. We might, for example, inquire whether similar 
shares of white and minority voters are "wasted" (that is, not cast for 
election winners or unnecessary to the winner's victory).65 Addition- 
ally, we might compare the challenged scheme to a race-neutral dis- 
59 See S. REP. No. 97-4I7, at i9 (i982); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber, Democracy, Majori- 
tarianism, and Racial Equality: A Response to Professor Karlan, 50 VAND. L. REV. 347, 354 
(I997) ("Democracy ceases to be an appealing idea if it is reduced to mere majoritarianism. Ma- 
joritarianism is a system wherein 40% of the people lose ioo% of the time."). Dilution principles, 
then, implicate what Professor Michelman terms "some of the most important [questions] that will 
ever face any political community . .. because they are decisions about exactly what a fair major- 
ity vote is, or about what the notion of a fair majority vote properly means." Frank I. Michel- 
man, "Protecting the People from Themselves," or How Direct Can Democracy Be?, 45 UCLA L. 
REV. I7I7, I729 (1998). 
60 See ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN & PILDES, supra note 5o, at 769-73. 
61 Issacharoff, supra note 9, at i86i-62; see also Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note I2, at I429. 
62 See Karlan, supra note 4i, at 3. 
63 See Gary King, John Bruce & Andrew Gelman, Racial Fairness in Legislative Redistricting, 
in CLASSIFYING BY RACE 85, 89-94 (Paul E. Peterson ed., I995). Although there is consider- 
able agreement among political scientists regarding the appropriate standard for gauging partisan 
fairness (the "partisan symmetry" standard), the same cannot be said for racial fairness. Id. at 85, 
93. 
64 Issacharoff, supra note ii, at 883; see also Pildes, supra note I9, at 2524-25 (contrasting 
procedural and outcome-based definitions of fairness). 
65 Professor Guinier has devoted considerable attention to the problem of "wasted votes" un- 
der our current, territorially based system. See, e.g., Guinier, Emperor's Clothes, supra note 46, at 
i6o6. 
2001] THE RIGHT TO AN UNDILUTED VOTE i68i 
tricting scheme. We could also determine whether, if whites enjoyed 
the same share of the population as nonwhite voters, they would be 
granted a similar amount of electoral power under the existing 
scheme.66 Or we might examine each group's relative share of the 
electorate. The question is a significant one, and our answer will 
largely depend on what theory of voting and representation we prefer. 
At least for now, the courts have adopted an opportunity-based stan- 
dard that grants minority voters a share of electoral control in keeping 
with their share of the population.67 
B. Dilution as an Aggregate Harm 
Working from the description of dilution theory set out in section 
I.A, we can identify what distinguishes dilution claims from conven- 
tional individual rights.68 There are at least three differences. First, 
although the harm of dilution can be understood as an individual in- 
jury, fairness is measured in group terms. Second, the right of an indi- 
vidual to an undiluted vote rises and falls with the treatment of the 
group. Third, the right is unindividuated among members of the 
group; no group member is more or less injured than any other group 
member.69 The distinctions reflected in this taxonomy are concededly 
artificial. Each simply illustrates a different facet of the same harm. 
Taken together, they provide what amounts to a diagnostic test for 
identifying aggregate harms and serve as a basis for creating a broader 
conceptual framework to understand these harms. 
Before turning to the diagnostic test, it is worth setting out what 
this framework is and is not designed to do. As noted above, an ag- 
gregate rights framework is not designed to answer the difficult nor- 
mative questions regarding when dilution claims should be recognized 
and who should be able to bring them.70 An aggregate rights frame- 
work could apply to any dilution claim - indeed, to any other type of 
civil rights claim that shares its characteristics - no matter what 
66 This test roughly resembles the approach used by political scientists to estimate partisan 
fairness. See King, Bruce & Gelman, supra note 63, at 93. For example, if Democrats receive 
fifty-five percent of the votes and win seventy-five percent of the seats, this result would be 
deemed fair if Republicans could similarly garner fifty-five percent of the votes and win seventy- 
five percent of the seats. Professors Ackerman and Strauss have described and critiqued compa- 
rable means of assessing fairness in the context of race and gender. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Be- 
yond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 7I3, 72I (I985); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory 
Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 956-67, 97I-75 (I989). 
67 See supra note 38. 
68 Part IV analyzes the relationship between dilution claims and group rights. 
69 As I explain below in section I.B.4, these three characteristics apply equally to the definition 
of the harm in dilution cases brought under the Constitution. They may not, however, provide an 
appropriate framework for establishing the invidious intent required to prove a constitutional 
harm. See infra pp. i688-89. 
70 See supra p. i676. 
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broad principle that suit seeks to vindicate. This framework will also 
work for members of any group, however that group is defined. Thus, 
if an environmentalist or a Democrat or an ultraconservative wished 
to bring a dilution claim, this framework would tell us not whether 
that individual should be allowed to do so, but only how to analyze 
the claim should we allow it to proceed. 
I. Fairness Is Measured in Group Terms.7" - One key characteris- 
tic of an aggregate right is that whatever benchmark is chosen for 
measuring fairness, it will differ significantly from that used in a con- 
ventional individual rights framework. To understand this difference, 
it is helpful to think of voting rights claims as falling along a contin- 
uum. At one end of the continuum are what we consider classic ex- 
amples of individual rights. And as we progress along the continuum, 
groups become increasingly more important for understanding the un- 
derlying injury. At the other end of the continuum are group rights. 
Dilution claims (and other aggregate rights) fall somewhere between 
the two extremes. They are individual harms that are measured by 
reference to the treatment of a group. 
Before further describing this continuum, let me offer a brief word 
on terminology to avoid any unnecessary confusion that might stem 
from the multiple definitions that can be attached to the phrase "group 
right." For some, a right cannot fall along a continuum, as I suggest 
here. On this view, the individual/group right distinction is like a light 
switch - a right is either an individual right or a group right. Sub- 
scribers to this dichotomous view are likely thinking of the term 
"group right" differently than I employ it here. This alternative con- 
ception would define "group rights" as belonging to a group as a whole 
(for example, a tribe's right to self-determination72). Such rights can- 
not inure to an individual. When I refer to an aggregate right's 
"group-based characteristics," however, I merely refer to "group" in the 
sense of "a collection of individuals," not as an entity that exists sepa- 
rate and apart from its members. For those who adopt this dichoto- 
mous view, I should emphasize at the outset that the right to an undi- 
luted vote can properly be understood as an individual right within a 
dichotomous scheme,73 and one need not accept the view that rights 
can be enjoyed by groups as autonomous, self-defining entities to ac- 
cept an aggregate rights framework.74 
Consider just two examples of what we typically think of as "indi- 
vidual rights" if we use the continuum model described above. In the 
71 For a similar formulation, see Issacharoff, supra note i i, at 884-88. 
72 See infra note 243. 
73 See infra section IV.A.i, pp. I722-24. 
74 I am indebted to Frank Michelman for drawing my attention to this potential source of con- 
fusion. 
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first category of individual rights claims are claims that can be estab- 
lished without reference to the treatment of other group members. For 
example, imagine that a state employee refuses to register a voter ex- 
plicitly on the ground that the voter is African-American. Our ex- 
cluded registrant would not need to document the treatment of other 
African-Americans to prove that she has been treated unfairly.75 Nor 
could the state defend against the discrimination claim by pointing out 
that it had properly registered many other African-Americans. Group 
membership is relevant to this claim only to the extent that race was 
the source of the disparate treatment. 
Even in cases in which the treatment of other group members may 
provide relevant evidence to support an individual's claim of discrimi- 
nation, the claim can nonetheless be established without reference to 
the group. Consider, for example, an African-American voter who is 
denied an opportunity to cast her vote based on what appear to be 
frivolous but nonracial grounds. Evidence that other African- 
Americans were similarly excluded would certainly buttress her claim 
of unfair treatment. But such evidence is not essential for establishing 
her discrimination claim. She could, for instance, succeed by proving 
that the grounds offered for rejecting her application were pretextual 
and that the state employee who excluded her was a racist. 
Both of these examples fit within a conventional understanding of 
an individual right. In each instance, the treatment of other members 
of the plaintiff's racial group is either irrelevant or relevant, but not 
necessary, to the plaintiff's case. There is also no question about 
which individual possesses the right or who is entitled to a remedy- 
the right-holder is the person treated in a discriminatory fashion by the 
state. Indeed, even if a number of other African-Americans brought 
similar claims in a class action, at bottom the right asserted by each 
member of the class would inure only to that individual and could be 
evaluated independently of the other class members' rights.76 
It is difficult to fit dilution claims into this framework because evi- 
dence regarding the treatment of other group members is essential for 
establishing that an individual's vote has been diluted.77 A court can- 
not determine whether an individual has a "fair" opportunity to aggre- 
gate her vote with other members of her racial group without knowing 
75 See, e.g., I BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIM- 
INATION LAW 30 (3d ed. i996). 
76 See I NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS ? I.02, at I-7 to -8 (3d ed. I992). 
77 See Pildes & Niemi, supra note i6, at 493 ("[D]iminution of relative group political power 
... is the sine qua non of a vote-dilution claim."); see also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 3o, 84 
(i986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 5 i, at 634; 
Briffault, supra note 46, at 6o; cf. Issacharoff, supra note i I, at 883-84 ("[A]ny sophisticated right 
to genuinely meaningful electoral participation must be evaluated and measured as a group right, 
that of groups of voters seeking the outcomes promised to them through the electoral system."). 
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where those other group members are located within the districting 
scheme. 
For this reason, dilution cannot be established simply by examining 
the treatment of an individual voter. Such an inquiry will reveal only 
whether that person had an equal opportunity to cast a vote. It will 
not tell us whether she had an equal opportunity to aggregate her 
vote.78 
Interestingly, even an examination of the ability of all members of a 
single group to aggregate their votes does not tell us whether dilution 
has occurred. That analysis tells us only whether each member of the 
group has had a chance to elect her candidates of choice. It does not 
tell us whether each has had a fair chance to do so. No matter how 
fairness is defined, we must look to the opportunities afforded to white 
voters to make that assessment. 
In this respect, a dilution claim intuitively resembles a housing seg- 
regation claim.79 In contrast to the conventional individual injuries 
described above, the harm of segregation is generally measured by 
considering the relative positions of groups. One cannot determine 
whether a particular individual has been "segregated" without know- 
ing how other members of her race are distributed within the chal- 
lenged housing system.80 Thus, as with dilution, the relative treatment 
of groups is the baseline for measuring fairness. 
2. The Right Rises and Falls with the Treatment of the Group. - A 
second distinguishing feature of an aggregate right is that it rises and 
falls with the treatment of the group. As noted above,8' in a conven- 
tional individual rights case a claim cannot be established or disproved 
solely by reference to the defendant's treatment of other members of 
78 Dilution cannot be established, then, by examination of the treatment of individual group 
members; it requires examination of the entire districting scheme. See Karlan & Levinson, supra 
note 46, at I2IO ("[T]he relevant political unit for determining the fairness of political influence is 
an entire jurisdiction, rather than a single district."); see also Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 46, 
at 2282 ("[R]acial vote dilution necessarily requires looking at results across a set of districts 
.... ..I,\ 
79 In analogizing dilution claims to segregation claims, I simply refer to the way in which we 
understand the injury underlying both claims. An aggregate rights framework is designed to help 
us understand this special kind of injury and decide how to remedy it. But one must look to 
broader, normative theories to determine when to recognize an aggregate injury, such as dilution 
or segregation, and who should be protected from such an injury. See infra section IV.A.4, pp. 
I732-35. Because the answers to these broader, normative questions may differ for dilution 
claims and for segregation claims, I do not mean to conflate the two when comparing the injury 
that underlies them both. 
80 There may even be tensions between segregation remedies and traditional conceptions of 
individual rights that are similar to those tensions discussed in the dilution context. See, e.g., 
United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d io96 (2d Cir. i988). 
81 See supra pp. i682-83. 
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the same racial group.82 In dilution cases, in contrast, a state can de- 
feat an individual's claim by showing that it treated the rest of the 
group fairly.83 
Consider a case in which the state has created one majority- 
minority district and could theoretically create a second but has in- 
stead fractured the minority group's remaining members into two ma- 
jority-white districts, where they will be consistently outvoted by 
whites when voting is racially polarized. If we conclude that the 
group as a whole has been treated fairly, then even those individuals 
who are fractured into the majority-white districts - and are thus un- 
able to elect their candidates of choice - cannot claim that their votes 
have been diluted.84 
Conversely, if we conclude that the group has been treated unfairly, 
individual voters in both the majority-white and majority-minority 
districts could claim dilution. Even those group members capable of 
electing their candidate of choice in their own district have had their 
votes diluted. If the group members had been properly distributed, 
these individuals would have been able to aggregate their votes in such 
a way that they could have elected two candidates of choice.85 These 
voters and their chosen representatives would thus have a better 
chance of influencing the political process at the legislative level. 
One might be tempted to argue that the voters fractured into the 
two majority-white districts are injured in both examples because they 
cannot elect their candidate of choice. Such an argument would, how- 
ever, conflate two types of harms that can arise from a territorially 
based districting scheme. It might well be true that minority voters 
within the majority-minority district in our hypothetical are better rep- 
resented because their candidate of choice holds office there.86 That 
82 In this respect, dilution claims differ even from other claims that depart from our conven- 
tional view of individual rights. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 452-53 (i982) (rejecting 
the "bottom-line" defense to a disparate impact claim). 
83 Cf Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 46, at 2282-85 (emphasizing that racial vote dilution 
claims require consideration of the results in a number of districts). 
84 One might argue that we should simply divide these minority voters into two groups - 
groups that can elect their candidates of choice and groups that cannot. As an initial matter, such 
a division would not disprove the point here. Even if we decide to focus only on group members 
capable of electing a candidate of choice, no individual member of that subgroup could establish 
her claim without reference to the treatment of other members of her subgroup. I discuss the 
broader question raised by this hypothetical - whether only those capable of residing in a ma- 
jority-minority district, if one were drawn, should be deemed injured - at pp. I703-07, below. 
85 But see Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 46, at 2283-84 (asserting that group members do 
not have their votes directly diluted if they are in a district that allows their group to elect its rep- 
resentative of choice). 
86 Professor Guinier has documented the benefits that come from direct representation. E.g., 
Guinier, Emperor's Clothes, supra note 46, at i6o7-o8; see also Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 
46, at 2283-84. There is, to be sure, anecdotal evidence suggesting that minority voters across a 
state will often rely on the assistance of a minority candidate elected in a different district. Ber- 
i686 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. II4:i663 
harm, however, is distinct from a dilution injury. As the Supreme 
Court explained in De Grandy, "some dividing by district lines and 
combining within them is virtually inevitable and befalls any popula- 
tion group of substantial size."87 A dilution injury hinges on whether 
group members are arranged so that they have an equal chance to ag- 
gregate their votes, not on whether every group member is able to cast 
a winning vote. 
When lines are drawn fairly, then, a minority voter cannot claim 
that she has been placed in a majority-white district due to a racial 
skew in districting. She is there simply because any territorially based 
scheme will place some whites in majority-minority districts and racial 
minorities in majority-white districts. Thus, these voters cannot claim 
vote dilution any more than a minority group member can claim a le- 
gally cognizable injury when she is denied a job through a nondis- 
criminatory hiring process. In each instance, although someone is de- 
prived of her preference, she is not "injured" in the legal sense because 
this deprivation is not due to a racial skew in the distribution of bene- 
fits.88 
Here again, the right to an undiluted vote can be analogized to the 
right not to be segregated. In a housing segregation case, for instance, 
it does not matter whether a particular African-American is placed in 
a municipality's worst housing development if the housing system as a 
whole is fully integrated. So too, under ? 2 it does not matter whether 
some minority voters are placed in a majority-white district if group 
members are arranged fairly. Once a certain level of fairness is 
achieved - integration in the housing context or a fair arrangement of 
voters in the redistricting context - an individual cannot say that her 
placement in the overall scheme is, to quote ? 2, "a denial or abridge- 
ment of [a] right .. . on account of race."89 
nard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had Said: "When It Comes to Re- 
districting, Race Isn't Everything, It's the Only Thing"?, I4 CARDOZO L. REV. I237, I246 n.40 
(I993); Telephone Conversation with J. Gerald Hebert, General Counsel, IMPAC 2000 (June I5, 
i999). One can certainly imagine that to the extent that a representative's job is to bring local 
services back to her district, see Karlan, supra note 2i, at i8i, minority voters fragmented in ma- 
jority-white districts may have less influence over the kind and quality of services they receive 
than their counterparts in majority-minority districts. After all, representatives' first priority is 
usually attending to the needs of their electoral base. 
87 Johnson v. De Grandy, 5I2 U.S. 997, IO5 (I993). 
88 Interestingly, in Strauder v. West Virginia, IOO U.S. 303 (i879), the Court used a similar ar- 
gument to describe a defendant's right not to stand trial before a jury from which African- 
Americans were systematically excluded. It noted that the question "is not whether a colored man 
... has a right to a grand or a petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race 
or color, but it is whether ... the composition or selection of jurors by whom he is to be indicted 
or tried" can be racially skewed. Id. at 305. 
89 42 U.S.C. ? I973 (1994) (emphasis added). 
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3. The Injury Is Unindividuated Among Group Members. - Fi- 
nally, in the context of dilution we would also expect to find a different 
type of injury than that which we encounter in a classic, individual 
rights suit. In a conventional case, the right is generally individuated 
- that is, a court can readily sort those who are "injured" by the 
challenged practice from those who are unharmed. 
The injury of vote dilution, in contrast, is unindividuated; all group 
members are injured equally by dilution, and all benefit equally from a 
remedy.90 Each voter has an equal stake in the group's ability to ag- 
gregate its vote because each has the same power - one vote - to 
contribute.' And when the state has drawn a plan to remedy vote 
dilution, all minority voters benefit from that plan whether or not they 
are included within the new "remedial" majority-minority district. 
That is because once the remedial district is drawn, no one can claim 
that her inability to aggregate her vote is due to a racial skew in the 
system. For all of these reasons, group members in dilution cases are 
effectively "fungible" for liability and remedial purposes.92 
Again, segregation cases offer us a useful analogy. In housing seg- 
regation cases, housing residents are fungible for purposes of a pro- 
spective injunction. Imagine a housing program with two projects. 
The first is a rundown, poorly maintained project located in a poor, 
segregated neighborhood. It is ioo% African-American. The second is 
a new, well maintained project located in an integrated, middle-income 
neighborhood. It is ioo% white. In remedying the injury of segrega- 
tion on a prospective basis, it does not matter which African- 
Americans are moved out of the inferior project into the superior one 
to bring about integration. From a legal standpoint, those moved to 
the better housing and those left behind benefit equally from the in- 
junction - the integration achieved by the switch. That is because 
the injury at issue is not the state's frustration of particular individu- 
als' preferences, but segregation itself,93 which is the aggregate result of 
90 Dilution doctrine does not distinguish between minority voters who vote in the same man- 
ner as most other members of the group and those who do not. I reserve discussion of the norma- 
tive implications of this fact for section IV.A.3, pp. 172 7-32. 
91 This principle does, of course, have its limitations. See infra section III.D.i, pp. I7II-I3. 
92 Cf Guinier, Emperor's Clothes, supra note 46, at i608-09, i6I 2 (noting that virtual represen- 
tation "assumes that individuals are interchangeable based on some externally observed charac- 
teristics"); Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 12, at I427 n.49 (noting that virtual representation 
"assumes that the interests of blacks and whites are fungible"). 
93 Segregation tends to result from a wide range of discriminatory practices arising in many 
different programs and housing developments, including racial steering, admissions practices that 
have a disparate impact on minorities, and discriminatory site selection. Despite this fact, courts 
have refused to disaggregate the class (by requiring one representative for racial steering claims, 
one representative for site selection claims, etc.). Instead, they have defined the injury as the end 
result of these actions - segregation itself - which affects all members of the group, regardless 
of how the state has treated them or where they live. See Smith v. City of Cleveland Heights, 760 
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the state's many different types of discriminatory actions against many 
individuals.94 
4. A Brief Note on Intentional Dilution Claims. - As noted 
above, plaintiffs in voting rights cases can theoretically bring two types 
of dilution claims: those alleging discriminatory effects, brought under 
? 2, and those alleging both a discriminatory purpose and effect, which 
arise under the Constitution. For obvious reasons, plaintiffs rarely 
litigate the latter type of claim.95 Nonetheless, it is worth considering 
whether an aggregate rights framework bears any relationship to the 
constitutional claim, especially in light of the questions that may be 
raised in the future regarding the constitutionality of ? 2.96 
Despite the differences between the statutory and constitutional 
claims, an aggregate rights framework remains necessary for proving 
discriminatory effect in the constitutional context. Regardless whether 
a state's actions are intentional, one cannot determine whether the in- 
jury of dilution has in fact occurred without reference to the three cri- 
teria discussed above. 
To the extent that intent is inferred from effect,97 an aggregate 
rights framework applies equally well to the intent prong of a constitu- 
tional dilution claim. But we may need to modify the aggregate rights 
framework in cases in which the state's intentional discrimination is 
directed not at the group as a whole, but at a particular subset of mi- 
F.2d 720, 722 (6th Cir. i985) (holding that an African-American who was not racially steered was 
nevertheless injured by the practice because of the stigma arising from the exclusion of other Afri- 
can-Americans); Young v. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. I037, I042 (E.D. Tex. i985) (holding that all par- 
ticipants in a housing program are injured in the same way if all "are illegally required to live in 
racially segregated housing" and the injury - that is, the "system of segregated housing" - is the 
"result" of the housing agency's many actions); cf. Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 44I 
U.S. 9I, II4 (I979) (holding that a neighborhood whose "racial composition allegedly is being ma- 
nipulated may be so extensive in area, so heavily or even so sparsely populated, or so lacking in 
shared social and commercial intercourse that there would be no actual injury to a particular 
resident"). Contrast this with Title VII suits involving a conventional individual right. In such 
suits, a named plaintiff bringing a hiring claim generally cannot represent class members pursuing 
promotion claims. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. I47, i6i (i982). 
94 I leave aside the question of what type of reparations might be necessary to compensate all 
of those forced to live in poor, segregated housing until the court issued an injunction. I should 
also note that there is at least one key difference between housing segregation claims and dilution 
claims: segregation cases generally require a finding of prior de jure segregation by the state. 
Thus, individualized proof is necessary to show that the defendant has engaged in discriminatory 
acts. Significantly, however, individualized proof of discriminatory treatment is unnecessary for 
the victims of segregation (just as it is unnecessary for the victims of dilution). We see a similar 
approach in affirmative action cases. See Daniel R. Ortiz, Self-Defeating Identities, in RACE 
AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 37I, 372-73 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin 
eds., i998). 
95 See supra pp. i673-74. 
96 I am indebted to Richard Fallon for raising this concern. For a discussion of ? 2 'S constitu- 
tionality, see infra pp. I736-3 7. 
97 See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 6I3, 6i8 (i982). 
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nority voters.98 In such a situation, an aggregate rights framework 
would continue to provide guidance regarding the nature of the harm 
and the appropriateness of the remedy, but a court would apply it in a 
more localized fashion.99 
In sum, because an aggregate harm like dilution takes groups into 
account in defining individual harm, it differs in important ways from 
our conventional view of individual rights. The next question is 
whether the three-part diagnostic test for identifying aggregate rights 
described above helps us make sense of dilution doctrine in practice. 
C. Until Shaw II, Case Law Reflected the Aggregate 
Nature of Dilution Claims 
Although the courts have rarely acknowledged, let alone come to 
grips with, the group-related aspects of dilution claims, dilution doc- 
trine has reflected the aggregate nature of these claims to a remarkable 
extent. Indeed, while the courts lacked a fully articulated conceptual 
framework for dealing with dilution claims, until Shaw II they none- 
theless instinctively moved toward an aggregate rights approach, even 
when that approach was at odds with a conventional view of individ- 
ual rights. 
One way in which dilution doctrine has traditionally reflected the 
aggregate nature of dilution claims is that fairness has been measured 
in group terms.100 When voting is polarized, the Supreme Court has 
chosen to evaluate dilution claims against a baseline of "proportional- 
ity" - that is, whether group members have an opportunity to exercise 
electoral control in a share of districts roughly proportional to their 
share of the relevant population.1l0 
More importantly for our purposes, the Court has chosen to adopt 
a statewide or regionwide proportionality inquiry that includes the en- 
tire minority population.'02 That inquiry would be largely irrelevant if 
dilution implicated a classic individual right. After all, Gingles held 
that a dilution claim requires proof that minority voters are numerous 
enough to constitute an electoral majority in a compact, single-member 
district, and a state may certainly defend against a ? 2 claim by as- 
98 See infra pp. I709-IO. 
99 See infra pp. I709-IO. 
100 See Johnson v. De Grandy, 5I2 U.S. 997, IOOO, IOI4 (I994). Even the Justices most critical 
of ? 2 agree with this assessment. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 50I U.S. 380, 4I4 (i99i) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (noting that ? 2 "looks not merely to the equality of individual votes but also to equal- 
ity of minority blocs of votes"). 
101 See De Grandy, 5I2 U.S. at IOI2-I3. 
102 See id. at I04, I023. 
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serting that such a Gingles district could not be drawn.103 Under a 
conventional individual rights framework, it simply would not make 
sense to consider minority voters who have no chance of being in- 
cluded within the Gingles district in the proportionality calculus.104 
These voters, on their own, could not assert a ? 2 claim. They are thus 
not "injured" in the classic, individual rights sense, nor could they 
prove they would "benefit" from the remedy imposed.'05 
A second noteworthy element of pre-Shaw dilution doctrine is that 
dilution claims have depended entirely on the treatment of the group 
as a whole. In De Grandy, for example, the plaintiffs tried to establish 
liability by pointing to a number of places in the state where minority 
voters were "fractured" - that is, placed in majority-white districts 
where whites would always outvote them. The De Grandy Court, 
however, rejected fracturing as a basis for liability.'06 It held that if 
the group as a whole enjoys rough proportionality, a dilution claim will 
fail regardless of how the state treats individual group members.107 
Thus, even those who have suffered what appears to be a concrete 
"harm" - the inability to elect their candidate of choice - cannot 
claim dilution if the group as a whole is treated fairly. 
Additionally, the courts' pre-Shaw rulings on standing and class 
certification in dilution cases have similarly reflected the aggregate na- 
ture of the claim. Courts have routinely granted standing to, and certi- 
fied classes consisting of, all members of the minority group who reside 
(or have registered) within the state or locality, not merely those who 
are capable of residing within a remedial majority-minority district 
should such a district eventually be drawn.108 Such an approach to 
certification and standing makes sense only if voters who cannot be 
103 See supra p. i674. 
104 See infra section III.B. 
105 Shaw v. Hunt, 5I7 U.S. 899, 9i6-I7 (i996); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
560-6i (1992). 
106 See De Grandy, 512 U.S. at ioig-i6. 
107 Id. This is not to suggest that minority voters could not levy a ? 2 challenge premised on 
the state's use of different line-drawing standards for minority and white voters, even in the pres- 
ence of substantial proportionality. But such a challenge either would not be a dilution claim or 
would be a dilution claim of a quite different sort. See infra p. I 709. 
108 See, e.g., Brooks v. Miller, I58 F3d I230, I232 (iith Cir. i998); Concerned Citizens v. 
Hardee County Bd. of Comm'rs, 906 F.2d 524, 525 (I Ith Cir. I990); Solomon v. Liberty County, 
957 F. Supp. I522, I526 (N.D. Fla. 1997); Brooks v. State Bd. of Elections, 848 F. Supp. I548, 
I552 (S.D. Ga. I994); Williams v. Orange County, 783 F. Supp. I348, I350 (M.D. Fla. I992); Brad- 
ford County NAACP v. City of Starke, 7I2 F. Supp. I523, I526 n.2 (M.D. Fla. i989); Warren v. 
City of Tampa, 693 F. Supp. I05I, io6i (M.D. Fla. i988); Potter v. Washington County Sch. Bd., 
653 F. Supp. I2I, I22 (N.D. Fla. i986); Jordan v. Allain, 6X9 F. Supp. 98, ioi n.i (N.D. Miss. 
i985); Butts v. New York, 6I5 F. Supp. I527, I528 (S.D.N.Y. i985); Chapman v. Nicholson, 579 F. 
Supp. 1504, I5IO (N.D. Ala. i984); Major v. Teen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 328 (E.D. La. i983); Buskey 
v. Oliver, 565 F. Supp. I473, I474 n.i (M.D. Ala. i983); Bailey v. Vining, 5I4 F. Supp. 452, 453 (M.D. Ga. i98i); Brown v. Moore, 428 F. Supp. II23, II23 (S.D. Ala. I976). 
2001] THE RIGHT TO AN UNDILUTED VOTE i6oi 
placed in a remedial majority-minority district are nonetheless injured 
by the dilutive effect of the plan.109 
Judicial rulings on dilution remedies similarly suggest that the right 
is unindividuated. For example, courts have concluded that when a 
state draws a new remedial district, the injury to all minority voters- 
not just those who reside within the newly drawn district - has been 
remedied.110 In sum, far from finding that an aggregate right cannot 
be squared with an individual rights approach, courts until Shaw II 
largely adapted conventional individual rights doctrines to the unique 
harm at issue in dilution cases. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF STRICT SCRUTINY IN SHAW CASES 
In Shaw II, the Supreme Court broke with this longstanding tradi- 
tion. Having recognized a cause of action for challenging race-based 
districting, the Court was forced to confront the differences between 
its highly individualistic view of rights and the aggregative aspects of 
dilution. North Carolina, accused of a racial gerrymander, defended 
the challenged districts as an appropriate remedy to avoid a ? 2 viola- 
tion."1 As a result, the Court had to decide how to apply strict scru- 
tiny, a doctrine developed within the context of conventional individ- 
ual rights, to districts drawn to avoid dilution, an aggregate harm. 
Thus, these disparate strains of equal protection doctrine came into di- 
rect contact in Shaw II, and strict scrutiny became the framework for 
mediating the differences between them. 
Faced with this doctrinal puzzle, the Supreme Court not only ap- 
plied a self-consciously individualist approach to dilution remedies, but 
also explicitly rejected some of the basic tenets of an aggregate rights 
approach as signaling the existence of a "group" right. Shaw II thus 
provides an excellent example of how the conceptual differences be- 
tween conventional individual rights and dilution claims (described in 
Part I) actually play out in practice. Section II.A describes the devel- 
opment of the Shaw doctrine, placing it within the context of the 
Rehnquist Court's equal protection jurisprudence. Section II.B sets 
out the doctrinal problem facing the Supreme Court in Shaw II and 
describes the Court's response. 
109 See Cannon v. Durham County Bd. of Elections, No. 97-1459, I997 WL 70I399, at *I (4th 
Cir. Nov. 12, x997). But see Barnett v. City of Chicago, No. 92 C i683, 1996 WL 34432, at *4-*5 
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, i996). 
110 See De Grandy, 5I2 U.S. at IOI5-i6 (noting that packing or fragmenting some minority 
voters "does not make the result vote dilution when the minority group enjoys substantial propor- 
tionality"); Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 863 F.2d I407, I4I4 (9th Cir. i988); McGhee v. 
Granville County, 86o F.2d iio, ii8 n.9 (4th Cir. i988); Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 
I240, I244 (5th Cir. i988). 
1ll Shawv. Hunt, 5I7 U.S. 899, 9II, 9I4-i8 (i996). 
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A. Placing Shaw II in Context 
I. The Development of the Shaw Doctrine. - In Shaw I, the Su- 
preme Court first addressed the constitutionality of a bizarrely shaped 
district drawn deliberately to augment minority voting strength. 
There the Court announced that, depending on how they were drawn, 
certain majority-minority districts would be subject to challenge under 
the Equal Protection Clause.112 
The Court initially identified two components to the Shaw injury. 
First, it held that race-based districting can cause "representational" 
harms because, according to the Court, it may lead the representatives 
elected in such districts to "believe that their primary obligation is to 
represent only the members of [the minority] group, rather than their 
constituency as a whole."1'13 
Second, the Court suggested that the shape of the district itself 
could cause an injury.114 Professors Pildes and Niemi have termed this 
injury an "expressive harm" because it results from the social meaning 
of the district's shape rather than from the actions or motivations of 
the state.115 On this view, the "expressive harm" doctrine prohibits 
"value reductionism" - that is, it prevents policymakers from "trans- 
form[ing] a decision process that ought to involve multiple values 
... and reducing] it to a one-dimensional problem."'16 
The Shaw majority appears to have backed away from both expla- 
nations during the last six years. It has not, to be sure, always spoken 
with one voice due to divisions between Justice O'Connor, who exer- 
cises the controlling fifth vote, and the other four members of the 
Shaw majority - Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Ken- 
112 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648-49 (I993). As with dilution doctrine, I accept Shaw doc- 
trine on its own terms and thus set aside many of the powerful critiques and analyses of Shaw. 
See, e.g., Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 5I; Samuel Issacharoff, The Constitutional Contours 
of Race and Politics, I995 SUP. CT. REV. 45; Samuel Issacharoff, Racial Gerrymandering in a 
Complex World: A Reply to Judge Sentelle, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. I257 (i996); Samuel Issacharoff 
& Thomas C. Goldstein, Identifying the Harm in Racial Gerrymandering Claims, i MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 47 (i996); Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 46, at 2285-88; Pamela S. Karlan, All over 
the Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights Trilogy, I993 SUP. CT. REV. 245; Pamela S. Karlan, 
The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50 STAN. L. REV. 73I (i998); Pam- 
ela S. Karlan, Just Politics? Five Not So Easy Pieces of the 1995 Term, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 289, 
304-I3 (I997); Karlan, supra note 46; Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting 
Rights in the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 287 (i996); Pildes, supra note i9; Pildes & 
Niemi, supra note i6. 
113 Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 648; see also United States v. Hays, 5I5 U.S. 737, 744 (I995). But see 
DAVID T. CANON, RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND REPRESENTATION 243-64 (I999) (discussing 
study results suggesting that black members of Congress balance the distinctive needs of black 
voters and the general interests of all voters more effectively than white members of Congress). 
114 Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 648-49, 658. 
115 See Pildes & Niemi, supra note i6, at 506-i6. 
116 Id. at 500. 
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nedy, and Thomas. For want of a better phrase, I term these four Jus- 
tices the "traditionalists" because they have tried to apply the type of 
equal protection analysis that has traditionally been used in most other 
areas of equal protection law to evaluate racial gerrymandering 
claims."7 All five members of the Shaw majority appear to have 
abandoned the "representational harm" justification for the Shaw doc- 
trine. Only those opinions written by Justice O'Connor consistently 
identify Shaw as addressing "expressive" harms, however, and only her 
first such opinion garnered a majority of the Court."18 
Significantly, however, all of the recent opinions supported by the 
entire Shaw majority - those the "traditionalist" Justices have drafted 
and Justice O'Connor has joined - have avoided expositions of the 
expressive harm doctrine. These opinions have shifted the Shaw doc- 
trine to a more conventional equal protection approach focusing on the 
use of a racial classification itself.19 In so doing, they have effectively 
redefined the harm arising under Shaw.'20 Rather than concentrating 
on the message conveyed by bizarrely shaped districts, the traditional- 
ist Justices have focused on the state's "essentialization" of a voter 
through the use of a racial classification.'2' To the extent that the dis- 
117 See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 905 (i996). This term should not be read as suggesting 
that the Court's application of this approach to benign classifications or to redistricting cases is 
"traditional." To the contrary, there were many reasons to think that the Court would not take 
this route in redistricting cases. See United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 
U.S. 144 (1977). Nor should one assume that these "conservative" Justices adhere more closely to 
precedent than their predecessors or colleagues. See generally Ernest Young, Rediscovering Con- 
servatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 6i9 
('994). 
118 Compare Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 980-8I (I996) (plurality opinion) (alluding to the ex- 
pressive harm doctrine), with Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 648 (discussing expressive harms). 
119 See, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546-47 (i999) (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, 
C.J., and O'Connor, Kennedy, & Scalia, JJ.); Bush, 517 U.S. at iooo-oi (Thomas, J., concurring in 
the judgment, joined by Scalia, J.); Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 904-05, 907-08 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined 
by the rest of the Shaw majority); Miller v. Johnson, sis U.S. 900, 904-05, 9II-14 (I995) (Ken- 
nedy, J., joined by the rest of the Shaw majority). Even the most recent Shaw opinion drafted by Justice O'Connor that gained a majority vote confines itself to discussion of the "harms caused by 
racial classifications" and thus mentions only stigma and "'representational harms."' United 
States v. Hays, 5Is U.S. 737, 747 (I995) (O'Connor, J., joined by the rest of the Shaw majority). 
120 One example of this shift in focus is Miller, SI U.S. at 913, 9i6, in which Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the entire Shaw majority, rejected the notion that Shaw was limited to bizarrely 
shaped districts, choosing instead to adopt the "predominant factor" test. That standard moves 
Shaw claims toward the test used in conventional equal protection analysis, which involves de- 
termining whether race was the "motivating" factor in the state's decisionmaking process. See, 
e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-66 (i977). 
121 See, e.g., Katharine Inglis Butler, Affirmative Racial Gerrymandering: Fair Representation 
for Minorities or a Dangerous Recognition of Group Rights?, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 595, 595-96 (i995) (arguing that the injury in Shaw is the racial classification itself); O'Rourke, supra note 46, at 736 (same). But see Eisgruber, supra note 59, at 350 (arguing that Shaw cases are not really racial 
classification cases); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Ethnic Segregation by Religion and Race: Reflec- 
tions on Kiryas Joel and Shaw v. Reno, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 5 I5, 523 (i996). 
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trict's appearance is considered under this modified version of the 
Shaw doctrine, it is only as evidence of the use of a racial classification 
and not as the source of the harm.'22 
2. Shaw, Equal Protection, and Strict Scrutiny. - Once the Su- 
preme Court decided in Shaw I that certain uses of race in redistrict- 
ing would be subject to challenge under the Equal Protection Clause, 
it faced two conceptual problems. First, assuming that the Court ad- 
hered to its prior equal protection jurisprudence, it had to decide what 
would trigger "strict scrutiny" analysis. Second, if it chose to apply 
strict scrutiny to some or all majority-minority districts, it had to de- 
cide how to do so. Although only the second question concerns us 
here, it is worth placing the Court's answer to the first question in con- 
text. 
The paradigmatic case for applying strict scrutiny is one in which 
the government has adopted an explicit racial classification that disad- 
vantages racial minorities.'23 Strict scrutiny is applied in such a case 
to ensure that the government has a strong reason for doing so (that is, 
a "compelling state interest'), and that there is a sufficient nexus be- 
tween the means the state has used to achieve that end and the end it- 
self (that is, the classification must be "narrowly tailored" to achieve 
the government's purpose). There are several ways to think about this 
test. On one view, it indicates that racial classifications disadvantag- 
ing racial minorities are so problematic that we will allow the govern- 
ment to use race only in the most extraordinary circumstances - and 
even then it must proceed with caution.'24 But one could also charac- 
terize the test as a means to smoke out an illicit motive when race- 
neutral goals are offered to justify the racial classification.'25 A court 
can gauge whether the state's proffered justification actually moti- 
vated its conduct by considering whether the means employed are 
closely aligned with the ends purportedly pursued.'26 
122 See Shaw II, 5I7 U.S. at 905-o6; Miller, 5I5 U.S. at 913. I do not mean to overstate the 
significance of this doctrinal change. Given the shifting nature of the alliances formed by the Jus- 
tices and their noteworthy failure to abandon the expressive harm theory, expressive harms might 
well reemerge in future Supreme Court decisions. 
123 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword: Imple- 
menting the Constitution, iii HARV. L. REV. 54, 7I, 94-I02 (I997) (offering a taxonomy of pur- 
pose tests). For a recent effort to provide a coherent and comprehensive approach to strict scru- 
tiny, see Rubin, supra note 3. 
124 See Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (I979). 
125 See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Affirmative Action and the Public Interest, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 
I, 25-26. 
126 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (i989); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirma- 
tive Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 436 (I997); Strauss, supra note 125, at 25-26. Peter Rubin has 
offered an even more detailed taxonomy of the multiple purposes served by the twin prongs of the 
strict scrutiny inquiry. See Rubin, supra note 3, at 14. 
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As equal protection law developed, the Court eventually had to de- 
cide how to evaluate a classification that was facially race neutral but 
had a disparate racial effect and might have been motivated by a ra- 
cial purpose. The Court declined to apply strict scrutiny to a facially 
neutral classification that merely had a disparate effect. Instead, in 
Washington v. Davis127 it required proof of a racial motivation to trig- 
ger strict scrutiny.'28 
Still later in the development of this jurisprudence, the Court dealt 
with cases in which explicit racial classifications, such as affirmative 
action programs, advantaged racial minorities. In City of Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson Co.'29 and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia,130 the 
Court applied strict scrutiny to such classifications, just as it did for 
classifications that disadvantaged racial minorities.'3' Strict scrutiny 
is employed in such cases not to smoke out an illicit purpose - in 
these cases the state's purpose is usually assumed to be benign - but 
to prevent the overuse of race in two respects: first, to ensure that "in- 
nocent bystanders" (usually whites) are not unduly burdened by the 
state's use of a racial classification;132 and second, to ensure that non- 
victims (usually minorities who have not been injured by the discrimi- 
nation) do not unnecessarily benefit from the remedy proposed.133 
Both of these concerns may relate to the Court's use of strict scrutiny 
to smoke out illicit motives - the absence of fit between the state's 
justifications and its allocation of benefits and burdens may reveal the 
existence of concealed animus. '34 But these inquiries are often treated 
as independent checks on a state even when its motives are not really 
in question.135 
In many ways, Shaw represents the next logical step in the devel- 
opment of equal protection law: it involves a facially neutral classifica- 
tion (we cannot look at a district line and immediately conclude that 
127 426 U.S. 229 (976). 
128 Id. at 239-40. 
129 488 U.S. 469 (i989). 
130 5 I5 U.S. 200 (I995). 
131 Id. at 226; Croson, 488 U.S. at 493. 
132 See Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. REV. I78 I, 1788 (i996). 
133 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 506, 508; Ayres, supra note 132, at I786. 
134 See Rubenfeld, supra note I26, at 436-37. As some commentators have pointed out, how- 
ever, these limitations do not always achieve the Court's purposes. See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 
132, at 1787. 
135 Commentators have taken the Court to task for using the narrow-tailoring prong of strict 
scrutiny to conduct what some term a "cost-benefit" test. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note I26, at 
428. For an article drawing similar conclusions in the First Amendment context, see Eugene Vo- 
lokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, i44 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2417 (I996). 
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the government has employed a racial classification136) that benefits 
racial minorities.137 The fact that the challenged governmental action 
is facially neutral suggests that Shaw cases fall into the Washington v. 
Davis line of decisions. Yet it is generally quite obvious in these cases 
that the state has deliberately used a racial classification - demo- 
graphics alone will usually suffice to establish that fact - thus moving 
us toward the more conventional equal protection cases involving ex- 
plicit racial classifications, in which strict scrutiny is automatically ap- 
plied. To add a further complication, in most of these cases the state 
deliberately used race to advance a benign purpose - the augmenta- 
tion of minority voting strength.'38 
In response to this conceptual problem, the Supreme Court has 
termed these districts facially neutral classificationsl9 but has none- 
theless declined to require the particularized proof of intent needed for 
challenges that fit within the Washington v. Davis paradigm.'40 The 
state's purpose, in the Court's view, is clear from the bizarre shape of 
the district itself. For this reason, it has treated these cases as if the 
state's use of a racial classification were overt and has applied strict 
scrutiny without explicit proof of a racial purpose.'41 
B. Shaw II's Solution to the Strict Scrutiny Question 
Once the Court had resolved when to apply strict scrutiny in racial 
gerrymandering cases, it had to decide how to do so. As the briefs 
filed in the Supreme Court during the mid-iggos reflect,'42 the answer 
was not intuitively obvious. 
136 Cf Frank R. Parker, The Constitutionality of Racial Redistricting: A Critique of Shaw v. 
Reno, 3 D.C. L. REV. I, 22-25 (1995) (exploring whether majority-minority districts involve fa- 
cially neutral classifications). 
137 I am indebted to Philip Frickey and Robert Post for helping me to situate Shaw within its 
doctrinal context. 
138 Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (i999), appears to be the exception. There, the state put 
forward a political explanation for the odd shape of its district. See id. at 549. 
139 E.g., Bush v. Vera, 5I7 U.S. 952, 958 (i996). 
140 See Parker, supra note 136, at 26-34 (attacking this approach). 
141 Professor Saunders has offered a different explanation for the Court's approach. She argues 
that Shaw should be understood as a prophylactic rule, like Miranda, a characterization that 
could also explain the Court's approach to strict scrutiny in Shaw cases. See Melissa L. Saunders, 
Reconsidering Shaw: The Miranda of Race-Conscious Districting, 109 YALE L.J. 1603, I6i6-36 
(2000). 
142 See, e.g., State Appellants' Brief on the Merits at 24-25, Bush (No. 94-805), available at 
1995 WL 517594; Brief Amici Curiae of the Democratic National Committee and the Democratic 
Congressional Campaign Committee Supporting Appellants at 7-9, Bush (No. 94-805), available 
at 1995 WL 782859; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 17-19, 
Shaw v. Hunt, 5I7 U.S. 899 (i996) (No. 94-923), available at 1995 WL 702822; Brief Amicus Cu- 
riae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under 
Law in Support of Appellees at 4-7, Shaw II (No. 94-923), available at I995 WL 70282 1. 
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In Shaw II, the Court squarely addressed this question, and its de- 
cision sheds significant light on the differences between an aggregate 
right and a conventional individual right. The facts of that case were 
as follows: North Carolina had deliberately drawn a bizarrely shaped 
majority-minority district in the center of the state (District I 2). In de- 
fending against the plaintiff's racial gerrymander claim, the state ar- 
gued that it had drawn District I 2 to achieve a compelling state inter- 
est - compliance with ? 2.143 As it has in virtually every Shaw case, 
the Court assumed, arguendo, that compliance with ? 2 constitutes a 
compelling state interest justifying the creation of a majority-minority 
district. 144 Thus, the real fight concerned whether District I2 was 
"narrowly tailored" to achieve compliance with ? 2. It is here that the 
Shaw majority's highly individualistic view of the Fourteenth 
Amendment came into direct contact with the aggregate conception of 
harm - vote dilution - that had prompted the creation of District I 2. 
In resolving this doctrinal problem, the Court focused on two key 
facts. First, although whites and African-Americans consistently voted 
for different candidates in the center of the state (thus satisfying the 
second and third preconditions for proving dilution under the Gingles 
test), it was not possible to draw a compact majority-minority district 
in that area. Gingles, of course, requires evidence that the state could 
have drawn an additional, compact majority-minority district ("the 
Gingles district") but failed to do so.145 Second, it was possible to draw 
a compact majority-minority district in the southeastern part of North 
Carolina, where polarized voting also existed, but the state had chosen 
to draw its remedial district elsewhere. Thus, the Court had to decide 
whether a bizarrely shaped remedial district located in the center of 
the state, where a Gingles district could not be drawn, was an appro- 
priate remedy for dilution suffered by minority voters on the south- 
eastern side of the state, where it was possible to draw an additional, 
compact majority-minority district. 
The Court answered this question in the negative. It held that a 
remedy for vote dilution is not narrowly tailored to comply with ? 2 if 
the remedial district drawn by the state substantially departs from the 
compact Gingles district. In the words of the Court, a bizarrely 
shaped district "somewhere else in the State" does not remedy "the 
vote-dilution injuries suffered by" minority voters residing within the 
Gingles district:146 
For example, if a geographically compact, cohesive minority popula- 
tion lives in south-central to southeastern North Carolina, as the Justice 
143 Shaw II, 5I7 U.S. at 9i6-I7. 
144 Id. 
145 See supra p. i674- 
146 Shaw II, 5 I 7 U.S. at 9 I 7. 
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Department's objection letter suggested, District I 2 that spans the Pied- 
mont Crescent would not address that ? 2 violation. The black voters of 
the south-central to southeastern region would still be suffering precisely 
the same injury that they suffered before District I 2 was drawn. District 
12 would not address the professed interest of relieving vote dilution, 
much less be narrowly tailored to accomplish the goal. 
Arguing, as appellees do and the District Court did, that the State may 
draw the district anywhere derives from a misconception of the vote- 
dilution claim. To accept that the district may be placed anywhere implies 
that the claim, and hence the coordinate right to an undiluted vote (to cast 
a ballot equal among voters), belongs to the minority as a group and not to 
its individual members. It does not.147 
Shaw II's application of strict scrutiny neatly illustrates the differ- 
ences between the Rehnquist Court's highly individualistic conception 
of rights and an aggregate rights theory. The Court simply ignored the 
aggregate aspects of the dilution injury that District I 2 was designed 
to remedy and applied strict scrutiny as if the right to an undiluted 
vote were like any other conventional individual right. 
III. STRICT SCRUTINY IN SHAW II: A CASE STUDY OF THE 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AN AGGREGATE RIGHT AND A 
CONVENTIONAL INDIVIDUAL RIGHT 
Part I identified the conceptual differences between an aggregate 
right and a conventional individual right. Shaw II's application of 
strict scrutiny to North Carolina's District I2 provides a concrete ex- 
ample of how those differences play out in practice. Shaw II makes 
clear that a remedy for an aggregate harm like dilution simply cannot 
be squeezed into a conventional individual rights framework. 148 
One sign that Shaw II's traditional approach does not mesh with 
an aggregate rights framework is how difficult it is to square its pro- 
147 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Bush, 5I7 U.S. at 997-98 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (applying the narrow-tailoring test in the same fashion as the Shaw II majority). 
Several commentators have advocated a similar approach. See, e.g., Butler, supra note I2i, at 
6i6-I7; O'Rourke, supra note 46, at 757-70. Justice O'Connor joined Shaw II in its entirety. 
Moreover, in applying strict scrutiny in the opinions she has authored, Justice O'Connor has 
adopted a similar focus. See Bush, 5I7 U.S. at 979 (finding that a district failed the strict scrutiny 
test because it included minority populations that "could not possibly form part of a compact ma- 
jority-minority district'); see also id. at 994 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that a remedial 
district cannot "deviate substantially from a hypothetical court-drawn ? 2 district"). 
148 See Pildes, supra note i9, at 2544 n.I33 (arguing that the Court's "effort to recast vote dilu- 
tion litigation in terms of individual rights simply cannot be sustained analytically"); cf. Ayres, 
supra note I32, at I783 n.8 (concluding that strict scrutiny may be applied differently in different 
contexts); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. I07, I29 
(I976) (contending that an individual rights approach "either provides no framework of analysis 
[for a group right] or, even worse, provides the wrong one"); id. at I70-77 (explaining how strict 
scrutiny might differ depending on the underlying right). 
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nouncements with the doctrine that had developed in the dilution con- 
text prior to Shaw II - doctrine that had, as noted above, been 
adapted to the unique characteristics of an aggregate right. For exam- 
ple, because it is often possible to draw the Gingles district in several 
different areas of the state,'49 the Court's assertion that the right of a 
voter located inside one such district is not remedied by drawing the 
remedial district elsewhere necessarily leads to the conclusion that the 
state should draw two remedial districts - one to remedy the dilution 
of each set of minority voters. But the creation of an extra remedial 
district is precisely the result the Court condemned as a policy of 
maximization in De Grandy,'50 a ruling that was plainly premised on 
the aggregate nature of dilution claims.'5' 
Even when there is only one general area for plaintiffs to locate the 
Gingles district but many ways to draw it, the Shaw majority's ap- 
proach to strict scrutiny runs into another doctrinal hurdle: the Court's 
longstanding view that the state retains broad remedial power to 
choose where and how to draw the remedial district.'52 Were the 
Court correct that any voter within the Gingles district is injured and 
that the creation of a district elsewhere does not remedy that injury, 
then the state could not draw a remedial plan that departs from the 
map offered by the plaintiffs as a precondition for establishing liability. 
The state would therefore have no discretion in drawing the remedial 
district. Interestingly, the Court recognized this tension in Shaw II. 
The Court indicated in a footnote that its statements did not confer on 
plaintiffs "the right to be placed in a majority-minority district once a 
violation of the statute is shown" because statests retain broad discre- 
tion in drawing districts to comply with the mandate of ? 2. This 
obiter dictum, however, does not resolve the tension between Shaw 
II's pronouncements and the doctrine emerging from courts' prior ef- 
forts to accommodate the unique nature of dilution claims.'54 
149 See Grofman, supra note 86, at I260. This possibility may even have been true in Shaw II. 
See Shaw II, 5I7 U.S. at 935-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
150 See Johnson v. De Grandy, 5I2 U.S. 997, ioi6-17 (I994); see also Miller v. Johnson, 5I5 
U.S. 900, 9I7 (I995). "Maximization" is the Court's term for the policy of creating as many ma- 
jority-minority districts as possible, rather than the number the Court views as "fair." 
151 See supra p. i690. 
152 See Lawyer v. Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 575-76 (I997); Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 
535, 540 (I978); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795 (I973). 
153 Shaw II, 5I7 U.S. at 917 n.9; accord id. at 947 (Stevens; J., dissenting); see also McGhee v. 
Granville County, 86o F.2d I1o, ii8 n.9 (4th Cir. 1988); Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 
1240, I244 (5th Cir. i988). 
154 The importance of this doctrinal shift will not become clear until the Shaw majority stabi- 
lizes. For example, the invalidation of the district challenged in Shaw II need not have hinged on 
a conventional approach to strict scrutiny, and the shifting nature of the Court's majority might 
lead it to adopt different approaches in the future. 
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The problem with Shaw II's analysis runs much deeper than su- 
perficial doctrinal conflicts, however. By applying the same form of 
strict scrutiny used for conventional individual rights, the Court neces- 
sarily endorsed a conception of dilution that fails to capture what 
makes that injury unique. That conceptual mistake, in turn, has had 
practical consequences. Indeed, the Court's choice has led it to focus 
on the wrong facts when evaluating Shaw claims and to ignore the 
right ones, thus frustrating the basic purposes of strict scrutiny. 
The Court's application of strict scrutiny in Shaw II hinged on two 
assumptions: first, it is possible to evaluate the constitutionality of a 
dilution remedy simply by looking at the shape of a single district; and 
second, it is possible to distinguish minority voters unharmed by dilu- 
tion from those who are actually injured. Sections IIl.A, Ill.B, and 
III.C analyze these assumptions in depth and explain why they cannot 
be reconciled with an aggregate rights approach. Section III.D pro- 
poses an alternative approach to strict scrutiny, one that is tailored to 
the unique attributes of dilution claims. 
A. The Court's Focus on a Single District in 
Evaluating a Dilution Remedy 
The Court's focus on a single district when applying strict scrutiny 
in Shaw II illustrates one way in which the Court's traditional ap- 
proach does not fit within an aggregate rights framework. In Shaw II 
the Court examined a single district, District I2, in evaluating the con- 
stitutionality of North Carolina's remedial plan. The Court concluded 
that it needed to look no further because the bizarre shape and loca- 
tion of the remedial district demonstrated undue reliance on a racial 
classification.155 
Inferring a violation of strict scrutiny solely from the shape and lo- 
cation of a single district would make sense if the state were trying to 
remedy the violation of a conventional individual right. But remedies 
for aggregate harms cannot be analyzed seriatim or in isolation.156 In 
this case, for example, examination of a single district tells us only that 
the state created at least one majority-minority district. But as long as 
? 2 demands at least one majority-minority district, that is precisely 
what the state was supposed to do. 
155 To be fair to the Court, this argument probably exaggerates its position. At least in Miller, 
in which the Court struck down a remedy for retrogression on the ground that the state had cre- 
ated more majority-minority districts than necessary to remedy the harm, the Court looked at the 
entire districting scheme to evaluate the remedy. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 920-2i, 923-24. But in 
every other Shaw case, the Court has done precisely what it did in Shaw II: assumed that a single 
district could provide all the evidence necessary to determine whether the state's remedial plan 
was narrowly tailored. 
156 See Guinier, supra note 47, at 4-5 (identifying this approch as a clear departure from prior 
dilution doctrine). 
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Indeed, a single district tells us little more about a dilution remedy 
than it tells us about whether dilution has occurred in the first place. 
As noted above, if we examine only the position of group members in 
a single district, all we can determine is whether those particular group 
members can elect their candidates of choice under the state's remedial 
plan. But we do not know whether they have a fair chance to do so. 
To make that assessment, as detailed in Part I, we must look at the 
opportunities afforded to all members of the minority group relative to 
those afforded to whites - a task that requires an examination of the 
entire districting scheme. 
This principle applies equally to a dilution remedy. A single dis- 
trict cannot answer the questions strict scrutiny is designed to resolve. 
First, did the state go too far in drawing a remedy (for example, did it 
create two districts when only one was necessary)? Second, did the 
state go far enough (for example, did it create two districts when three 
were required)? 
One might argue in response that this conclusion simply misses the 
point of strict scrutiny. At least one purpose of strict scrutiny is to en- 
sure that the state does not overuse race in drawing a remedy. And 
what better proof is there to establish that the state has excessively re- 
lied on race than the shape of the remedial district? That is, one could 
argue that a compact majority-minority district indicates that the state 
has used race much less than does a bizarrely shaped district with pre- 
cisely drawn lines that trace the racial boundaries of every census 
block. Such an analysis is presumably the impetus for Justice Ken- 
nedy's conclusion that a bizarrely shaped district suggests that the 
state has engaged in what he terms "gratuitous race-based district- 
ing."157 If it is true that a bizarrely shaped district reveals an excessive 
use of race, then district shape should tell us all we need to know un- 
der the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny analysis. 
Although this argument has intuitive appeal, Justice Kennedy's as- 
sumption that "gratuitous race-based districting" is tied to the shape 
and location of the district cannot be sustained when viewed through 
the lens of an aggregate rights framework.'58 An aggregate rights ap- 
proach lets us examine the trade-offs involved in redistricting and uses 
the entire scheme, not just an isolated district, to assess the state's use 
of race. 
In this respect, an aggregate rights framework reflects one of the 
essential truths about districting: everything is related. When one 
157 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 999 (i996) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
158 See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, You Don't Have To Be Liberal To Hate the Racial Gerryman- 
dering Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 779, 799-800 (i998) (critiquing Justice Kennedy's approach on 
similar grounds). 
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voter is moved into a district, another is moved out.159 Focusing on a 
particular set of voters or a particular district does not tell us the 
whole story. For this reason Professor Pildes has criticized the Court's 
focus on a particular district's boundaries when analyzing Shaw 
cases,160 a problem analogous to the one identified here. 
To put this aphorism in more concrete terms, a state remedying 
dilution must draw a plan that contains a sufficient number of major- 
ity-minority districts. To achieve that goal, a state must classify a cer- 
tain number of voters. But it certainly does not classify fewer voters 
when drawing a compact majority-minority district than it does when 
creating a misshapen one. To the contrary, it draws both in precisely 
the same way.161 After selecting the type of geographic "building 
block"162 it will use to draw its maps from a computer-based district- 
ing program, the state (acting through its redistricter) locates the core 
of the district and continues to add building blocks until it reaches its 
goal - here, an appropriately sized district of an appropriate racial 
makeup. Every time the state adds or subtracts a building block, it 
must consider the effect of that change on the population ratio (a fact 
that will usually appear on the redistricter's computer screen). Other- 
wise, the state risks liability under ? 2, either for failing to create a dis- 
trict with enough minority voters to constitute an electoral majority or 
for including so many that the state will be accused of packing those 
voters and diluting their voting strength. Thus, no matter what the 
shape of the district it draws, the state must use a racial classification 
to include or exclude voters until it obtains the right ratio of minority 
to nonminority voters.163 And whenever the state departs from a 
compact district to accommodate a race-neutral request, it must add a 
predominantly minority neighborhood elsewhere to offset this popula- 
tion change (and probably draw a bizarrely shaped district to do so). 
For purposes of narrow tailoring, then, shape is irrelevant for deter- 
mining whether the state has overused a racial classification.164 
159 Cf Issacharoff & Goldstein, supra note II2, at 64 ("I]n districting, a decision to include one 
kind of person is fundamentally also a decision to exclude other kinds of people."). 
160 Pildes, supra note i9, at 2545-47. 
161 Lowenstein, supra note I58, at 822. 
162 States often identify what type of building block they will use as one of their districting cri- 
teria. See, e.g., NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING LAW 2000, 
at I58 (i999) (defining Kansas's building block); id. at I46-89 (providing a state-by-state analysis 
of districting requirements); see also DAVID BUTLER & BRUCE CAIN, CONGRESSIONAL 
REDISTRICTING: COMPARATIVE AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 42-64 (I992). 
163 Cf Pildes & Niemi, supra note i6, at 5o6 (concluding that a bizarrely shaped district "does 
not involve a more invidious use of race than" a compact one). 
164 It is odd that any of the traditionalist Justices has latched onto shape as a sign that race has 
been "overused." The best justification for their decision to extend Shaw to compact majority- 
minority districts is the fact that the same number of voters are classified on the basis of race in 
creating compact and noncompact districts, so that either can reflect an overuse of race. See 
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B. The Court's Effort To Separate Voters "Injured" by 
Dilution from Voters Who Are Unharmed 
The second key to the Court's approach in Shaw II is its view that 
it is possible to distinguish those minority voters who are actually "in- 
jured" by a dilutive plan from those who are unharmed. Indeed, the 
Court explicitly rejected the state's contention that for strict scrutiny 
purposes, it did not matter which minority voters were placed in the 
remedial district. And the Court condemned North Carolina's reme- 
dial plan for its failure to identify and separate "injured" minority vot- 
ers from those voters unharmed by dilution. 
Although the injury in Shaw cases no longer stemmed from the 
shape of the district by the time Shaw II was decided, the shape and 
location of the district were central to the Court's effort to distinguish 
between these two sets of minority voters. In the Court's view, the 
only minority voters injured by dilution were those residing in the 
compact Gingles district (the hypothetical compact majority-minority 
district that plaintiffs must identify to establish dilution).165 Thus, the 
Court reasoned, a bizarrely shaped remedial district located in a dif- 
ferent part of the state improperly benefits nonvictims (those voters lo- 
cated outside the Gingles district) and fails to remedy the injuries of 
those voters actually injured (those within the Gingles district). 
The Court's approach would be perfectly sensible in a conventional 
individual rights context. Courts routinely apply strict scrutiny to en- 
sure that a race-conscious remedy reaches those voters whom the state 
has injured and does not benefit those whom the state has not 
harmed.166 But it is very difficult to square the Court's view with an 
aggregate rights framework, in which dilution claims belong. 
Here, for example, dilution is an unindividuated injury that falls on 
all minority voters, regardless of where they live. As explained in de- 
tail in Part I, dilution does not mean that a particular individual can- 
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 9I2-I3 (I995); see also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 672 (I993) 
(White, J., dissenting); Lowenstein, supra note I58, at 822 ("[T]he mere shape of a district ... does 
not indicate whether it is more or less racially drawn.'). If this tenet can be used to invalidate 
compact majority-minority districts, however, it should equally preclude reliance on a bizarre 
shape to establish the overuse of race in applying strict scrutiny. 
165 Shaw v. Hunt, 5,7 U.S. 899, 9I4-I7 (i996). Some commentators have echoed this view, ar- 
guing that departures from the compact Gingles district reveal a lack of fit between the state's use 
of a racial classification and its purported ends. See Butler, supra note 121, at 6,7; O'Rourke, 
supra note 46, at 756. 
166 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (i989). There appears to 
be at least one exception to this principle. The Court strongly prefers race-neutral remedies over 
race-conscious ones. See infra note i98. As Ian Ayres has explained, however, race-neutral reme- 
dies may be dramatically underinclusive or overinclusive - that is, they may not remedy the in- 
juries of all victims, or they may benefit those who were not harmed by discrimination. See 
Ayres, supra note 132, at 1789-90. For the reasons discussed below in note I98, I assume for these 
purposes that any viable remedy for dilution requires the state to employ a racial classification. 
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not elect her preferred candidate. The claim hinges instead on the 
relative ability of an individual to aggregate her vote effectively. Be- 
cause that harm cannot be measured without reference to the place- 
ment of all members of a group, no group member is injured more or 
less than any other.167 Similarly, the remedy for dilution - the crea- 
tion of an additional majority-minority district - eliminates the injury 
for all minority voters, whether or not they are ultimately placed in the 
remedial district.168 Again, that is because the injury hinges on the 
overall distribution of the group. For these reasons, although the 
Court's effort in Shaw II to identify the minority voters whom North 
Carolina injured would make sense in a conventional individual rights 
context, the Court's approach is not the right way to apply strict scru- 
tiny in the context of an aggregate harm like vote dilution.169 
The Court's only defense of its approach is little more than a non 
sequitur. The Court has asserted that the state's departure from the 
Gingles district in drawing a remedial plan signals a misuse of race be- 
cause "? 2 does not require a State to create . . . a [noncompact dis- 
trict]."170 While the quoted statement is clearly correct, it certainly 
does not suggest that ? 2 forbids noncompact districts.171 Section 2 
does not require a state drawing a remedial district to create a district 
that is predominantly Democratic, a district that follows county lines, 
or a district that preserves an incumbent's seat. But given the defer- 
ence courts grant to state districting choices, a state can assuredly con- 
sider these criteria in drawing a district.172 And unless the Shaw in- 
jury arises from the district's shape - a view the traditionalists have 
167 The Court's concern with the location of the district might have carried greater weight had 
voting been racially polarized in only one part of the state. See infra p. I7I4. 
168 See supra pp. i687-88. 
169 For similar reasons, the Court's approach in Shaw II cannot be justified on the ground that 
the challenged district's shape suggests that the state has tried to "burden" white voters. Al- 
though the creation of a majority-minority district requires the inclusion of white voters to ensure 
that the district's population satisfies equipopulosity requirements, see Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, 
supra note 5i, at 6oi, 630-32, that is true no matter where the district is drawn. See Shaw I, 509 
U.S. at 682 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("'Dilution' thus refers to the effects of districting decisions not 
on an individual's political power viewed in isolation, but on the political power of a group. This 
is the reason that the placement of given voters in a given district, even on the basis of race, does 
not, without more, diminish the effectiveness of the individual as a voter." (citations omitted)); 
Pildes & Niemi, supra note i6, at 506; cf Issacharoff, supra note 9, at i879 (noting that, in con- 
trast to other areas, votingig is not an area in which preexisting individual white expectations 
have been formed"). 
170 Bush v. Vera, 5I7 U.S. 952, 979 (i996) (citing Johnson v. De Grandy, 5I2 U.S. 997, ioo8 
(I994)); see also Butler, supra note I2i, at 6I7; O'Rourke, supra note 46, at 756 (arguing that a 
remedial plan that "depart[s] from traditional redistricting criteria" is "not narrowly tailored"). 
171 See Lowenstein, supra note I58, at 823 ("Section 2 simply requires a specified number of 
[majority-minority districts] ..., but is indifferent to the shapes of the [majority-minority dis- 
tricts] that are actually drawn."). 
172 See S. Christian Leadership Conference v. Sessions, 56 F.3d I28i, I302 (IIth Cir. I995) (en 
banc) (Hatchett, J., dissenting). 
200I] THE RIGHT TO AN UNDILUTED VOTE I705 
disavowed - a state may choose to privilege these other criteria over 
compactness when remedying the dilution injury.173 
An example might be useful. Imagine that ? 2 requires State A and 
State B each to draw a majority-minority district. State A values 
compactness highly as a districting criterion. When it draws a reme- 
dial district, it will draw the district in roughly the same place the 
plaintiffs drew the Gingles district to establish their claim, even if that 
choice means that the state has to divide a county or put two incum- 
bents in the same district and force them to run against each other. 
State B may think compactness is generally a good idea, but it may 
be worried that drawing the remedial district where plaintiffs drew the 
Gingles district would mean that Congressman X's house will be in 
Congresswoman Y's district and that the Democrats will end up with 
majorities in seven of twelve districts, a result the Republican state 
legislature will not accept.174 States often compromise compactness on 
these grounds even when race is not involved, so State B will prefer to 
piece together a majority-minority district elsewhere, even if that dis- 
trict will end up bizarrely shaped. And the end result is the same for 
purposes of remedying the harm - the districting scheme remedies the 
aggregate injury of dilution. Thus, as long as the shape of the district 
is not itself inherently harmful,175 the shape of the district tells us 
nothing about the state's motive. 
There is, however, a stronger response to the argument sketched 
out above than the Court has offered. That response would go some- 
thing like this: if a precondition for establishing dilution is the ability 
to draw a compact majority-minority district, then the Court is right to 
say that the only people who are injured by dilution are those who re- 
side in that district. These voters are the only ones with standing to 
bring a claim, and they should therefore benefit from the remedy. This 
argument is a weighty one, but it is ultimately unpersuasive. 
To determine whether the Court is right to focus so heavily on Gin- 
gles at the remedial stage, we need to decide why the Gingles district is 
a requirement for establishing dilution in the first place. One possible 
story - the story the Court has plainly adopted - is that the existence 
of a compact majority-minority district is somehow essential to the 
definition of dilution itself. There are several problems with this story. 
173 Justice Kennedy, alone among the traditionalist Justices, has conceded that Gingles does not 
mandate that the state's remedial district be drawn where the Gingles district was placed. Bush, 
5I7 U.S. at 999 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("While ? 2 does not require a noncompact majority- 
minority district, neither does it forbid it ... ."); see also id. at I034 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
("[Niothing in ? 2 requires the creation of a noncompact district."). 
174 For an example of how one state ranked its preferred districting criteria, see Miller v. John- 
son, 5I5 U.S. 900, 906 (I995). See also NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra 
note 062, at I46-89 (i999) (providing state-by-state districting requirements). 
175 See supra pp. i693-94. 
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First, this story cannot be reconciled with existing dilution doc- 
trine. As explained in section I.C, courts grant standing to, and certify 
classes of, all minority voters in a state, regardless of where they 
live.176 Moreover, in assessing whether the state has drawn "enough" 
remedial districts, the court includes all of the state's minority voters 
in the proportionality calculus, not just those residing in the Gingles 
district. Again, if only those voters who reside in the Gingles district 
are injured, this line of case law would be nonsensical. 
Second, although this explanation may dispose of the facts in Shaw 
II, in which a compact district could not have been drawn in the cen- 
tral part of the state, it runs into a practical problem in cases in which 
more than one Gingles district could be drawn. As noted above,177 if 
all minority voters who could reside in a Gingles district must obtain a 
remedy, a state would have to maximize the number of majority- 
minority districts when drawing a remedial plan. 
Third, nothing about the theory of dilution itself requires us to im- 
port "compactness" into the equation. For example, imagine a state 
where all districts are noncompact. If minority voters in these districts 
were denied the opportunity to elect a proportionate share of represen- 
tatives, we would surely term that injury "dilution." Similarly, imagine 
a group that is either too small or too dispersed to elect a candidate of 
choice in a districting scheme that uses compact districts. Presumably 
we could conclude that those voters have had their votes "diluted" (al- 
though we might not be willing to take the steps necessary to remedy 
that dilution). In short, the compactness requirement in Gingles does 
not necessarily stem from the nature of the injury itself. 
Fourth, nothing in ? 2 suggests an independent congressional en- 
dorsement of territorially based schemes, let alone compactness. Yet 
Congress surely knows how to mandate compactness if it wishes to do 
so. Indeed, at various points in history, Congress has clearly and ex- 
plicitly mandated a single-member districting scheme or compactness 
for congressional districts.178 Thus, if anything, established canons of 
statutory construction counsel against reading the vague text of ? 2 as 
mandating compact remedial districts.179 
Similarly, there is no reason to think that the only conception of 
dilution possible under the Constitution - the source of Congress's 
power to enact ? 2- is one that incorporates a compact, territorially 
based scheme. The Court itself has consistently disavowed any notion 
176 See supra pp. i690-9-. 
177 See supra p. I699. 
178 See ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN & PILDES, supra note 50, at 769-72. 179 Cf Custis v. United States, 5II U.S. 485, 492 (I994) (declining to infer congressional intent 
when there was evidence that when Congress sought to achieve a particular result, "it knew how 
to do so"). 
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that the Constitution requires compact districts.180 Indeed, if the Con- 
stitution required compactness, the states - thirty percent of which do 
not legally mandate compactness"" - could not privilege other dis- 
tricting criteria over compactness under any circumstances. Such a 
theory would also be inconsistent with the states' historical practice of 
using at-large districting schemes.182 
To place this analysis in more concrete terms, consider the follow- 
ing hypothetical: imagine that tomorrow all of the states begin draw- 
ing bizarrely shaped districts or using a postcard districting scheme, in 
which the state assigns people from entirely different regions to the 
same "virtual" district, either randomly or systematically (for example, 
alphabetically). Would the courts continue to require a minority group 
to show that a compact Gingles district could be drawn in order to es- 
tablish dilution? If the answer to this question is no, then the Gingles 
requirement does not stem from the essential nature of the injury we 
call dilution. 
Finally, a rule that the only individuals deemed "injured" by dilu- 
tion are voters capable of residing in the majority-minority district that 
the state will eventually draw reflects a fairly anemic view of the 
democratic process. It suggests a theory of representation that reduces 
democracy entirely to the relationship between a constituent and her 
elected representative. On this view, what happens in another district 
and thus at the legislative level - is simply irrelevant to a voter. 
For instance, a minority voter living in a majority-minority district 
would not be concerned about whether her representative is capable of 
finding other legislators who share similar concerns to form coalitions. 
And a member of a racial minority who lives in a majority-white dis- 
trict where she is routinely outvoted would not care whether her 
elected representative works within a decisionmaking body that con- 
tains other legislators capable of articulating her needs.183 In short, if 
the Gingles compactness requirement does not stem from the essential 
nature of the injury, it is not clear why only those who reside within 
the Gingles district should be deemed "injured" by a dilutive plan. 
Why, then, does Gingles require proof that a compact majority- 
minority district can be drawn before allowing a suit to go forward? 
Here is an alternative story. The Court recognized that it theoretically 
could have construed ? 2 as mandating proportionality even when it is 
not possible to create compact remedial districts. That is, the Court 
could have read ? 2 as requiring unusual remedies (for example, a dis- 
180 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (I993). 
181 See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 162, at I46-89. 
182 ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN & PILDES, supra note 50, at 772. 
183 See supra note 2 I (discussing critics who argue that current dilution doctrine pays insuffi- 
cient attention to these questions). 
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tricting scheme made up of bizarrely shaped districts, a postcard dis- 
tricting scheme, or a system of cumulative voting) in states where a 
single-member, territorially based districting plan would fall short of 
proportionality, as it always would for small or geographically dis- 
persed minority groups. 
The Court presumably chose not to construe ? 2 in this way be- 
cause it recognized that almost all states and localities use a territori- 
ally based system for elections, and that many states consider com- 
pactness to be an important districting criterion. If the Court were to 
recognize all dilution claims, then it would necessarily tread on the 
traditional districting discretion of the states, something the courts are 
always reluctant to do. Specifically, by requiring that a plaintiff show 
at least that a state could have drawn a compact majority-minority dis- 
trict, the Court prevents small or dispersed groups from filing ? 2 
claims and thus seeking a remedy that it would be reluctant to 
grant.184 Thus, the Gingles requirement suggests that there are limits 
to the Court's willingness to exercise its remedial authority on behalf 
of minority voters whose votes have been diluted. 
There are at least two other instances in which the Court has 
similarly cabined the reach of ? 2 to avoid intruding on state district- 
ing prerogatives. Section 2 challenges to judicial electoral schemes 
provide one such example. There, as here, the courts have concluded 
that the states have a significant redistricting interest that may over- 
ride ? 2 concerns. As a result, in several recent cases appellate courts 
have concluded that the states' interest in allowing judges to be elected 
at large is weighty enough to preclude certain types of ? 2 chal- 
lenges.185 
Courts have taken comparable steps to protect the state from intru- 
sive claims when a plaintiff brings a valid challenge to a districting 
plan close to election time. Courts often deny plaintiffs the remedy 
that they would otherwise receive for fear of forcing the state to under- 
take the burdensome task of redistricting late in the election cycle.186 
184 See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-5i n.I7 (i986) (explaining why the Court 
adopted the compactness requirement). 
185 See, e.g., Cousin v. Sundquist, I45 F.3d 8i8, 829-3I (6th Cir. i998) (rejecting the notion that 
cumulative voting represents an appropriate ? 2 remedy in the context of judicial elections); Mil- 
waukee Branch of the NAACP v. Thompson, ii6 F.3d II94, I201 (7th Cir. I997) (upholding the 
state's at-large districts against a ? 2 challenge); League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council 
No. 4434 v. Clements, 999 F.2d 83i, 875-76 (5th Cir. I993) (en banc) (rejecting a single-member 
districting scheme as well as limited and cumulative voting as remedies in judicial elections). 
186 See, e.g., White v. Daniel, 909 F.2d 99, I03-04 (4th Cir. i9go); MacGovern v. Connolly, 637 
F. Supp. III, II5-i6 (D. Mass. i986). 
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In sum, the compactness requirement may resemble a prudential 
standing requirement.187 Neither requirement is essential to the statu- 
tory claim (an "irreducible minimum 188 for establishing an injury), but 
each is an expression of judicial reluctance to extend the courts' reme- 
dial powers beyond a certain limit (a "judicially self-imposed 
limit[]"1'89). The Court simply will not allow plaintiffs seeking radical 
changes in the electoral system to gain remedial assistance from the 
courts. 
If this alternative story about the compactness requirement is cor- 
rect, it disfavors requiring a state to draw a compact district once a 
plaintiff has established a ? 2 violation. Indeed, if the reason for the 
Gingles requirement is that states need not abandon compactness in 
order to comply with ? 2, this principle of deference should equally 
prevent courts from imposing a compactness requirement when a state 
remedying a ? 2 violation values other districting criteria more highly. 
C. Other Types of Dilution Claims 
One might be able to justify the Court's heavy focus on the location 
of the remedial district for a narrow set of claims. For example, one 
could imagine a case in which a state grants a minority group rough 
proportionality but deliberately packs more voters into majority- 
minority districts than in majority-white districts. The Court has sug- 
gested that it would be willing to entertain such a claim.190 If this in- 
jury were termed "dilution," it would more closely resemble the type of 
dilution we see in one-person, one-vote cases than the dilution claim 
presented in Shaw II. Although the injury would still retain all of the 
characteristics of an aggregate harm,191 the remedy would necessarily 
require the state to redraw the overpopulated districts and thus would 
cabin the state's remedial discretion in a way that traditional dilution 
theories would not. 
A more interesting question would arise in a case in which most 
minority voters subscribe to an extremely liberal political agenda but 
the state deliberately places its majority-minority districts where more 
"moderate" minority voters are concentrated. Again, the Court might 
consider such a claim.192 Indeed, it is in this sense that one might un- 
derstand De Grandy's concern with "the rights of some minority voters 
187 See generally United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 75 I v. Brown Group, Inc., 
5I7 U.S. 544, 55i-58 (I996) (describing prudential standing requirements). 
188 Id. at 55I. 
189 Id. (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (I984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
190 See Johnson v. De Grandy, 5 I2 U.S. 997, 1015 (i986). 
191 See infra pp. I737-38 (describing one-person, one-vote claims as involving aggregate 
harms). 
192 See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 75 (i986). 
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... be[ing] traded off against the rights of other members of the same 
minority class."1193 
This type of claim would be best understood as a claim of dilutive 
intent directed at the left-wing group of minority voters rather than at 
all minority voters. In such a case, it would be appropriate for the 
Court to focus on the lines drawn in one part of the state because of 
the directed nature of the harm. Nonetheless, to the extent that the 
Court evaluates the dilution suffered by that subset of minority voters, 
it would still require an aggregate rights framework to evaluate their 
injury and determine the appropriate remedy. 
One might argue that the same analysis should apply to all intent 
claims, even those in which the state intends to discriminate against 
minority voters statewide. That is, one might contend that even when 
the state intends to discriminate against minority voters generally, the 
main locus of its discriminatory efforts will likely be where there is a 
large concentration of minority voters (where the Gingles district could 
be drawn).194 If one is seeking this type of "congruence," to borrow a 
term from City of Boerne,195 between the locus of the state's primary 
efforts to harm minority group members and the remedy, then perhaps 
the Court's emphasis on the Gingles district would be defensible.196 
But in a case involving statewide polarization and an intent to dis- 
criminate against all minority voters, placing the remedial district 
where the Gingles district could be drawn achieves "congruence" only 
in a fairly imprecise sense. After all, the effects of the action are felt 
- and are intended to be felt - statewide.197 Further, the state must 
be race conscious wherever there are pockets of minority voters - that 
is, it must deliberately decide not to create a noncompact majority- 
minority district wherever pockets of minority voters exist, just as it 
must consciously decide not to create a compact district in the area 
where minority voters are most concentrated. 
In any case, the arguments for adhering to the Gingles district for 
the hypothetical claims above stem not from the aggregative aspects of 
the underlying harm, but from the state's intentional infliction of that 
193 De Grandy, 512 U.S. at ioi9. One might argue that this case could never arise because the 
minority voters could not establish that they vote cohesively statewide, as required by Gingles. 
See supra p. i674. Thus, as hypothesized below, see infra p. I7I4, while each group might be 
able to raise a dilution claim challenging the lines drawn in the area in which its members reside, 
neither group could bring a statewide dilution claim. 
194 I am indebted to Richard Fallon and Frank Michelman, both of whom proposed variants of 
this argument. 
195 City of Boerne v. Flores, 52I U.S. 507, 530 (I997); see also infra p. 1736. 
196 The Gingles requirement might thus be understood as an effort to balance the "effects" lan- 
guage of ? 2 ("in a manner which results in a denial or abridgment or the right of any citizen"), 42 
U.S.C. ? I973(a) (I994) (emphasis added), against the "intent" language of ? 2 ("denial or abridg- 
ment .. . of the right to vote on account of race or color'), id. (emphasis added). 
197 See supra pp. i687-88. 
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harm. Even in those situations in which it might be appropriate for a 
court to focus on lines drawn in only one part of the state, an aggre- 
gate rights framework would still apply in analyzing the harm and its 
remedy, albeit in a more localized fashion. The Supreme Court's 
highly individualistic approach to strict scrutiny would thus remain ill- 
suited to achieve the Court's purpose. 
D. An Alternative Approach to Strict Scrutiny 
Merely establishing that the application of conventional strict scru- 
tiny analysis to dilution remedies is theoretically incoherent does not 
prove that the Court had a choice in the matter. Thus, before con- 
demning the Court's approach, we must first address whether strict 
scrutiny can be tailored to an aggregate rights framework. The fol- 
lowing is a preliminary outline of what such an approach might look 
like. 
i. Scope of the Remedy. - Assuming that a race-conscious remedy 
is necessary to cure dilution,198 the question to be answered by the 
strict scrutiny inquiry is whether the state has somehow overused or 
misused a racial classification in complying with ? 2. To resolve that 
question in an aggregate rights context, a court would not consider 
where and how a particular district is drawn. Instead, it would ana- 
lyze whether the state's remedial plan, taken as a whole, contains more 
198 Before assuming that a race-conscious remedy is appropriate under the narrow-tailoring 
prong, one must first determine whether a race-neutral alternative for achieving the same end 
exists. See Ayres, supra note 132, at 1789-93 (criticizing this requirement as violating other tenets 
of strict scrutiny). One might argue that the state should employ race-neutral tactics - like ad- 
vertising or community outreach - to decrease racial tensions and thereby avoid the need for 
race-conscious districting. See id. at I789-90. Given the entrenched nature of racial polarization, 
however, it is extremely unlikely that such tactics would reduce it sufficiently to achieve their 
purpose, particularly during the ten-year span during which a dilutive districting plan would re- 
main in place. One of the few viable race-neutral alternatives to creating majority-minority dis- 
tricts is some form of cumulative voting. But the courts have been extraordinarily reluctant to 
require states to adopt such a system. See, e.g., Cousin v. Sundquist, I45 F.3d 8i8, 822 (6th Cir. 
i998); Quilter v. Voinovich, 912 F. Supp. ioo6, I02 I (N.D. Ohio 1995) (deeming it "obvious[]" that 
a race-neutral means of complying with ? 2 "does not exist'). That fact may change, particularly 
to the extent that conservatives are attracted to cumulative voting schemes because they are race 
neutral, see, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, All for One: Can Cumulative Voting 
Ease Racial Tensions?, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. i8, i996, at Io, and allow other electoral minori- 
ties - including religious and political ones - to have a voice in the system. Cf Steven J. Mul- 
roy, The Way Out: A Legal Standard for Imposing Alternative Electoral Systems as Voting Rights 
Remedies, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 333, 349-50 (i998) (arguing that certain types of cumula- 
tive voting enhance the ability of "racial and ethnic minorities to elect preferred candidates"); id. 
at 355 (contending that under an "alternative electoral scheme voters are free to vote on racial or 
nonracial lines as they see fit, without forfeiting their chance of obtaining fair representation for 
nonmajority views"). In any case, because a cumulative voting scheme does not further the 
analysis here, for these purposes I will assume - as the Supreme Court has - that no race- 
neutral alternatives exist for remedying a dilution violation and that creating majority-minority 
districts is necessary to comply with ? 2. 
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remedial districts than necessary to provide minority voters rough 
proportionality - which is all that ? 2 can be construed to afford.'99 
First, such an analysis might indicate that the state has used race more 
than was necessary to achieve its purported goal.20 Second, if the 
state has given minority voters a greater-than-proportional share of 
districts, white voting strength may be diluted.201 In either case, one 
might infer that compliance with ? 2 was not the state's true motive.202 
Another relevant criterion for evaluating whether the state's reme- 
dial scheme is narrowly tailored would be whether the state included 
more minority voters within the remedial district than necessary to ac- 
complish its purported end - the creation of a district in which mi- 
nority voters can exert electoral control.203 The inclusion of more mi- 
nority voters than necessary to create an effective voting majority204 
199 See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, ioi6-i8 (I994); Marylanders for Fair Representa- 
tion, Inc. v. Schaefer, 849 F. Supp. I022, I045 n.I7 (D. Md. i994); Issacharoff & Karlan, supra 
note 46, at 2283. This proposal is comparable to the Court's conclusion in Miller v. Johnson, 51I5 
U.S. 900 (1995), that Georgia had used race excessively because it created more majority-minority 
districts than required by ? 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 920-2 I, 923-24. 
200 Cf United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. I44, i62 (I977) (noting 
with approval that the state created no more majority-minority districts than necessary to comply 
with the Voting Rights Act). 
201 See Marylanders for Fair Representation, 849 F. Supp. at I045 n.I7; see also Quilter, 9I2 F. 
Supp. at 102 I; cf Briffault, supra note 46, at 6o-6i. 
202 A state could, of course, create an additional majority-minority district for a variety of other 
reasons. It simply could not justify the creation of the additional district on ? 2 grounds. 
203 See Shaw v. Hunt, 86i F. Supp. 408, 446 (E.D.N.C. 1994); Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 
Ii88, I206-08 (W.D. La. I993), vacated, 5I5 U.S. 737 (I995). In some cases, this criterion will be 
irrelevant. For example, in areas where minority voters are highly concentrated, a remedial dis- 
trict will inevitably be a "supermajority" district in which minority voters constitute sixty-five 
percent or more of the voting population. In cities, for example, there are usually neighborhoods 
in which African-Americans are very concentrated. See, e.g., Barnett v. City of Chicago, 969 F. 
Supp. I359, I438-39 (N.D. Ill. I997), affd in part and vacated in part, i4i F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 
I998); see also Barnett v. Daley, 32 F.3d ii96, 1200-01 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that African- 
Americans in Chicago live in "highly compact," segregated neighborhoods). As a result, when 
compact districts are drawn in these areas, African-American voters are often "packed" into them. 
See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646 (I993). 
204 Political scientists have yet to agree on what percentage of minority voters is necessary to 
allow the group to elect its candidate of choice. Compare Lisa Handley, Bernard Grofman & 
Wayne Arden, Electing Minority-Preferred Candidates to Legislative Office: The Relationship 
Between Minority Percentages in Districts and the Election of Minority-Preferred Candidates, in 
RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN THE i9goS I3, 37 (Bernard Grofman ed., i998) (determining 
that there is "no evidence to indicate that majority minority districts are no longer necessary to 
ensure African-Americans and Hispanics fair representation"), and David Lublin, Racial Redis- 
tricting and Afiican-American Representation: A Critique of "Do Majority-Minority Districts 
Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?", 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. I83, 185-86 
(i999) (concluding that majority-minority districts are necessary to elect minority voters' candi- 
dates of choice), with David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, A Social Science Approach to Race, 
Redistricting, and Representation, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. I87, I87 (i999) (concluding that dis- 
tricts containing less than a fifty percent minority population can elect the group's candidate of 
choice). This difficult question becomes even more complex if one considers the extent to which 
potential white crossover voting should be taken into account in determining what constitutes a 
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may indicate a lack of fit between the state's means and ends. It 
might suggest that the state is providing too great a "benefit" to a mi- 
nority group. Section 2 merely guarantees minority voters an effective 
opportunity to exercise electoral control;205 it does not guarantee them 
overwhelming electoral majorities regardless whether the minority 
community can field a viable candidate or makes adequate efforts to 
get out the vote.206 Or a court might find that the state is actually 
harming a minority group by packing more members of that group 
than necessary into the remedial district, thereby robbing the group of 
an opportunity to influence electoral outcomes in other districts.207 
Finally, the state's packing of minority voters might have occurred at 
the behest of the incumbent of that district,208 who will always prefer 
a safe district to a horse race.209 
2. The Location of the District When Polarization Exists in Only 
One Part of the State. - Interestingly, in some instances a court would 
consider the location of a district when applying strict scrutiny in a 
form tailored to an aggregate right (although it would do so for a dif- 
ferent reason than the Court did in Shaw II). In Shaw II, the Court 
controlling majority. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 89 n.I (i986) (O'Connor, J., concur- 
ring in the judgment). See generally Lichtman & Hebert, supra note 3 (arguing that the determi- 
nation of what constitutes a controlling majority requires a careful examination of racial polariza- 
tion levels). 
205 Johnson v. De Grandy, 5I2 U.S. 997, IOI7 n.ii (I994). 
206 See Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 986 (ist Cir. i995); NAACP v. City of Columbia, 
850 F. Supp. 404, 4I9 (D.S.C. I993), affd mem., 33 F.3d 52 (4th Cir. 1994). 
207 See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. I46, 153-54 (I993); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46 n.ii (stating 
that the minority vote is rendered less effective if states concentrate minority voters "into districts 
where they constitute an excessive majority"); United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. 
Carey, 430 U.S. I44, 172-73 (i977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part) (explaining other ways that 
"benign" remedies can conceal discriminatory animus); Briffault, supra note 46, at 68-69. For an 
effort to reduce this concern to an empirical test, see W. Mark Crain, The Constitutionality of 
Race-Conscious Redistricting: An Empirical Analysis, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. I93 (200I). 
208 See CAIN, supra note I4, at I (arguing that incumbent self-interest influences all districting 
decisions); Briffault, supra note 46, at 32; Grofman, supra note 86, at I248 (describing this con- 
cern); Guinier, No Tvo Seats, supra note I2, at I454. 
209 When voting is polarized, it is always safer for the incumbent to include as many minority 
voters as possible in the district. CAIN, supra note I4, at I76. While that impulse is certainly un- 
derstandable, a state may have trouble justifying its compliance with the incumbent's wishes on 
? 2 grounds if such packing is unnecessary to provide a full remedy. This is especially true if the 
candidate's interest in a "safe" district offers no benefit to voters within that district. See Roberts 
v. Wamser, 883 F.2d 6I7, 622 (8th Cir. i989) (discussing "[t]he possible divergence of interests be- 
tween a candidate seeking office and a citizen attempting to protect his right to vote"); CAIN, su- 
pra note I4, at 2 (explaining why incumbents with safe seats have less incentive to pay attention 
to their constituents' needs and interests); Cain, supra note 46, at I28; see also Guinier, No Two 
Seats, supra note I2, at I454-56 (making a similar argument); Lublin, supra note 204, at i86 
(noting evidence of decreased turnout when a minority candidate enjoys a "safe" seat). But see 
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, io66 (i996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the Shaw doctrine is 
problematic because it does not allow a "minority incumbent [to be] protected as any other in- 
cumbent could be'). 
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rejected a district drawn in the center of the state to remedy the dilu- 
tion injury of voters on the southeastern side of the state. It did so not 
because of regional variations in polarization levels, but because the 
Gingles district could be drawn only on the southeastern side of the 
state. 
If whites voted consistently against the preferences of African- 
American voters in the southeastern part of North Carolina (but not in 
the central part, where the remedial district was drawn), then the 
Court's concern with the location of the remedial district in Shaw II 
would have been more defensible. In that context, African-American 
voters in the middle of the state would not have been deprived of a 
fair opportunity to aggregate their votes. They could aggregate their 
votes as effectively as whites because their preferences would not 
meaningfully differ from whites, and thus no group would consistently 
outvote them. Because there would be no need to "remedy" any injury 
in that area, a court might well conclude that a remedial district 
drawn there was not narrowly tailored to remedy a dilution injury.210 
3. "Representational Harms" of a Different Sort. - Is there any 
sense in which a single district's shape might be relevant if the narrow 
tailoring prong were reworked to take into account the unique attrib- 
utes of aggregate rights? One could argue that a severely misshapen 
district imposes an injury that has nothing to do with dilution or the 
aggregate nature of the underlying right. On this view, when lines are 
drawn as bizarrely as they were in North Carolina and Texas in the 
first round of redistricting following the i990 Census, it is not possible 
to represent the districts effectively.211 In Bush, for example, the state 
drew lines with surgical precision to divide Hispanic voters and Afri- 
can-American voters into two districts.212 It was thus difficult for vot- 
ers and candidates to determine where the districts began and ended, 
causing some chaos during the election.213 Moreover, a change in the 
210 This argument is not inconsistent with the criticism of Shaw II set forth in section III.A, 
above, which argues that a single district cannot be examined in isolation when evaluating a dilu- 
tion remedy - if only part of a state exhibits polarized voting, a plaintiff's challenge will not be 
statewide but will focus instead on a particular region within the state. It remains true that a re- 
medial district drawn in a region where polarized voting is a problem cannot be evaluated in iso- 
lation. 
211 But see Pildes & Niemi, supra note i6, at 50I-02 (offering and rejecting this explanation of 
Shaw). Professor Grofman has offered a slightly different version of this theory, arguing that such 
districts are "non-cognizab[le]" because one cannot "characterize the district boundaries in a man- 
ner that can readily be communicated to ordinary citizens of the district in commonsense terms 
based on geographical referents." Grofman, supra note 86, at I262-63. 
212 Bush, 5 I 7 U.S. at 962. 
213 See id. at 974. Similarly, in his dissent in Shaw, Judge Voorhees argued that the unusual 
length and bizarre shape of District I2 "make fair representation virtually impossible." Shaw v. 
Hunt, 86i F. Supp. 408,493-94 (E.D.N.C. I994) (Voorhees, C.J., dissenting); see also Marylanders 
for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, 849 F. Supp. I022, I056 (D. Md. I994); E. Jefferson Coa- 
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shape of a district - particularly the shift from a compact to a 
bizarrely shaped district - may adversely affect grassroots and com- 
munity organizations that have previously depended on shared politi- 
cal campaigns214 or ties to local political structures. 
There is also some mild support in political science literature for 
the view that traditional districting criteria such as compactness have 
some effect on voter turnout and participation.215 A bizarrely shaped 
district may even inhibit an official's ability to serve her constituency 
once she is elected.216 That possibility is more likely if, as is sometimes 
the case, the neighborhoods that are divided contain and define com- 
munities of interest.217 Thus, misshapen districts arguably cause a 
"representational harm" of a different sort than that identified in the 
early Shaw opinions.218 
Although the view that the shape of a district should be considered 
in applying strict scrutiny is fraught with difficulty,219 the most per- 
suasive justification for rejecting this view is the dearth of empirical 
evidence to support it.220 Even if courts were to engage in the type of 
lition for Leadership & Dev. v. Jefferson Parish, 69i F. Supp. 99i, I007-08 (E.D. La. i988); Brif- 
fault, supra note 46, at 42-43; Grofman, supra note 86, at I262-63. 
214 Cf CAIN, supra note I4, at I2-I3 (exploring some of these issues); Eisgruber, supra note 59, 
at 35 I (same). 
215 See Briffault, supra note 46, at 42-43; cf. Niemi, supra note 56, at i89 (noting a relationship 
between voter recognition of candidates and compactness). 
216 See WILLIAMS, supra note 4I, at 234; Briffault, supra note 46, at 42 (noting that "close at- 
tention to territoriality may be appropriate" when local services are involved). 
217 See Saunders, supra note I4I, at i623-24; cf. Miller v. Johnson, 5I5 U.S. 900, 908 (I995) 
(noting that inclusion of rural and urban African-Americans in a single district "tells a tale of dis- 
parity, not community"); id. at 9i9 (finding that no "community of interest" existed between the 
disparate groups of voters included in the district) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Prosser v. 
Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 863 (W.D. Wis. i992) ("To be an effective representative, a legisla- 
tor must represent a district that has a reasonable homogeneity of needs; otherwise the policies he 
supports will not represent the preferences of most of his constituents."). But see Briffault, supra 
note 46, at 4I-42. 
218 See Butler, supra note I 2I, at 620-2 I (suggesting an even stronger role for geographical rep- 
resentation in evaluating remedial districts); O'Rourke, supra note 46, at 767-72. 
219 One might argue that this view requires the type of balancing test that many commentators 
have rejected as incompatible with traditional strict scrutiny; it tells us only whether the state's 
properly intentioned choice represents bad policy for reasons that have little to do with the Equal 
Protection Clause. See supra note I35. One also might conclude that courts cannot - or should 
not - second-guess state judgments about what constitutes an effective district. See Shaw v. 
Hunt, 5I7 U.S. 899, 92 2-23 (I996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (questioning the federal courts' jurisdic- 
tion to evaluate "legislative choices about the political structure of a State"); Gaffney v. Cum- 
mings, 4I2 U.S. 735, 749 (I973) ("[T]he apportionment task, dealing as it must with fundamental 
'choices about the nature of representation,' is primarily a political and legislative process." (cita- 
tions omitted) (quoting Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92 (I966)); Pildes & Niemi, supra note 
i6, at 502-I3. The Court itself has repeatedly insisted that it does not intend Shaw to require 
states to adhere to compactness or any other districting criteria. E.g., Bush v. Vera, 5I7 U.S. 952, 
962 (I996); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (I993). 
220 In the words of one leading expert, "the usefulness of requiring that districts be compact has 
been vastly overrated." Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 
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balancing required by this view, it is not clear that these fairly nebu- 
lous harms are sufficient to invalidate a state's redistricting priori- 
ties,22' particularly given the advancements in communications and 
transportation that make proximity less important than in years 
past.222 Thus, except perhaps in extreme circumstances,223 these 
nebulous harms are unlikely to outweigh the benefits of strict com- 
pactness to states (which retain the freedom to choose their own dis- 
tricting criteria, particularly incumbency protection, in complying with 
? 2) and the concomitant benefits to minority voters (because the flexi- 
bility accorded to the states will make voluntary compliance with ? 2 
more likely).224 
Were the Court to accept the approach outlined above, the practi- 
cal consequences would be significant. Professor Grofman has said 
that every voting rights controversy involves three components: theory, 
doctrine, and "a consideration of cui bono and whose ox is being 
gored."225 Here, the restrictions the Court has imposed on states may 
have a significant practical impact on the next round of redistricting, 
which will take place following the release of the 2000 Census data. 
The Court has effectively mandated that all districts drawn to comply 
33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 89 (i985); see BUTLER & CAIN, supra note i62, at 73; CAIN, supra note I4, 
at 32-5I (calling into question the significance of compactness); Pildes & Niemi, supra note i6, at 
538 & n.I77 ("Empirical evidence on this question is slim."); cf Shaw II, 5I7 U.S. at 936 n.I3 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (dismissing the importance of compactness). For an extensive judicial 
analysis of the effect (or lack thereof) of compactness on districting, see Shaw v. Hunt, 86i F. 
Supp. 408, 472 n.6o (E.D.N.C. I994), revd, 5I7 U.S. 899 (i996). 
221 See CAIN, supra note I4, at 52-77 (describing the tradeoffs between compactness and other 
legitimate interests and arguing that compactness should not always outweigh such interests). 
222 See, e.g., id. at 32-33; Briffault, supra note 46, at 43; Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan 
Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 
UCLA L. REV. I, 22 (i985); Pildes, supra note i9, at 253I-32; Pildes & Niemi, supra note i6, at 
538 n. I77 (documenting the increasing irrelevance of compactness for redistricting purposes). 
223 One example might be the "postcard districts" described by Professor Pildes. See Pildes, 
supra note i9, at 2535. 
224 See Grofman, supra note 86, at I263 (reaching a similar conclusion). Admittedly, this new 
definition of a representational harm seems inviting in at least one sense - it would explain the 
Court's puzzling ruling in Hays that the only individuals with standing to pursue Shaw claims are 
those individuals, minority or white, residing in the challenged district. See United States v. 
Hays, 5I5 U.S. 737, 744-45 (I995). Numerous commentators have struggled to make sense of this 
ruling, which is difficult to justify no matter how one characterizes the Shaw injury. See, e.g., 
John Hart Ely, Standing To Challenge Pro-Minority Gerrymanders, iii HARV. L. REV. 576 
(1997); Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 46; Saunders, supra note I4i; Note, Expressive Harms 
and Standing, II2 HARV. L. REV. I3I3 (I999). If the injury at issue here is indeed tied to the 
state's creation of an unrepresentable district, then those living within the district, regardless of 
their race, are injured by the misshapen district's effect on the ability of their chosen candidate to 
represent them. 
225 Grofman, supra note 86, at I267. 
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with ? 2 be compact. If states continue to be constrained by these 
court-imposed limitations in complying with ? 2, they may decide that 
the costs of compliance - creation of an additional compact majority- 
minority district even when it undermines other state concerns, such as 
the preservation of incumbents' seats - outweigh the benefits. In- 
deed, a state unable to draw bizarrely shaped majority-minority dis- 
tricts to satisfy its ? 2 duties may decide not to draw any majority- 
minority districts at the outset of the redistricting process. It might in- 
stead wait until it is forced to do so, when a court-ordered remedial 
plan could provide the state with additional political cover. That 
choice is one we should expect many states to be tempted to make in 
the next round of redistricting,226 and the costs to minority voters in 
terms of delay and resources could be significant. 
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AGGREGATE RIGHTS 
AND AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS FRAMEWORK 
As a theoretical matter, the arguments sketched out in Part III are 
largely interesting detours. It is not necessary to agree with them to 
accept the conceptual framework put forth in this Article. Returning 
to the issues discussed in sections III.B and III.C, for example, even if 
one preferred a theory of dilution that incorporates a compactness re- 
quirement into the definition of injury, two things would remain true. 
First, the underlying harm would retain all of the characteristics of an 
aggregate right sketched out in Part I. However one defines "fair," 
fairness would have to be measured in group terms, and no individual 
could assert an injury without reference to the relevant group. Second, 
to the extent that the Court has arrived at the correct approach to 
strict scrutiny, it has not done so because it adopted an aggregate 
rights approach while favoring the counterarguments sketched out in 
sections III.B and III.C. Instead, the Court's efforts to apply strict 
scrutiny in its conventional form fortuitously led it to the same result 
one might reach using an aggregate rights framework.227 Thus, at best 
the Court has reached what some might consider the "right" result for 
the wrong reason. 
226 See Statement Made at the National Conference of State Legislatures Conference on "Plot- 
ting the 'oos Maps" (Mar. 5, I999). 
227 Similarly, to return to Justice Kennedy's concern about "gratuitous race-based districting" 
discussed in section HLA, even if the shape of a single district could establish that race was mis- 
used - for example, if the Court returns to the "expressive harm" theory so that the Shaw injury 
stems from the shape of the district itself - it would remain true that a dilution remedy could not 
be fully evaluated without reference to the districting scheme as a whole. And one need not ac- 
cept the version of strict scrutiny outlined in section III.D to conclude that dilution is different 
from more conventional forms of individual injury. 
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For these reasons, the arguments set forth above in favor of my 
proposed approach are important even if they do not persuade. These 
are the arguments that the Court has not considered because it thinks 
the right to an undiluted vote is a conventional individual right. Ac- 
cordingly, the next time that the Court encounters an aggregate right, 
it will again try to squeeze it into a conventional individual rights 
framework, just as it did in Shaw Il. 
The more interesting question is: why? Why has the Court ignored 
the possibility that dilution claims are different from conventional in- 
dividual rights? Perhaps the answer is simply that the Court has not 
had a conceptual framework for understanding and resolving these 
questions. If that is the case, then this Article represents a first step 
toward developing such a framework and should provide assistance to 
future courts dealing with dilution claims. 
Although it is possible that the scales will simply fall from the tra- 
ditionalist Justices' eyes the moment a framework for analyzing aggre- 
gate harms is offered, it seems unlikely that the Court's inability to 
conceptualize this conflict is the source of the results or rhetoric we see 
in the Shaw cases. Prior courts have lacked the conceptual framework 
outlined here but have nonetheless instinctively adapted dilution doc- 
trine to fit the unique harm at issue. And the Court would not have 
had to work too hard to come up with an appropriate adaptation of 
the strict scrutiny framework. That is because lower courts, which 
had tried their hand at fashioning a framework for applying strict 
scrutiny before Shaw II, had come up with at least a rudimentary ver- 
sion of the alternative approach to strict scrutiny proposed in this Ar- 
ticle.228 
It thus seems more likely that the Court's self-conscious adherence 
to a conventional version of strict scrutiny reflects deeper normative 
concerns about recognizing an aggregate harm like dilution. On this 
view, the Court's attachment to the Gingles district is merely a proxy 
for expressing its discomfort with the group-based aspects of dilution 
claims. 
The Court's fear of the group-based aspects of aggregate rights, in 
turn, seems to stem largely from concerns about essentialization - the 
drawing of inferences about an individual's substantive preferences 
based on her group membership. The driving force behind the Shaw 
doctrine is, of course, the Rehnquist Court's extreme discomfort with 
race-based decisionmaking in any context, and the aggregate nature of 
the right at issue here seems likely to draw the Court's attention to 
that concern in the context of voting. That is, to the extent that Shaw 
228 See supra p. I7I2 & nn.fi99 & 203. 
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resembles Bakke in its effort to downplay the state's use of race,229 the 
aggregate nature of dilution harms and their remedies inevitably high- 
lights the group-based aspects of redistricting and the inherent tensions 
between voting rights jurisprudence and a highly individualist, anti- 
essentialist conception of rights.230 
The language of the Shaw opinions suggests that the Court is well 
aware of these tensions. Indeed, the Shaw doctrine itself can be 
viewed as part of a longstanding normative debate about the role of 
groups and community identity in our rights-based system. Shaw I is 
replete with normative justifications for the Court's decision to recog- 
nize the "analytically distinct" constitutional violation arising from cer- 
tain majority-minority districts, all of which suggest that the Court is 
uncomfortable with the aspects of voting that do not fit easily with 
conventional individualist assumptions.23' If anything, the Shaw doc- 
trine has become increasingly individualistic as the traditionalists have 
shifted toward a more conventional equal protection approach, one 
that focuses on the use of the racial classification itself. As Professor 
Fiss has observed, "by making classification the focus of the Equal 
Protection Clause," one "furthers the ideal of individualism" by but- 
tressing the "ideal of treating people as 'individuals."'232 The Court's 
highly individualistic conception of voting can also explain subsidiary 
aspects of the Shaw doctrine - for example, its puzzling treatment of 
the standing question.233 
As I explore in greater depth in this Part, it would not be surprising 
if the Court were uncomfortable with some of the basic attributes of 
an aggregate right for the same reasons that it is uncomfortable with 
race-based decisionmaking in general.234 For example, in the eyes of 
the Court, acceptance of a bizarrely shaped remedial district might 
suggest that it is not important which individual voters are included in 
229 See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 5i, at 643 (predicting that the Shaw doctrine will 
not end up "Crosonizing reapportionment law" but "will ultimately be understood to have Bakked 
it"). 
230 Professors Guinier and Torres have noted that voting cases involving race often call the 
Court's attention to deeper, more systemic questions about the democratic process. See LANI 
GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: RETHINKING RACE AND POWER ch. 
6 (forthcoming 200I). 
231 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647-49, 657-58 (I993). For example, there may be a connec- 
tion between the group-based nature of dilution claims and the Court's early concern about the 
"message" purportedly conveyed by bizarrely shaped districts. That is, because aggregate rights 
do not fit neatly within an individualist approach, bizarrely shaped districts - where the lack of 
fit between the two frameworks becomes most apparent -- create the "perception" that race has 
been overused. See supra pp. I 70I-02. 
232 Fiss, supra note I48, at I 26. 
233 See generally Reed, supra note 46. 
234 Some members of the Court have clearly expressed their concerns about ? 2 'S group-based 
qualities. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 5I2 U.S. 874, 892-905 (I994) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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the remedial district and that all that matters under ? 2 is what the 
group as a whole ultimately receives. Fungibility and notions of group 
entitlement, of course, sit uncomfortably within a conventional indi- 
vidual rights framework and a jurisprudence geared toward avoiding 
group-based classifications. Indeed, these notions would seem wholly 
inconsistent with the fundamental respect that liberalism accords to 
individual autonomy. 
Thus, a requirement that a state adhere to the Gingles district 
when drawing its remedial plan helps counter any impression that vot- 
ers are interchangeable or that the right inures to the group. At least 
at a superficial level, the emphasis on the remedial district's shape and 
location makes dilution claims look as if they fit within a conventional 
view of individual rights and helps downplay the significance of the 
race-conscious decisionmaking behind it. 
The Court's opaque suggestion at the end of its opinion in Shaw II 
that applying anything but a traditional approach to strict scrutiny 
would signal that the right to an undiluted vote is a "group" right235 is 
further evidence that the approach it adopted stems from the Court's 
fear that recognition of the group-related attributes of dilution claims 
require it to indulge in essentialization.236 For the Rehnquist Court, 
"group right" is a loaded term, and it is quite striking that the Court 
employed it when first forced to confront the aggregative aspects of 
dilution directly. In sum, Shaw II, for all of its unintelligible formal- 
ism, may have been a key moment in the Court's equal protection and 
voting rights jurisprudence. 
And notice what the Court did at this key moment. One might 
have expected the Court in Shaw II to follow one of two paths when 
faced with a doctrinal question that so clearly implicated these two 
competing visions of the Equal Protection Clause. First, the Court 
could have done what courts have historically done in the dilution con- 
text: allowed both conceptions of equal protection injury to coexist and 
tailored strict scrutiny to fit the unique attributes of the right to an 
undiluted vote.237 Second, the Court could have rejected the view that 
both visions can coexist and invalidated dilution claims on that 
ground. Instead, the Court simply ignored these differences and me- 
chanically applied a conventional individual rights framework. 
235 Shaw v. Hunt, 5I7 U.S. 899, 9i6-I7 (i996). 
236 See Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Comment: Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. 
FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, I04 HARV. L. REV. 107, i08-09 (i990) (identifying two main 
tenets of a "liberal, individualistic conception of equal protection" as the view that "the individ- 
ual," not the group, is "the object of fundamental rights" and the resistance to a "separation of the 
polity into racial groupings from which individuals cannot escape"). 
237 See supra section I.C. 
238 See supra p. I7I7 & n.226. 
239 See Fiss, supra note I48, at II8-24 (offering institutional justifications for the courts' 
marked preference for an individualist approach). 
240 See infra note 279. 
241 See supra p. i682. 
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That choice does not represent a viable, long-term jurisprudential 
strategy. First, the Court's approach not only leads to doctrinal inco- 
herence in dilution law, as Part III demonstrates, but unnecessarily 
burdens minority voters in their efforts to achieve equality.238 Second, 
the Court will repeatedly face questions similar to those presented in 
Shaw II outside the dilution context. The conception of harm that an 
aggregate rights framework helps explain is not limited to dilution 
claims but permeates much of our legal culture. As explained in the 
next section, many rights - particularly civil rights - fall along the 
same type of individual/group rights continuum that characterizes the 
right to vote. At some point, then, the Court must decide whether 
these competing visions of racial harm are irreconcilably in conflict. 
The remainder of this Article discusses these normative questions 
but leaves their full resolution for another day. Section IV.A examines 
some of the concerns that the Supreme Court, with its highly individu- 
alist account of rights and its antiessentialist impulses, might have 
about the group-like qualities of dilution claims. It concludes that 
these concerns can largely be traced to the unique nature of the injury 
in dilution cases. 
That conclusion means that the stakes in this conflict are very high. 
As section IV.B explains, if the Court's normative concerns about rec- 
ognizing an aggregate right go to the basic nature of the underlying in- 
jury, there is no possibility of an easy doctrinal fix. Were the Court to 
define constitutional rights in such highly individualistic terms that 
there were no room for aggregate rights, it would prevent the courts 
and Congress from recognizing a large number of concrete racial 
harms, as well as rights that promote broader structural principles es- 
sential to a well-functioning democracy. Such a move by the Court 
might even raise questions about the viability of representative democ- 
racy itself - a question worthy of much greater attention than can be 
given here. 
A. Is the Right to an Undiluted Vote an Individual Right, 
a Group Right, or Something in Between? 
The Court's trepidation about departing from a conventional indi- 
vidual rights framework is understandable.239 Indeed, many scholars 
have debated whether group rights of any sort can be integrated into a 
liberal tradition like our own.240 As noted earlier, part of that debate 
has centered on how to define an "individual" or "group" right.241 
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There are at least as many definitions of these terms as there are aca- 
demics writing about them, and the terms themselves can be defined 
along more than one axis, as Professor Post's helpful taxonomy sug- 
gests.242 "Group right" is a particularly slippery concept because the 
term is invoked in quite different contexts.243 Further, these categories 
may not be mutually exclusive, but may instead exist along the type of 
continuum described at the beginning of this Article.244 And we might 
label rights differently depending on how they are characterized.245 
Articulating a fully developed theory of what constitutes a group 
right is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, this section focuses 
on the concerns that the Supreme Court might have about the group- 
like attributes of aggregate rights - a list derived from its prior juris- 
prudence. These categories are certainly not mutually exclusive - to 
the contrary, all seem to boil down to concerns about essentialism- 
but each is addressed separately for simplicity's sake. 
i. Whether the Right to an Undiluted Vote Inures to the Individ- 
ual or to the Group. - The Court might be concerned about an aggre- 
gate right like the right to an undiluted vote because the right rises 
and falls with the treatment of the group, thus suggesting that the 
right itself inures to the group.246 An individual right typically "fo- 
cuses on the specific effect of the alleged discrimination on particular 
242 Professor Post, in deciding how to classify a right, distinguishes between right-holders and 
interests. For example, the right to hold property may be understood as an individual right- 
because it protects an interest shared by everyone in a society, not just the interest of a more nar- 
rowly defined group - even if a group of individuals (like a church or a corporation) may be the 
"right-holder" (or property owner) in some cases. Robert C. Post, Democratic Constitutionalism 
and Cultural Heterogeneity, 25 AUSTRALIANJ. LEGAL PHIL. i85, 191-92 (2000). 
243 For example, in the United States one might instinctively think of a "group right" as a right 
an individual enjoys by virtue of her membership in a group. Yet much of the literature in other 
areas of the world - particularly the literature dealing with communitarianism - conceives of a 
group right as a right that belongs to the group (often a tribe or community) as a whole and fos- 
ters interests that are distinctively those of the group, such as a community's right to cultural self- 
definition. See Allen Buchanan, The Role of Collective Rights in the Theory of Indigenous Peo- 
ples' Rights, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (1993); Peter Jones, Human Rights, 
Group Rights, and People's Rights, 2i HUM. RTS. Q. 8o (iv99); Michael McDonald, Should 
Communities Have Rights? Reflections on Liberal Individualism, 4 CAN. J.L. & 
JURISPRUDENCE 217 (1993); Douglas Sanders, Collective Rights, 13 HuM. RTS. Q. 368 (i99I); 
Henry J. Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle over Autonomy Regimes for Minori- 
ties, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. I539 (1991) (discussing such claims in the human rights context); 
Vernon Van Dyke, Collective Entities and Moral Rights: Problems in Liberal-Democratic 
Thought, 44 J. POL. 2I (i982). See generally WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, 
AND CULTURE (i989) (discussing these issues and their relation to traditional principles of liber- 
alism). 
244 See supra section I.B.i, pp. i682-84; see also Steiner, supra note 243, at I544 (noting that 
some rights share the "characteristics of both individual and group rights"). 
245 See Post, supra note 242, at I2. 
246 See Shaw v. Hunt, 917 U.S. 899, 917 (i996). 
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individuals, rather than on groups,"247 and evidence regarding the 
treatment of other group members usually cannot establish or defeat a 
claim of discrimination.248 Rights that rise and fall with the treatment 
of the group, in contrast, may involve theories of group entitlement or 
the possession of rights by a collectivity that is autonomous from its 
individual members.249 In such circumstances, the Court may fear 
that individuals receive a benefit not because they have been person- 
ally injured, but because they are members of a group to which the 
right ultimately belongs.250 Further, as Professor Melissa Williams has 
observed in a different context, group rights raise concerns about es- 
sentialism: liberalrl wariness of group-based claims . . . arises from a 
suspicion that such claims will make groups' moral status prior to in- 
dividuals' moral status and will result in the denial of individual 
equality and autonomy in the name of group equality."'25' 
The right to an undiluted vote does not fit easily into either a group 
rights or an individual rights category. While it is certainly true that 
an individual's right is linked to the status of the group, that is be- 
cause the injury being asserted by an individual is the inability to ag- 
gregate her vote. The only way to measure that individual harm is to 
evaluate the position of other group members with whom she wishes 
to coalesce. 
One might respond that the right to an undiluted vote must be a 
group right (at least in the sense the Court uses that term) because 
even an individual who cannot aggregate her vote effectively - for 
example, a racial minority in a majority-white district where voting is 
racially polarized - cannot raise a dilution claim if the group as a 
whole is fairly distributed. The status of the group seems to be what 
matters here, not the status of the individual. 
Perhaps group status is paramount here in this limited sense, but 
that is only because individual injury cannot be evaluated without ref- 
erence to the treatment of the group, not because the individual suffers 
only by virtue of her membership in the group. The injury here is not 
the inability to elect a candidate of choice, but the inability to aggre- 
gate one's vote on account of race.252 And because of the special na- 
247 Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 6i N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1003, 1005 (I986). 
248 See supra pp. I682-83 & nn.75-76. 
249 See Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimi- 
nation Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. I, 48-49 (1976). 
250 See id. at 5 I. 
251 WILLIAMS, supra note 4I, at 240. 
252 Cf supra pp. i687-88 (comparing the right to an undiluted vote to the right not to be segre- 
gated). 
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ture of the injury, that might be enough for us to conclude that the 
right is nonetheless consonant with individualist principles.253 
Consider the typical employment discrimination case. Racial mi- 
norities who are denied a job surely suffer a concrete harm. But even 
in a world without discrimination, we would expect both racial mi- 
norities and whites routinely to be denied jobs. Racial minorities are 
thus "injured" in a legal sense only when that denial is because of race. 
The same is true in redistricting. Any territorially based system 
will result in the placement of some whites in majority-minority dis- 
tricts and the placement of some minorities in majority-white districts. 
For this reason, a minority voter placed in a majority-white district is 
not "injured" when the group as a whole is distributed fairly; the harm 
she suffers is not a harm inflicted "on account of race," but one that 
naturally arises in a territorially based scheme. Although such an in- 
jury might be sufficiently concrete to confer standing, this harm is not 
a legal harm for which the Constitution or ? 2 provides a remedy. 
In contrast to conventional discrimination claims, however, in dilu- 
tion cases we can decide whether an individual has suffered harm "on 
account of race" only by looking at the relative treatment of different 
groups.254 It is the unique nature of the injury here that requires a 
group focus, not the identity of the right-holder.255 Thus, although an 
analysis of group treatment is necessary to assess the injury, the harm 
remains an individual one. 
2. Whether Deprivation of the Right to an Undiluted Vote Inflicts 
a Concrete Harm on Individuals. - The Court might also be con- 
cerned about an aggregate rights approach because the right at issue is 
unindividuated and group members are effectively fungible for dilu- 
tion purposes. In a conventional individual rights case, in contrast, 
courts can readily separate the injured from the unharmed. This con- 
253 Professor Guinier has argued that an approach that takes into account the aggregative as- 
pects of a representative democracy does not require an abandonment of an individual rights 
principle. See Guinier, No 7ivo Seats, supra note I2, at I5I I-I2; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 
2 I, at 358-64 (offering an individualist account of dilution doctrine premised on "racial taint"). 
254 For further discussion, see pp. i683-84, above. 
255 One possible test for determining whether dilution claims are consonant with individualist 
principles is whether an individual could assert such a claim. Again, segregation claims, which 
also involve an aggregate right, offer a useful analogy. A single child can certainly raise a segre- 
gation claim even though proving the harm will require the courts to examine the treatment of 
other children in the school system and any remedy granted will be systemwide, not merely con- 
fined to the plaintiff's school. The same seems to be true of dilution cases. An individual can 
theoretically assert that her vote has been diluted - that is, she is unable to aggregate her vote 
effectively due to a racial skew in the state's districting choices - even if she cannot prove that 
claim without referring to the status of racial groups and the relief she seeks necessarily involves a 
rearrangement of racial groups. Thus, as the Supreme Court itself has noted, while "the right to 
vote is personal," any remedial plan may require the restructuring of an entire districting scheme. 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 56i (I964). 
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cern presumably stems from a fear that the injury is not sufficiently 
concrete for standing purposes.256 Although the concreteness require- 
ment of standing rules implicates separation of powers issues,257 
standing doctrine is also closely tied to individualist principles - that 
is, the assumption that rights belong to the individual and that only 
the individual may pursue a remedy for the harm she has suffered, 
even if that harm is inflicted because of the individual's membership 
in a group.258 That is presumably why fungibility sits uncomfortably 
in an individualist framework.259 
For those minority voters who would be able to elect their candi- 
date of choice but for the racial skew operating in the distribution of 
voters, concreteness seems an unlikely ground for rejecting dilution 
claims.260 Moreover, to the extent that fungibility is a concern in this 
context, it is certainly possible to hypothesize a case in which a court 
could distinguish between group members who are injured and those 
who are unharmed. For example, as noted above, if polarized voting 
occurred in only one part of the state, voters in another area of the 
state - where group members' ability to aggregate their votes was not 
thwarted by polarized voting - would not be able to assert an injury, 
and it would be problematic to treat them as fungible for remedial 
purposes.261 
The Court's concern with concreteness is much weightier for those 
individuals who will remain in a majority-white district under either 
the dilutive or the remedial plan. For example, imagine that a Latino 
lives in a large, all-white suburban neighborhood far from any other 
Latinos. As long as the state adheres to a territorially based system 
with contiguous districts and voting is racially polarized throughout 
the state, he will always be outvoted by his white neighbors. That is 
true even if Latinos in other parts of the state can establish a dilution 
claim and obtain a remedial district. As long as the remedial Latino- 
majority district is contiguous, it will not reach our hypothetical voter. 
256 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-6i (I992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 
737, 752 (1984); Pildes & Niemi, supra note i6, at 5I3. 
257 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559-60. 
258 See Charles Kelso & P. Randall Kelso, Standing to Sue: Transformations in Supreme Court 
Methodology, Doctrine and Results, 28 U. TOL. L. REV 93, 94 (i996) (arguing that standing doc- 
trine is difficult to apply in situations in which groups, rather than individuals, are injured); Ste- 
ven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 
137I, I459 (i988) ("'Standing' is a metaphor of individualism."). 
259 See Brest, supra note 249, at 5i; Guinier, Emperor's Clothes, supra note 46, at i6I2. 
260 Indeed, the remedy in dilution cases is always immediate and is only applied when someone 
has already been injured. Grofman, supra note 86, at 1246; cf Smith v. City of Cleveland 
Heights, 760 F.2d 720, 723 (6th Cir. I985) (finding that injury to an African-American living in an 
area where racial steering took place is "direct and concrete" because it is "peculiar ... to a dis- 
tinct group of which he is a part"). 
261 See supra p. 1714; see also Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 46, at 2282 n.33. 
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One might argue that this voter has not been sufficiently injured by 
the dilutive plan to have standing. To be sure, the first question that 
comes to mind is whether a Latino living in a white, suburban neigh- 
borhood has more in common with Latinos living in poor, urban areas 
than with his white, middle-class neighbors.262 This argument is a 
variant of the essentialization argument, which I discuss in the next 
section.263 For now, I assume our hypothetical Latino shares the same 
interests and political goals as other Latinos. 
Even accepting this assumption, we nonetheless face a difficult 
problem: no matter what happens, he will never be able to elect his 
candidate of choice, and a dilution remedy will have no effect on his 
relationship with his own representative. To conclude that this indi- 
vidual has standing to assert a dilution claim, we must articulate a 
theory of injury that does not depend on his eventual placement in a 
majority-Latino district. 
We might describe the injury in the following way: although no La- 
tino voter in the state is entitled to elect a candidate of choice, each is 
entitled to know that the reason he or she cannot do so is not due to a 
racial skew.264 But here our hypothetical voter knows that, with or 
without the racial skew, he would never be able to elect a candidate of 
choice as long as voting is racially polarized. 
A stronger response would be to argue that our plaintiff has a con- 
crete interest in what happens in other districts. Acceptance of this 
view would require a fairly robust theory of democratic representation. 
Specifically, the Court would have to accept that "fairness" in redis- 
tricting involves something more than the relationship between a con- 
stituent and her direct representative. On this view, voters are not 
only interested in the service their representative provides or how their 
representative votes, but in the proper functioning of the legislature it- 
self. For example, our hypothetical Latino voter might have good rea- 
son to prefer a legislature in which at least one candidate chosen by 
Latino voters is able to take part in coalition building or legislative 
deliberation, or he might simply believe that the legislative process im- 
proves when it includes a more diverse range of voices and interests.265 
262 See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 908 (I995). 
263 See infra section IV.A.3, pp. I72 7-32. 
264 See supra p. i686. 
265 This theory of harm would seem to explain the injury of dilution whether one prefers a de- 
liberative or a pluralist, interests-oriented account of democracy. In the latter instance, of course, 
a racial minority has lost an opportunity to have a representative in the legislature pursuing his 
interests. In the former instance, our hypothetical Latino voter has lost the opportunity to have 
his representative offer a distinct voice to the process of deliberation. As Professor Michelman 
points out, one need not assume that "deliberative politics . . . demand[s] of participants the sub- 
mergence of their individualities . . . in a collective being or common good." Frank I. Michelman, 
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Another possible response - one I am exploring in a forthcoming arti- 
cle - is that the right derives from a structural principle regarding the 
way democracy should function. On that view, all Latinos - indeed, 
all voters - have an interest in a well-functioning democracy that 
makes room for the perspectives of racial minorities.266 The absence 
of concreteness stems from the fact that the right is a structural one 
rather than a classic individual harm. 
In addition to requiring significant changes in standing doctrine, 
this approach would require a broader view of the right to an undi- 
luted vote.267 At present, dilution claims largely involve easy mathe- 
matical standards - a court analyzes whether there is rough propor- 
tionality and, if not, whether there is a good reason for its absence. 
And although courts ruling on dilution claims dutifully recite the nine 
Senate factors, which require courts to consider the quality of repre- 
sentation that minority groups receive,268 dilution claims almost al- 
ways come down to a quantitative judgment.269 Although this quanti- 
tative approach certainly has its own shortcomings,270 it is at least a 
judicially manageable standard. Shifting to a qualitative standard for 
dilution, in contrast, would lead the courts further into the political 
thicket, in which there are no easy baselines for assessing what is fair. 
Courts would have to make nuanced judgments about what participa- 
tion means, how to define representation, and how to evaluate whether 
racial minorities are full participants in our democracy. 
In any case, here, too, we find ourselves in the quandary discussed 
above.27' What makes dilution claims more "group-like" is the special 
nature of the injury. To the extent that the Court is uncomfortable 
with this aspect of dilution doctrine, there is no easy doctrinal fix; 
there is nothing we can do to make dilution claims function exactly 
like conventional individual rights claims. 
3. Whether Preventing Dilution Requires a Court To Indulge in 
Essentialization. - An aggregate right may also raise concerns about 
essentialization - the fear that vindicating the right would require as- 
sumptions about the political preferences of minority voters based on 
their racial identity.272 Indeed, much of the Court's concern that dilu- 
tion claims implicate a "group right" stems from this discomfort. The 
Conceptions of Democracy: The Case of Voting Rights, 4i FLA. L. REV. 443, 448 (1989); see also 
Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L. J. 1493, I504 (1988). 
266 Such a theory would result in a different Article III problem because every voter would pre- 
sumably share this interest and thus have standing to assert a claim. 
267 See supra note 21 (discussing related issues). 
268 See id. 
269 See supra p. i673 & n.39. 
270 For examples of authors discussing these shortcomings, see infra note 283. 
271 See supra p. I723-24. 
272 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647-49, 65 7-58 (I993). 
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Court's reluctance to endorse an aggregate right should not surprise 
us. To return to our hypothetical Latino voter in the suburbs, a court 
might be unwilling to assume that he shares the same interests and 
concerns as Latino voters in poorer, urban areas. When voting is ra- 
cially polarized between whites and Latinos in both the suburbs and 
the city, there are many reasons to make such an assumption. Polari- 
zation across socioeconomic classes strongly suggests that race is the 
source of that polarization and that Latinos of all classes are politically 
aligned. After all, even if our hypothetical Latino voter has not suf- 
fered the type of economic harms often associated with racism, history 
suggests that race remains a salient characteristic in his life.273 Indeed, 
even when the cohesion of African-American voters and the divisions 
between those voters and white voters are explained just as effectively 
by economic status as by racial identity, courts have been willing to as- 
sume that race, not economics, is the source of these voting patterns.274 
Further, denying the possibility of such connections based solely on 
class or geography would prevent our hypothetical Latino voter and 
other members of his group from choosing and defining their own col- 
lective identity.275 Nonetheless, although the courts routinely indulge 
in such assumptions when politics are involved - no one worries 
about concluding that the Democrats stranded in Orange County care 
whether other voters can elect Democrats to the California legislature 
-the Supreme Court has never thought of race as a political con- 
struction276 and has already shown its reluctance to assume that mi- 
nority voters from different classes and neighborhoods share enough in 
common to justify treating them as a group.277 Presumably, the Court 
fears that when states move individual members of a minority group 
around in a districting scheme to comply with ? 2, they are treating 
them, to quote Professor Bernard Williams, merely "as the surface to 
which a certain [political] label can be applied."278 
The typical response to this concern has been to point out that 
there is no danger of essentialization when the individual has deliber- 
273 See Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class, 68 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 939, 967-88 (I997) (discussing racial discrimination experienced by African- 
American members of the middle class); Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: 
Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEX. L. REV. i847 (I996) (same); Rubin, supra note 3, at I I4 (same). 
274 See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 62-66 (I986). 
275 See generally GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 230 (proposing race as a political category 
that allows for self-identification and definition). 
276 See generally id. (proposing that race be understood as a political construction). 
277 See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 9o8 (I995) (noting that the inclusion of different Afri- 
can-Americans "tells a tale of disparity, not community"). 
278 Bernard Williams, The Idea of Equality, in MORAL CONCEPTS 153, 159 (Joel Feinberg ed., 
i969). Indeed, fear that the Voting Rights Act conceives of racial groups "largely as political in- 
terest groups" has concerned a number of its critics. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 5I2 U.S. 874, 905 
(I994) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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ately chosen that identity.279 To put this theory in more pragmatic 
terms, ? 2 is triggered only when voting is racially polarized280 - that 
is, when both whites and minorities are in fact voting along racial 
lines.281 
This response is not a complete one, however. Even if we focus on 
group status because most group members have chosen to self-identify 
along racial lines, we might fear that the state is treating the few group 
members who do not share the preferences of the group as if they do. 
This was the nub of Justice Thomas's attack on ? 2 in Holder v. 
Hall,282 in which he excoriated proponents of ? 2 for purportedly 
treating all members of a minority group as if they "think alike."283 
Professor Guinier has offered one theory for addressing Justice 
Thomas's concern. In territorially based districting schemes, the state 
must make assumptions about individuals' substantive preferences in 
order to comply with ? 2 and other districting criteria. A cumulative 
voting scheme, Professor Guinier argues, allows individuals to coalesce 
279 This argument is similar to one sometimes offered by scholars trying to reconcile various 
strands of communitarian thought with the tenets of liberalism. See KYMLICKA, supra note 243, 
at 49, i62-81, 194-205, 254; THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES (Will Kymlicka ed., I995) 
(providing a collection of essays related to this topic); WILLIAMS, supra note 4I, at I5, 203-37, 
239-43; Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, go MICH. L. REV. 
685 (1992) (rejecting the notion that liberalism is incompatible with communitarianism); Daniel R. 
Ortiz, Correspondence, Saving the Self?, 9i MICH. L. REV. ioi8 (1993) (same). As Professor 
Steiner has noted, however, references in liberal political theory to groups and group rights are 
"guarded (if not hostile)." Steiner, supra note 243, at I549. 
280 See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, I056 (i996) (Souter, J., dissenting); Karlan & Levinson, su- 
pra note 46, at 12i6. 
281 For example, Professors Karlan and Levinson have argued that "racial and ethnic group 
affiliation in the political process" is "voluntary" because "race is first and foremost an internal 
identification, generated through the political positions taken by members of a discrete, demog- 
raphically-identifiable group." Karlan & Levinson, supra note 46, at 1217 (emphasis omitted). 
Similarly, Professor Issacharoff has argued that "group status" under Gingles is "self-generated by 
the voting patterns of those claiming statutory protection." Issacharoff, supra note ii, at 887. 
Thus, these commentators argue, voters who choose to "affiliate along racial lines to participate in 
the political process" should be able to do so "on an equal footing with voters who choose to affili- 
ate based on other shared characteristics." Karlan & Levinson, supra note 46, at M2g9; see also 
WILLIAMS, supra note 41, at 206; Rubin, supra note 3, at II4; cf. Fiss, supra note 148, at 148 
(making the same argument in more general terms to support subordination theory); Guinier, Em- 
peror's Clothes, supra note 46, at i634-35 (arguing for the empowerment of self-identified groups). 
282 5I2 U.S. 874 (I994). 
283 Holder, 512 U.S. at 906 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Professor Guinier has 
addressed this concern at length in [E]racing Democracy, supra note 46, at ii8-25. Professor 
Melissa Williams has offered another response to Justice Thomas's view, arguing in VOICE, 
TRUST, AND MEMORY, supra note 4i, at 176-202, that shared experiences among minority 
groups are sufficient to establish a commonality of interest. See also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. 
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 400-0I (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Eisgruber, supra note 59, at 35I 
(I997) (arguing that the fact that minority voters may share common interests does not require us 
to assume that they think alike); Eisgruber, supra note I2i, at 523 (same). 
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along whatever lines they wish without requiring the state to involve 
itself in these groupings.284 
Assuming that we retain territorially based districting schemes, a 
different response to the antiessentialist challenge would return us to 
? 2 'S procedural underpinnings. A dilution suit can be understood as 
vindicating the principle that fairness in redistricting requires that in- 
dividuals have the opportunity to aggregate their votes effectively 
along certain lines (be they racial, political, etc.285) should they choose 
to do So.286 When voting is not racially polarized, minority group 
members can aggregate their votes no matter how the lines are drawn 
because they are voting in roughly the same way that whites are vot- 
ing. But where voting is polarized, the state must take special care to 
ensure that it does not prevent minority voters from aggregating their 
votes. An aggregate rights framework, then, is simply a procedural fix 
designed to equalize an individual's opportunity to make her vote 
count, regardless of how she ultimately decides to vote.287 
The Supreme Court has taken precisely this approach in the one- 
person, one-vote cases, which require that states include a roughly 
equal number of voters in all state and congressional districts.288 
These cases were originally fashioned as equal protection claims based 
on the assumption that rural voters - who enjoyed a disproportionate 
share of voting power in the legislature because their districts were so 
underpopulated - had different interests from urban voters, who were 
typically the victims of such schemes.289 The Court gradually rede- 
fined the right in process-based terms to avoid the problem of essen- 
tialization. Thus, rather than describing the right to equipopulosity as 
the right of urban voters to influence the voting process as a group or 
to attain particular substantive outcomes, the Court eventually cast it 
284 See Guiner, [Eiracing Democracy, supra note 46; Guinier, No TAo Seats, supra note I2. 
285 Obviously, a state cannot ensure that members of every political, racial, social, or religious 
group have a fair chance to aggregate their votes under every scheme; a normative decision must 
be made regarding which voters we wish to protect. See WILLIAMS, supra note 4i, at 26. 
286 See id. at io-T i (describing the dilution doctrine in this fashion). 
287 See Issacharoff, supra note 9, at i865 (identifying ? 2 as a "process correction" mechanism, 
distinct from "purely outcome-driven civil rights claims against the distribution of goods and op- 
portunities in this society"); Karlan, supra note 2i, at 178 (noting process-based underpinnings of 
the Gingles compactness requirement). 
288 The one-person, one-vote principle requires almost mathematical equality among congres- 
sional districts. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730-3I (i983). But see Abrams v. Johnson, 
521 U.S. 74, 98-ioi (I997) (approving higher deviations in the creation of congressional districts 
among other reasons to accommodate the state interest in preserving communities of interest). 
Courts apply a slightly more lenient standard to state or local districts. See, e.g., Mahan v. How- 
ell, 41O U.S. 3I5, 324-25 (I973) (permitting more flexibility in state or local districting than in 
congressional districting). 
289 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. i86, 273 (i962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting the com- 
plaint as challenging a "purposeful and systematic plan to discriminate against a geographical 
class of persons"). 
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as the right of every citizen to have an equal opportunity to participate 
in the political process, regardless of his or her views.290 Indeed, some 
have argued that the Court has gone even further by defining the right 
as nothing more than a guarantee to an equal share of a representa- 
tive's attention - a right easily vindicated by ensuring that every rep- 
resentative serves the same number of constituents.291 
Procedurally defined rights fit more easily within an individual 
rights approach. At least in theory, they require no substantive judg- 
ments about what is fair and allow courts to treat all individuals the 
same way regardless of their views, thereby avoiding the problem of 
essentialization.292 Indeed, the Court itself explicitly grounded its 
characterization of the one-person, one-vote principle in antiessentialist 
terms: "[A]ll who participate in the election are to have an equal vote 
whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever their occupation, 
whatever their income, and wherever their home may be in that geo- 
graphical unit."293 
Similarly, the alterations to a dilutive scheme required by ? 2 need 
not be premised on the assumption that group members will vote alike 
any more than the one-person, one-vote rule hinges on the view that 
equipopulosity will alter electoral results. Both simply ensure that, if 
members of a group (whether defined in geographic or racial terms) 
choose to affiliate along certain lines, they will have a fair opportunity 
to do so. I call this a "proceduralist" approach for want of a better 
term.294 A proceduralist account is deliberately designed to ignore the 
substantive preferences of voters and the way those preferences are fil- 
tered through the legislative process; it is concerned solely with the 
manner in which voters aggregate their votes on election day. 
This answer, however, has its own limitations. A proceduralist ac- 
count risks ignoring the complex role that political groups play within 
the democratic process.295 While such an approach concededly offers a 
manageable, easily applied standard for judges and redistricters, it also 
prevents courts from assessing the conditions under which cross-racial 
alliances can form, the effect of racial minorities' participation on po- 
290 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565, 568 (i964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. I, I4 (i964); 
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-80 (i963). Indeed, the Court has often described the injury as 
one grounded in the right to full citizenship. See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 567 (noting that de- 
basement of the vote makes an individual "that much less a citizen'). 
291 See Reed, supra note 46, at 454-55 (i999); Guinier, supra note 47, at I-5. 
292 See WILLIAMS, supra note 4I, at 9. 
293 Gray, 372 U.S. at 379. 
294 That term has been used in a different sense, and with a great deal more precision, by Pro- 
fessor Michelman. See Frank I. Michelman, Dilemmas of Belonging: Moral Truth, Human Rights, 
and Why We Might Not Want a Representative Judiciary, 47 UCLA L. REV. I 2 2 I, I 2 34 (2 000). 
295 I detail these issues in a forthcoming article. Heather K. Gerken, Looking Ahead: The 
Limits of Procedural Accounts of Voting (Feb. 23, 200I) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
Harvard Law School Library). 
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litical debate, the quality of representation received by racial minori- 
ties, constitutive aspects of participation, or the dynamics of the legis- 
lative process after election day. 
Precisely because this approach provides such a thin conception of 
voting - one that is arguably at odds with the basic theories that give 
rise to concerns about vote dilution296- one might prefer a third al- 
ternative: accepting that courts cannot remedy the aggregate harm of 
dilution without indulging in some assumptions about the political 
preferences of minority voters. On this view, the cost of making such 
assumptions is minor when compared to the alternative: the dilution of 
minority votes that will inevitably result from a colorblind ap- 
proach.297 
In any case, whatever choice one prefers, what matters for the pur- 
poses of this Article is that the necessity of making the choice stems, 
once again, from the injury at issue. Dilution claims are about the ag- 
gregation of group preferences, and the identification of group prefer- 
ences is fraught with difficulties, particularly in the context of race. 
For that reason, to the extent the Court remains uncomfortable with 
the group-based nature of dilution claims, no easy doctrinal change 
can eliminate this problem. 
4. An Issue Outside the Aggregate Rights Debate: The Antidis- 
crimination Principle. - Even if one were willing to conclude that an 
aggregate right is properly understood as an individual right (albeit not 
a conventional individual right), two questions would remain: who 
should be able to assert the right, and when should she be able to do 
so? Here, in contrast to the characteristics of dilution claims identified 
above, these questions can be addressed without reference to the in- 
jury at issue. They therefore need not be considered when deciding 
whether dilution claims themselves are consistent with individualist 
principles. 
Scholars generally invoke two main normative theories to explain 
who should be able to assert a right under the Equal Protection Clause 
and when she should be able to do so: the antidiscrimination principle 
and the subordination theory. The antidiscrimination principle, which 
has long been "the predominant interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause,"298 provides that individuals should not be treated differently 
296 See supra section I.A.2, pp. i676-8i. 
297 Frank Michelman has argued that Justice Brennan's decisions reflect such an approach 
and may nonetheless be consonant with principles of liberal individualism. See Frank Michel- 
man, Super Liberal: Romance, Community, and Tradition in William J. Brennan, Jr.'s Constitu- 
tional Thought, 77 VA. L. REV. I26i, I290-I326 (i99i). For an opposing critique of Justice Bren- 
nan's affirmative action jurisprudence, see Fried, supra note 236. 
298 Fiss, supra note I48, at ii8, I23 (describing the "highly individualistic" nature of the anti- 
discrimination principle); cf. Guinier, Emperor's Clothes, supra note 46, at i620 (describing cri- 
tiques of the Voting Rights Act). 
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based on arbitrary criteria.299 It thus focuses on the motivations of the 
decisionmaker.30 Inflicting an injury on the basis of race is improper 
because race is an "irrational" basis for making decisions about indi- 
viduals.301 The subordination theory,302 in contrast, focuses not on in- 
tentional discrimination, but on action that has the effect of further 
disadvantaging a group that has traditionally been relegated to an in- 
ferior position in society.303 
The antidiscrimination principle dictates that both whites and ra- 
cial minorities should be able to bring dilution claims. Given its focus 
on illicit intent, it would also require that the baseline for measuring 
whether dilution has occurred be a race-neutral scheme.304 Advocates 
of the subordination theory, in contrast, would be concerned only 
about dilution suffered by racial minorities, not whites. And the stan- 
dard for evaluating what is "fair" would not be race neutrality. In- 
stead, the subordination theory, with its focus on societal harms, would 
likely find unacceptable any districting scheme that falls short of soci- 
ety's perception of what is "fair" - anything less would exacerbate the 
powerlessness of an already subordinated group305 and further stigma- 
tize minority group members.306 
Whether or not the antidiscrimination principle is properly equated 
with an individualist approach,307 however, any inconsistencies be- 
299 Fiss, supra note 148, at i09. 
300 Colker, supra note 247, at I005; Strauss, supra note 66, at 945. 
301 Strauss, supra note 66, at 940-4I; see also Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment 
Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 241, 263-313 (1971) (describing an individualist, "color-blind" ap- 
proach and critiquing that approach); Peter J. Rubin, Equal Rights, Special Rights, and the Na- 
ture of Antidiscrimination Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 564, 568 (i998) (same). See generally Fiss, su- 
pra note I48, at i08-28, I29-77 (describing and critiquing this approach and offering an 
alternative view). 
302 Owen Fiss offered an early articulation of the subordination theory in his seminal piece, 
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause. See Fiss, supra note 148, at 107-08. Erving Goffman's 
book, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (i963), has also 
proved to be a seminal work in this area. 
303 Colker, supra note 247, at 1007-08; Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, I976 Term- 
Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 9i HARV. L. REV. i, 8 (1977); 
Strauss, supra note 66, at 943; Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 24I0, 
2411I-I2 (I994). The subordination theory can take a number of forms. Professor Strauss has, for 
example, described four different varieties: (i) subordination, (2) stigma, (3) second-class citizen- 
ship, and (4) encouragement of prejudice. Strauss, supra note 66, at 94I-44. As Professor Strauss 
acknowledges, although the focus of these theories is different, they "overlap and their boundaries 
are not clear." Id. at 940, 945. For simplicity's sake, I group all of these theories under the rubric 
of "subordination." 
304 Colker, supra note 247, at I005; Strauss, supra note 66, at 945. 
305 See Fiss, supra note I48, at 152-54 (emphasizing the special importance of remedying dis- 
parities in political power). 
306 See Karlan, supra note 2 I, at 21I4-15; Karlan, supra note 4I, at 42-43. 
307 The equation of the two is certainly understandable, for the former "yields a highly indi- 
vidualized conception of rights." Fiss, supra note I48, at I27; see also Fiss, supra note 30I, at 24I. 
Nonetheless, many commentators have argued that rights derived under a subordination theory 
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tween current dilution doctrine and the antidiscrimination principle do 
not stem from the injury in question. They therefore can be remedied 
with a doctrinal fix. 
Imagine, for example, that the Supreme Court explicitly held that 
the antidiscrimination principle is the sole normative theory for adju- 
dicating racial harms under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend- 
ments. If a lower court had held that only racial minorities could as- 
sert dilution claims, the Supreme Court could correct that problem 
without calling into question the aggregate nature of the dilution in- 
jury. That is because anyone can assert an aggregate right under this 
principle. The injury at issue is the same no matter who asserts it. 
Indeed, the framework sketched out above would work equally well 
for vote dilution suffered by whites, Republicans, or members of the 
Christian Right. 
The same is true for the standard one chooses to define what is 
"fair." If the Court were to conclude that the proportionality standard 
is inconsistent with the antidiscrimination principle,308 rejection of that 
are consonant with an individual rights approach. See Colker, supra note 247, at ioii n.24; Fiss, 
supra note I48, at I23-26, I59-60; Karst, supra note 303, at 7. And Professor Brest has offered an 
individual rights theory for considering group-related harms, stigma, and aggregative injuries. 
See Brest, supra note 249, at 48. Professor Melissa Williams has gone further, asserting that rec- 
ognition of group status in vindicating what she terms "group-based claims" is essential to 
achieving liberal ideals. WILLIAMS, supra note 4I, at 239-43. 
308 At first glance, one might mistakenly think that proportionality is an inappropriate remedy 
because it represents more than a minority group could hope to gain in a winner-take-all system 
like our own. Winner-take-all schemes are systematically skewed against electoral minorities of 
all sorts. Thus, "one can expect a [group] with even a narrow majority statewide to win a much 
larger proportion of seats than its proportion of the statewide vote." Marylanders for Fair Repre- 
sentation v. Schaeffer, 849 F. Supp. I022, I042 (D. Md. I994); see CAIN, supra note I4, at i66-68; 
REIN TAAGEPERA & MATTHEW SHUGART, SEATS AND VOTES: THE EFFECTS AND DE- 
TERMINANTS OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 233 (i989); Sanford Levinson, Gerrymandering and 
the Brooding Omnipresence of Proportional Representation: Why Won't It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L. 
REV. 257, 267-68 (i985); Richard Niemi & Stephen G. Wright, Majority-Win Percentages: An 
Approach to the Votes-Seats Relationship in Light of Davis v. Bandemer, in POLITICAL 
GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 266, 278 n.4 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990); Pildes, supra 
note i9, at 2530-31. Political scientists have used the "Cube Law" as a rough rule of thumb for 
calculating this "disproportionality effect." The Cube Law was first formulated during the early 
I900S in an effort to justify the absence of proportionality in British elections; two scholars re- 
vived it during the I950s. See TAAGEPERA & SHUGART, supra, at I58, 208. Under the Cube 
Law, a group that represents three of every five voters will, ceteris paribus, control a ratio of seats 
that equals 33/23, or 27/8. See id. at I58. Thus, a party with only sixty percent of the population 
will generally win seventy-seven percent (27/35) of the available seats. 
If past government conduct can properly be understood as the source of racially polarized 
voting, then the "disproportionality effect" routinely observed in winner-take-all elections becomes 
more problematic, and the proportionality standard can be defended more readily under the anti- 
discrimination principle. The injury to be remedied in a dilution case would not be that a racial 
group is an electoral minority, but that voting is racially polarized. After all, the votes of a racial 
minority would be fully effective if voting were not racially polarized - that is, they would enjoy 
a roughly proportional share of political power - because their preferences would not differ in 
any relevant respect from those of the white majority. See Briffault, supra note 46, at 28-30; 
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standard would not prevent the Court from recognizing the injury of 
dilution. What matters in an aggregate rights context is that some 
group-based measure is used for evaluating fairness; it need not be 
proportionality.309 And even if the Supreme Court were to abandon 
proportionality as a measure of fairness, we would nonetheless need to 
examine the relative treatment of groups to determine whether an in- 
jury exists at all. 
The same would be true if the Court elevated the subordination 
theory to constitutional status. The subordination theory merely su- 
perimposes a second level of injury on the underlying aggregate harm; 
it infers stigma or a reinforcement of second-class citizenship from the 
fact that a minority group member's vote has been diluted. We would 
therefore still need a framework for defining and recognizing when the 
underlying injury, dilution, has occurred and what should be done to 
remedy it. 
In short, our choice of a normative theory for identifying who can 
assert a claim and when she can assert it is largely irrelevant to an ag- 
gregate rights framework. To the extent that the Court prefers one 
normative theory over another, it can address this concern by shifting 
the standard for identifying the right-holder and measuring fairness. 
It need not, however, reject the basic theory of aggregate harms behind 
? 2. 
B. The Choice Before the Court 
Section IV.A makes two things clear. First, the Supreme Court is 
correct when it asserts that certain attributes of an aggregate right 
push the right to an undiluted vote further down the individual/group 
rights continuum. The right to an undiluted vote cannot be squeezed 
into the highly individualistic account of equal protection rights that 
we see in many of the Court's recent decisions. Second, the group- 
related attributes of the right to an undiluted vote stem from the un- 
derlying injury itself. There is therefore no easy doctrinal "fix" to rec- 
oncile these competing visions of racial harm. 
These facts present the Court with a stark choice. It is fair to as- 
sume that the Court will not knowingly recognize a "group right," at 
least as the Court understands that term.310 Thus, it must either adopt 
a theory of individual rights flexible enough to include the group-based 
King, Bruce & Gelman, supra note 63, at 95-96. Their situation would be comparable to that of 
people of Swedish origin or those whose last names begin with the letter "Y". While these groups 
are certainly in the electoral "minority," their votes are not diluted because no one is voting consis- 
tently against their preferences. For these reasons, proportionality is an appropriate remedy for 
the true source of vote dilution. 
309 See supra pp. i68o-8i. 
310 See supra section IVIA. 
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aspects of dilution claims or come to grips with the tension between its 
own individualist impulses and the constitutionality of ? 2. 
One might think that a third alternative is available to the Court: 
muddling through. On this view, the Court could continue to ignore 
the differences between aggregate rights and conventional individual 
rights. But that strategy is not viable in the long term. The tensions 
between these two competing conceptions of racial harm will continue 
to build, and doctrinal conflicts will continue to multiply.311 At some 
point these pressures will become so great that the Court will no 
longer be able to maintain the fiction that aggregate rights and con- 
ventional individual rights are indistinguishable. Moreover, as noted 
above,312 the Court's adherence to this approach comes at the cost of 
imposing burdensome and doctrinally incoherent restrictions on the 
states' efforts to augment minority voting strength. 
Proponents of ? 2 may prefer these costs to the obvious alternative 
having the Supreme Court squarely address the constitutionality of 
? 2. Indeed, this Article suggests that the Court could theoretically in- 
validate ? 2 on grounds that are quite different from those suggested 
by other commentators, who have focused on the adequacy of Con- 
gress's justification for adopting a results-based test for measuring dis- 
crimination.313 
Under City of Boerne v. Flores,314 Congress has the power to enact 
prophylactic rules to prevent the deprivation of constitutional rights, 
and it may take steps to remedy past constitutional harms.315 The 
most likely basis for challenging the constitutionality of ? 2 is the ar- 
gument that the results-based test adopted by Congress - and the 
remedy of proportionality - is not "congruent" or "proportional" to 
the underlying harm. Defenders of ? 2 would have to establish that 
Congress had an adequate factual record to conclude either that it is 
fair to infer intentional discrimination from a state's failure to achieve 
proportionality or that the requirement of proportionality is an appro- 
priate remedy for intentional discrimination.316 
This Article suggests that there may be a second, less obvious 
ground for questioning the constitutionality of ? 2 under City of 
Boerne. City of Boerne held that Congress cannot "alter[] the mean- 
311 Judith Reed has identified one such example. She explains that the Court's highly indi- 
vidualistic conception of the right to vote led to a standing principle in the Shaw cases that many 
find difficult to reconcile with established standing doctrine. See Reed, supra note 46, at 418. 
312 See supra pp. I 7 i6-I 7. 
313 See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and 
Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725 (i998). 
314 521 U.S. 507 (I997). 
315 Id. at 517-22. 
316 Such an argument would likely track the analysis provided by Professor Karlan in a recent 
article defending the statute. See Karlan, supra note 313. 
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ing" of the Constitution or "chang[e] what the right js.'317 While Con- 
gress may adopt prophylactic measures to prevent future deprivations 
of a constitutional right or offer remedies for past deprivations, the 
Court has held that the power to identify the underlying right itself 
rests exclusively with the judiciary.318 If the Court were to conclude 
that the Constitution recognizes only the type of conventional individ- 
ual harm we see in its recent equal protection jurisprudence, then ag- 
gregate rights, with their group-based attributes, arguably exceed the 
scope of the injury that the Constitution recognizes. Congress would 
thus lack the power to vindicate these rights. 
One major problem for those who seek to invalidate ? 2 on these 
grounds is that any such attack would apply equally to intentional 
dilution claims brought under the Constitution, which the Court itself 
has endorsed.319 While the first ground of attack noted above would 
preclude a results-based statutory standard for dilution claims, it 
would leave in place intentional dilution claims brought under the 
Constitution. An attack on the aggregate aspects of dilution claims, in 
contrast, would go to the injury itself, and that injury is common to 
both the statutory and constitutional rights. In short, the Court cannot 
easily make the aggregate rights problem go away. 
In any case, the lack of a conceptual framework for resolving this 
question certainly increases the risk that the Court will take the ex- 
traordinary step of declaring ? 2 unconstitutional. Without a theory 
for understanding precisely what makes dilution claims different, the 
Court might repeat the mistake it made in Shaw II: condemning any 
right that takes groups into account as a group right. As Part I and 
section IV.A establish, the dilution injury requires taking groups into 
account. Thus, the conceptual framework proposed here at least offers 
an appropriate approach for identifying and resolving the possible 
sources of the Court's concern. 
Even setting aside the fate of ? 2, an aggregate rights framework is 
helpful because it shows us what else is at stake in this controversy. 
This framework makes clear that rejection of an aggregate harm in the 
context of vote dilution will hold serious consequences for many other 
areas of the law. 
Consider first the one-person, one-vote doctrine. Although the 
right to an equally weighted vote is typically considered a classic "in- 
dividual right," it shares the characteristics of an aggregate right.320 
317 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. 
318 Id. at 5I9-21. 
319 See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 6I3, 615 (I982). 
320 Compare Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 56I (i963) (describing the right as an individual 
one), Briffault, supra note 46, at 28-29 (noting that the Court classifies the right as an individual 
one despite its group-based characteristics), Cain, supra note 46, at 128 (describing the right as an 
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Like dilution, the one-person, one-vote doctrine focuses on the aggrega- 
tive qualities of voting - a court measures whether an individual's 
vote is equal to another's by considering whether the number of votes 
aggregated to elect a candidate in one district equals the number of 
votes aggregated in another district to do the same.321 An individual's 
right similarly rises and falls with the treatment of the group (albeit a 
geographically defined group rather than a racially defined one); if 
each district contains an equal number of voters, no individual voter 
therein can assert a one-person, one-vote claim. And the right is unin- 
dividuated among members of the group; no individual in a district is 
more or less injured than any other. 
Similarly, many civil rights claims involve aggregate harms. For 
example, Title VII disparate impact claims challenge neutral employ- 
ment practices that have a disparate impact on members of a minority 
group. The only way to assess whether an individual has been denied 
a job as a result of a racially skewed process is to compare the treat- 
ment of members of her group with the treatment of white applicants. 
Thus, individual claims of injury hinge at least in part on the treat- 
ment of the group. 
As detailed in Part I, segregation claims offer another example of 
an aggregate harm. In segregation cases, the harm arises from the ar- 
rangement of different racial groups, again necessitating an examina- 
tion of group treatment to assess an individual claim. 
The rejection of an aggregate rights theory would also have impli- 
cations for broader normative theories that explain when a civil rights 
individual one), Guinier, Emperor's Clothes, supra note 46, at I597 (noting that the Court's termi- 
nology suggests that the right is an individual one), Issacharoff, supra note 9, at i856-58 (noting 
that the Court "unambiguously expressed the right ... in terms of individual entitlements" but 
describing the right's group-based characteristics), and Sunstein, supra note 303, at 24Io (de- 
scribing the one-person, one-vote right as an "idea that every citizen should have the same power 
over political outcomes"), with Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 8i8-ig (i968) (describing this prin- 
ciple as forbidding "the idea that one group can be granted greater voting strength than another"), 
Guinier, Emperor's Clothes, supra note 46, at I595 (arguing that the one-person, one-vote principle 
is "consistent with both group and individual conceptions of voting"), Issacharoff & Karlan, supra 
note 46, at 2282 n.30 (asserting that one-person, one-vote cases "should be viewed as cases about 
group political power ... rather than purely about individual rights"), Pamela S. Karlan, The 
Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 7I TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1717-18 (I993) (same), 
and Low-Beer, supra note 46, at i64 (classifying the right as "both an individual and a group 
right"). 
321 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. i86, 207-o8 (i96i); Guinier, Em- 
peror's Clothes, supra note 46, at I597-98; cf. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 846-48 (i983) (re- 
jecting a one-person, one-vote claim because it challenged a single district rather than the state- 
wide plan). As Justice Powell explained, "[w]hile population disparities do dilute the weight of 
individual votes, their discriminatory effect is felt only when those individual votes are com- 
bined." Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. iog, i67 (i986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). In the dilution context, in contrast, the "discriminatory effect" is felt when certain indi- 
vidual votes are consistently not combined. 
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injury like dilution should be recognized. For example, the subordina- 
tion theory, with its focus on stigma and the disadvantaging of previ- 
ously outcast groups, fits neatly within an aggregate rights framework. 
Both the dilution and subordination theories are concerned with the 
aggregation of disadvantages,322 although the latter's source ("soci- 
ety"323 versus polarized voting in a specific state or subdivision), tim- 
ing ("past discrimination" versus a particular census cycle), and means 
(all political, social, and economic discrimination versus polarized 
voting) are far less discrete. Moreover, group subordination theories 
focus on the relative treatment of groups of individuals; indeed, the 
overarching injury under a subordination theory (stigma, or the rein- 
forcement of second-class citizenship) is premised on inequities in 
group status and the harms to individuals that arise from such inequi- 
ties.324 And, as with aggregate rights, the harm of subordination is 
unindividuated among members of the group; when a particular group 
is excluded from participation in political and community life, every 
individual member of that group is arguably injured by that exclu- 
sion.325 
Interestingly, the "expressive harm" doctrine, which the Court has 
apparently discarded as an explanation for the Shaw injury but could 
revive in the future,326 shares the traits of an aggregate right. The 
harm at issue can be measured only by examining relative group 
treatment - whether the lines of a bizarrely shaped district divide 
members of different racial groups into separate districts. In addition, 
the right rises and falls with the treatment of members of a group. If 
the aggregate result of the state's many line-drawing decisions is to di- 
vide racial groups, then everyone in the challenged district can claim 
an expressive harm; if not, no individual can claim any harm. Finally, 
the injury is unindividuated, for all citizens are harmed by a district 
that suggests that the state has privileged racial considerations over all 
322 Strauss, supra note 66, at 94I; see also Neal Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is 
Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REV. I, 40, 44-45, 50 (i99I); Karst, supra note 303, at 48-49. 
323 See Colker, supra note 247, at ioo8-o9 (explaining that subordination theory focuses on dis- 
crimination by society as a whole, not just discrimination by a particular actor). 
324 Id. at ioog; Strauss, supra note 66, at 941-43, 95I. Thus, like an aggregate right, a group 
subordination theory rises and falls with the status of the group. See Fiss, supra note I48, at I48. 
In the absence of such inequities between racial groups, no individual could claim an injury. See 
Fiss, supra note 148, at 148-49, I54-55; Sunstein, supra note 303, at 2443 (declining to apply the 
anticaste principle to Asian-Americans). 
325 See Smith v. City of Cleveland, 760 F.2d 720, 722 (6th Cir. I985); Fiss, supra note 148, at 
148-49 ("That is why the free blacks of the antebellum period - the Dred Scotts - were not 
really free, and could never be so long as the institution of ... slavery still existed."); cf. Strauss, 
supra note 125, at 2I ("A person might be subject to the effects of past discrimination even if he 
himself has never been the victim of a specific act of discrimination."). 
326 Cf. supra note 6 (noting that the Shaw majority has not offered a consistent rationale for the 
doctrine); pp. I992-94. 
I 740 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. II4:i663 
others.327 And even if the Court does not return to the expressive- 
harm doctrine in voting cases, that injury resembles the harm articu- 
lated in Establishment Clause cases, particularly those authored by 
Justice O'Connor.328 
Constitutional injuries are not the only harms that fit within an ag- 
gregate rights framework. In the torts context, for example, some 
scholars have begun to develop theories that mass torts differ from 
traditional torts in that "no coherent individualized relationship exists 
. . . between 'wrong' and 'harm,"' thus necessitating a new framework 
for adjudicating these claims that takes group interests into account.329 
Finally, rejection of an aggregate rights approach may hold serious 
consequences for democratic theory. In most of the contexts described 
above, the rejection of an aggregate harm would not necessarily call 
into question the fundamental principles undergirding that body of 
law. For example, one could presumably reject a cause of action for 
disparate impact claims under Title VII without abandoning the con- 
cept of employment discrimination itself. 
In the context of voting, however, the rejection of an aggregate 
rights framework might sweep more broadly than the Court antici- 
pates by casting doubt on some of the fundamental premises of repre- 
sentative democracy outlined in Part I. That is because, as noted 
above, the theory of representative democracy is built around the con- 
cept of vote aggregation. As Justice Stewart observed, "[r]epresen- 
tative government is a process of accommodating group interests 
through democratic institutional arrangements. Its function is to 
channel the numerous opinions, interests, and abilities of the people of 
a State into the making of the State's public policy."330 For example, 
rejection of aggregate harms may call into question the notion that one 
individual can represent a group331 or that the aggregation of prefer- 
ences is an appropriate way to represent individuals with diverse in- 
terests.332 We also might be less willing to trust a majoritarian system 
that depends on vote aggregation if we cannot correct districting deci- 
327 See supra p. I692. 
328 E.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 5I5 U.S. 753, 774, 776-79 (I995) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (focusing on the "message" 
conveyed by a religious display to the reasonable observer). 
329 See David Rosenberg, Collectivized Adjudication of Mass Tort Cases 8 (August 9, 2000) 
(memorandum to the Harvard Law School Faculty, on file with the Harvard Law School Li- 
brary); see also David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public 
Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (i984); David Rosenberg, Individual Jus- 
tice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases, 7 I N.Y.U. L. REV. 2 IO (I996). 
330 Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 749 (I964) (Stewart, J., dis- 
senting). 
331 Professor Guinier terms this principle "synecdoche." Guinier, supra note 47, at 5. 
332 See supra pp. i678-79. 
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sions that skew the aggregation process in favor of members of the 
dominant racial group. 
A highly individualist account of voting rights would also push us 
toward a very narrow conception of democracy. If only individual 
harms matter, there will be little work for democratic theory to do in 
determining what should occur after votes are placed in the ballot box. 
To use Professor Karlan's shorthand, to the extent that voting involves 
"participation," "aggregation," and "governance,"333 only participatory 
rights will be protected under a purely individualistic constitutional 
scheme. Aggregation and governance cannot be understood without 
taking groups into account.334 Further, to the extent that aggregate 
rights are designed to protect structural concerns - such as accommo- 
dating minority interests in a majoritarian system or fostering partisan 
competition - there will be less room to address such concerns in the 
context of our current individual rights-based system.335 
As these examples demonstrate, the consequences of rejecting an 
aggregate rights framework in the context of vote dilution might mat- 
ter to us for two distinct reasons. A pure instrumentalist might be re- 
luctant to reject aggregate rights because such a decision would pre- 
vent the courts and Congress from remedying an entire category of 
serious harms, especially those that have been perpetrated against ra- 
333 Karlan, supra note 320, at I708. 
334 See Guinier, [E]racing Democracy, supra note 46, at I26-28 (explaining that groups become 
increasingly relevant as one moves from rights designed to guarantee equal access to the polls to 
rights intended to equalize legislative influence); Reed, supra note 46, at 4I8 (making a similar 
prediction about the future of the Court's voting-rights jurisprudence based on its standing rul- 
ings); see also James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community and the Constitutional Structure of Politi- 
cal Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, I45 U. PA. L. REV. 893, 899, 983 (I997) (ar- 
guing that the Court has historically been less receptive to certain types of voting claims). 
Another way of looking at this problem is to consider what Jonathan Still terms the six ba- 
sic "criteria for political equality." See Jonathan W. Still, Political Equality and Election Systems, 
9I ETHICS 375, 377-385 (I98i). A highly individualistic account of voting would address only 
two of these problems: the question of "universal suffrage," which ensures that everyone is able to 
vote, and "equal shares," which roughly resembles the one-person, one-vote principle. Id. at 378- 
8o. But we certainly could not consider the question of "Equal Probabilities," id. at 38o-82 
that is, that every voter has the same chance of affecting election outcomes (the problem with 
which dilution doctrine is concerned) - or any of the other three conceptions of equality that fur- 
ther depart from an individualist approach. These include the principle of "Anonymity," which 
means that the results of the election would be the same if every voter cast her vote for her pre- 
ferred candidate's opponent; "Majority Rule," which means that the results of the election repre- 
sent the preference of the majority; and "Proportional Group Representation," which means that 
each group of voters receives a share of legislative seats that is proportional to its voting power 
within the electorate. Id. at 382-85. We could not address these criteria because each would re- 
quire us to look at what happens to the democratic process after every voter has gained access to 
the ballot, a stage in which groups become most relevant. 
335 For a powerful argument in favor of thinking about democracy in structural terms, see 
Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic 
Process, 50 STAN.-L. REV. 643 (i998). 
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cial minorities. But the fact that, at least until recently, aggregate 
rights have peacefully coexisted with conventional individual rights 
might give us pause for a different reason. It suggests that our juris- 
prudential system can encompass a more robust and flexible concep- 
tion of individual rights than the Court's most recent equal protection 
jurisprudence might indicate. 
Although the last issue must be saved for another day, here is a 
broad sketch of what a response might look like: We might be willing 
to define individual rights broadly enough to make room for a right 
with group-based aspects that stem not from the identity of the right- 
holder - groups versus individuals - but from the unique nature of 
the underlying injury. On this view, we can fit aggregate rights, which 
seem to blend both individual and group characteristics, into an indi- 
vidual rights scheme (broadly defined) as long as the group-based as- 
pects of these rights stem entirely from the causal relationship between 
individual and group treatment. In short, as long as the underlying 
harm is an individual harm, it does not matter that we measure it by 
examining the treatment of other group members. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article represents the first step toward developing a concep- 
tual framework to understand vote dilution and the many other aggre- 
gate harms that pervade our jurisprudence. It provides a roadmap for 
identifying aggregate harms and adapting those doctrinal structures 
that have been built around conventional individual rights to the spe- 
cial nature of the injury in question. 
If the absence of a conceptual framework for understanding dilu- 
tion claims is the only explanation for the Court's ruling in Shaw II, 
then adoption of this approach will serve the limited but salutary pur- 
pose of correcting that mistake - with the practical result that states 
will be much less constrained in their efforts to augment minority 
voting strength. The framework proposed here will similarly help 
other courts avoid the mistake made in Shaw II - trying to squeeze 
aggregate rights into a conventional, individual rights framework 
and thus prevent incoherent results in other areas of the law. 
The framework proposed here also suggests, however, that a larger 
constitutional battle may be looming in our future. It confirms the 
Court's intuition that there is something different about aggregate 
rights - that they fall further down the individual/group rights con- 
tinuum than the highly individualistic, profoundly antiessentialist con- 
ception of harm recently put forward by the Court. Additionally, it 
suggests that these group-like qualities cannot be eliminated through 
doctrinal adjustments because they go to the essence of the injury in 
question. In short, if we are going to recognize an aggregate harm like 
dilution, we must take into account its group-like qualities. 
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If the Court refuses to do so, it is not only ? 2 that will fall. Many 
claims, particularly civil rights claims, will be in constitutional jeop- 
ardy. And a rejection of dilution claims because of their group-like 
qualities might even cast doubt on some of the basic assumptions be- 
hind our representative democracy. The only questions that remain 
are whether - and when - the Court will address these issues di- 
rectly. 
